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THE SHAREHOLDERS’ APPRAISAL REMEDY
AND HOW COURTS DETERMINE FAIR VALUE
BARRY M. WERTHEIMER†
Corporations created under modern corporation statutes are
democratic organizations, subject to majority rule. As a result, minority shareholders are vulnerable to abuse at the hands of the majority.1 For example, majority shareholders may take actions that
have the short-term effect of depressing the price of a corporation’s
stock, in order to acquire the minority’s interest in the corporation at
an artificially low price.
Minority shareholders are granted limited statutory rights as a
check against rampant majority rule. One such right is the ability of
shareholders to dissent from certain corporate actions, primarily
mergers and other fundamental corporate changes,2 and to receive
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for their valuable research assistance, and James D. Cox, Deborah A. DeMott, Robert W.
Hamilton, Donald C. Langevoort, and John C. Weistart for their useful comments on an earlier
draft of this Article.
1. Corporate law, unlike partnership law, does not permit an equity owner to dissolve the
entity at will. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801(1) (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §
31(1)(b) (1914) (superceded 1994). The combination of majority rule and lack of liquidity
makes minority shareholders in a closely-held corporation particularly vulnerable. The plight
of minority shareholders in closely-held corporations has been well documented. See generally
F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985).
2. Under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA or Model Act), the following
events trigger the availability of the appraisal remedy: 1) consummation of a plan of merger; 2)
consummation of a plan of share exchange; 3) consummation of a sale or exchange of all, or
substantially all, of the property of the corporation outside of the usual and regular course of
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the appraised fair value of their shares.3 This is sometimes known as
the dissent and appraisal remedy, dissenters’ rights, or, simply, the
appraisal remedy.4 Every state corporate statute contains at least
some form of appraisal remedy,5 yet the proper role the appraisal
remedy should play in corporate law remains elusive.
The efficacy of the appraisal remedy, as well as the purpose it
serves, has been much debated.6 The origin of the appraisal remedy
typically is tied to the move in corporate law to majority approval of
fundamental corporate changes, and away from a requirement of
unanimous shareholder consent. When unanimous approval was no
longer required, and shareholders effectively lost their individual
right to veto corporate changes, the appraisal remedy was provided
business; and 4) certain amendments to the corporation’s articles of incorporation. See MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (1991). Nineteen states have statutes that closely follow the Model
Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. introduction at xli (Supp. 1996). Under Delaware law,
only merger or consolidation transactions give rise to appraisal rights. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262 (1991 & Supp. 1996). Virtually all states agree that mergers and consolidations
should give rise to appraisal rights. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 statutory comparison 1.a. Outside of those two areas, however, state corporation statutes fail to agree on the
events that should trigger appraisal rights. See id. § 13.02 statutory comparison 1.b.-f.
3. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a). Minority
shareholders also are protected by doctrines that are largely derived from common law, particularly the fiduciary duties that apply to directors. See 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 1,
§ 7.02, at 5.
4. Under most corporate statutes, it is no longer necessary to actually vote against the
action taken; rather, it is sufficient if the shareholder electing the appraisal remedy abstains
from voting on the proposed action. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.21(a)(2) & cmt.; see
also Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 79, 133 & n.252 (1995) (noting that only the state of Louisiana requires a shareholder to actually dissent to be eligible for an appraisal remedy).
5. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 statutory comparison 1(a) (noting that all
jurisdictions grant an appraisal remedy in at least some merger situations); 2 AMERICAN LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 292
(1994) [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES] (stating that every American state has some form of appraisal remedy); see also Don S. Clardy, Comment, Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock Under the
Appraisal Remedy—Is the Delaware Block Method Right for Tennessee?, 62 TENN. L. REV.
285, 285 & n.3 (1995) (citing the appraisal remedy statutes for all fifty states and for the District
of Columbia).
6. For a sampling of the debate, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 69-84 (1976); Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in
Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 875-84; Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The
Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985); Bayless
Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223,
226-62 (1962); Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
829, 829-64 (1984); Siegel, supra note 4, at 82-86, 93-111; Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity,
and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-5, 9-42 (1995); Barry
M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy, 65 TENN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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to them in return. Thus, the historical explanation for the existence
of the appraisal remedy is as a quid pro quo for the loss of shareholders’ right to veto fundamental corporate changes.7
The companion historical purpose ascribed to the appraisal remedy is a liquidity function.8 In the absence of an appraisal remedy, a
shareholder opposed to a fundamental corporate change could nonetheless be forced, by majority approval of the other shareholders, to
remain an investor in an enterprise that no longer resembled the
original investment made by that shareholder. The appraisal remedy
provides liquidity to a shareholder and a “way out” of an involuntarily altered investment.
The nature of fundamental corporate transactions has changed,
however, and the appraisal remedy now serves different purposes.9
Majority rule of corporations is the established norm; providing an
appraisal remedy to compensate shareholders for their loss of a veto
right may provide an historical explanation for the appraisal remedy,
but it lacks explanatory power for the remedy’s continued existence.
Similarly, very few current appraisal cases evidence the historic liquidity function of the appraisal remedy.10 On the other hand, in
most jurisdictions it now is possible to engage in a fundamental
transaction for the sole purpose of “cashing out” or eliminating minority shareholders.11 As a result, the focus of the appraisal remedy
has shifted. Most of the current appraisal litigation involves cash-out
mergers, often instituted by a controlling shareholder.12 The ap-

7. See Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683, 687 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 8.
8. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 18; Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 10.
9. For a complete discussion of the purposes now served by the appraisal remedy and
how those purposes have changed over time, see generally Wertheimer, supra note 6. For the
most part, of course, appraisal statutes read much as they did when they were first enacted.
The different context in which most appraisal proceedings arise today, however, indicates that
the remedy is now performing a different function than it did at an earlier time. See id.
10. See id. at 28-29.
11. For a discussion of the evolution of the “cash-out” merger, see generally Elliott J.
Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1981).
Professor Weiss labels this type of merger a “take out merger.” See id. at 625; see also
Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that the number of cash-out mergers for the sole purpose of eliminating minority shareholders began to increase in the 1970s, spurred by low stock
prices and more permissive corporate statutes and interpretations of those statutes).
12. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 4. Indeed, Professor Thompson has concluded that 8090% of recent appraisal litigation involves a cash-out merger. See id. at 25-28; see also
Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 22 (observing increase in incidence of cash-out mergers to eliminate minority shareholders instigated by controlling shareholders).
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praisal remedy today serves a minority shareholder protection role,
sometimes providing liquidity to shareholders, but most often operating to protect minority shareholders who are cashed out of their investment. The remedy fulfills this function ex ante, deterring insiders
from engaging in wrongful transactions,13 and ex post, providing a
remedy to minority shareholders who are subjected to such transactions.14
Although the appraisal remedy has been available for quite
some time, it has only recently seen much use.15 There are several
explanations for the recent upsurge in appraisal litigation,16 but the
changes brought about by the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark
opinion in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.17 surely account for some, if not
much, of this increased activity.18 Weinberger apparently was intended to revamp the appraisal remedy so that shareholder challenges to merger transactions would be efficiently resolved in an appraisal proceeding, rather than some other form of legal challenge to
the transaction.19 Toward that end, the court in Weinberger did three
13. See Fischel, supra note 6, at 878-81; Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 24-27.
14. See Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 24-27. Additionally, it has been noted that the appraisal remedy serves a “discovery” function, providing a mechanism for shareholders to uncover wrongful behavior. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 6, at 443-44, 455-57, 463-65, 473
(discussing the discovery function of the appraisal remedy); Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 13-15,
38-39 (same).
15. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 75 (noting that Ohio had enacted “rudimentary”
appraisal statutes as early as 1851-52); Thompson, supra note 6, at 14-15 (noting that the first
appraisal statutes appeared in the late nineteenth century, but did not become ubiquitous until
the second half of the twentieth century); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
18. Most state statutes, including those based on the Model Business Corporation Act, do
not provide much guidance to courts with respect to how to determine fair value in an appraisal
proceeding. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. Among the states, Delaware has
generated the largest body of case law with respect to the determination of fair value. Moreover, because Delaware is the preferred state of incorporation for a disproportionate number of
U.S. corporations, see 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER
DEFENSE § 4.01 (5th ed. 1997) (noting that over half of America’s largest public corporations
are incorporated in Delaware), the decisions of Delaware state courts on matters of corporate
law, in general, and appraisal litigation, in particular, are very influential nationwide. Accordingly, this Article focuses largely on Delaware case law interpreting the appraisal remedy.
19. The most common way to object to a merger transaction, outside of an appraisal proceeding, is to allege that the officers, directors, or shareholders of the corporation breached a
fiduciary duty in approving or recommending the transaction. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (alleging directors breached fiduciary duty by failing to exercise due care in approving cash-out merger). A shareholder making such an allegation might
seek injunctive relief, thus preventing the merger from going forward, see, e.g., Sealy Mattress
Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Del. Ch. 1987), or damages, see, e.g., Cede & Co. v.
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things. First, it eliminated the ability of shareholders to challenge a
merger on the ground that it was not undertaken for a valid business
purpose.20 Second, the court stated that the appraisal remedy should
ordinarily be the exclusive remedy available to a shareholder objecting to a merger.21 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in order to
make this now generally exclusive appraisal remedy workable and
fair, the court abandoned the inflexible “Delaware block” method of
valuation as the exclusive means of establishing fair value.22 Instead,
courts were directed to take a “more liberal approach [that] must include proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise
admissible in court.”23
In order for the appraisal remedy to fulfill its current purpose of
protecting minority shareholders, most often in connection with cashout mergers, it must be administered in a manner consistent with that
purpose. The changes adopted in Weinberger have advanced this
goal, but there are problems with the appraisal remedy that must be
solved if it is to be fully effective. This will require amendments to
existing appraisal statutes, accompanied by changes in the way that
courts determine the fair value of shares in appraisal proceedings.
Specifically, appraisal statutes should be amended to insure that
they apply to the various forms in which it is possible to structure a
fundamental corporate transaction. Statutory exclusions from the
Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171, at *2-3 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d, 684
A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
20. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. In 1977, the Delaware Supreme Court had concluded that a majority shareholder could not “cause a merger to be made for the sole purpose
of eliminating a minority on a cash-out basis.” Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 978-79
(Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); cf. Tanzer v. International General Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-25 (Del. 1977) (holding that a parent corporation can engage in a cash-out merger of a subsidiary corporation, if the real purpose of the
transaction is not to “rid itself of unwanted minority shareholders in the subsidiary,” and the
transaction satisfies the “entire fairness” test), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983).
21. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. The court noted that the appraisal remedy may not
be adequate in some instances, particularly situations involving “fraud, misrepresentation, selfdealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching,” and left
open the possibility that litigants may not be limited to the appraisal remedy in those circumstances. Id.; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b) (1991) (making the appraisal remedy
the exclusive means of challenging corporate action creating an entitlement to appraisal unless
such action is unlawful or fraudulent).
22. See infra note 66 and accompanying text for a brief description of the Delaware block
method.
23. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13.
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applicability of the appraisal remedy, particularly exclusions in some
states that render the remedy inapplicable to publicly traded corporations, should be eliminated. The statutory procedures governing appraisal proceedings should be made less onerous and more clear.
It is particularly important that courts determining fair value in
appraisal proceedings be aware of the purposes now served by the
remedy. Courts should be willing to entertain all relevant evidence
bearing on the fair value of the corporation. They should not place
undue reliance on market prices, and should not permit minority or
“lack of marketability” discounts. If a corporation’s value is derived
by reference to a per share market price, the value should be adjusted
upward to remove the inherent minority discount embodied in market prices. When available, evidence as to the price an unaffiliated
third party would be willing to pay for the corporation as a whole
should be particularly probative in the appraisal context. Finally,
courts must be aware of the equitable context in which the appraisal
proceeding has arisen, and be especially vigilant when dealing with
conflict of interest transactions.
Part I of this Article will briefly recount the history of the appraisal remedy, and explain the increased frequency of its use in response to changes in law and finance. Part II will examine how
courts determine fair value in appraisal proceedings, focusing on several recurrent problems that arise in such proceedings. Finally, Part
III will propose changes in the statutory provisions governing the appraisal remedy and in the way courts handle appraisal litigation.
I. HISTORY OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS
A. The Origins of the Appraisal Remedy: A Brief History
The first corporations were created by legislative grants of corporate charters, rather than pursuant to a statutorily created procedure for incorporation.24 By the 1870s, however, corporate statutes
had become widespread.25 Prior to the enactment of such statutes,
the general rule in most states was that a corporation could not
24. See William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 82. These legislatively-granted charters
were typically made available to corporations to carry on businesses that were public in nature
(e.g., mills, bridges, canals, and railroad companies), with the corporation performing a function that might otherwise have been undertaken by the state. See id. at 82-83.
25. See id. at 84.
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merge or consolidate with another corporation without the unanimous consent of its shareholders.26 The courts chipped away at this
general rule in classic common law fashion;27 ultimately, the requirement of unanimous approval was abrogated by statute, so that
“[o]ver the first third of the twentieth century the pattern of allowing
fundamental changes in all corporations to take place on something
less than a unanimous shareholder vote became the norm.”28
The creation of a statutory appraisal remedy accompanied this
departure from the requirement of unanimous action.29 Today, the
statutory norm is to permit fundamental corporate changes to occur
with the approval of the majority,30 and to provide an appraisal remedy to those shareholders that dissent from the merger or fundamental change.31
B. The Rise in the Use of the Appraisal Remedy
Although the statutory appraisal remedy has existed for some
time, until recently the remedy had been infrequently invoked, at

26. See 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
951, at 908 (2d ed. 1886).
27. See Carney, supra note 24, at 86-90. For example, the requirement of unanimous consent was not applied as rigidly to the sale of corporate assets as it was to mergers and consolidations. See id. at 86-87.
28. Id. at 94.
29. See Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547,
548 n.7 (1927) (noting that 20 states had adopted a statutory appraisal remedy by 1927); see
also supra note 7 and accompanying text. The adoption of appraisal statutes may have lagged
somewhat behind the adoption of statutes permitting merger by less than unanimous shareholder approval. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 14-15. Even before the enactment of appraisal statutes, courts sometimes refused to enjoin a merger or consolidation that lacked
unanimous consent, instead concluding that the proper remedy should be the payment to the
objecting shareholder of a pro rata share of the corporation’s value. See Carney, supra note 24,
at 93-94.
30. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 11.03(e), 12.02(e) (1991) (requiring only majority approval for merger and sale of assets). Although majority approval is the norm, some jurisdictions require the approval of certain transactions by a supermajority vote. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 78(c)(1)(iii) (1992) (requiring a two-thirds vote to approve a merger or
consolidation); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(E) (Michie 1993) (same). In addition, most corporate statutes allow the parties to deviate from the statutory approval requirements (e.g., requiring something greater than majority approval), if such a provision is included in the corporation’s articles of incorporation. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 11.03(e), 12.02(e)
(allowing corporations to require, in the articles of incorporation, greater than majority vote to
approve mergers and sales of assets).
31. See supra note 5.
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least as measured by reported legal decisions.32 Although the number
of reported decisions undoubtedly understates the actual use of the
appraisal remedy,33 it seems clear that the remedy has not been invoked with great frequency. There are many explanations for its infrequent use in the past, and also for its increased use in recent years.
Transactions triggering an appraisal right were much less common during most of the lifetime of the appraisal remedy than they
have become in the last twenty to thirty years. Dramatic changes
have occurred in the capital markets since the advent of the appraisal
remedy, and merger activity is far more common today than it was at
an earlier time.34
At the onset of this exponential increase in capital market activity, unhappy shareholders sometimes looked to the federal securities
laws as a means of challenging acquisition transactions.35 At one
point it looked as if the law of mergers and acquisitions was becoming “federalized.” Shareholders, or their lawyers, perceived signifi-

32. See Seligman, supra note 6, at 829 & n.3 (noting that between 1972 and 1981 there
were roughly 20 reported state court decisions involving an appraisal valuation even though
there were over 16,000 mergers of U.S. concerns).
33. Many appraisal proceedings are settled prior to trial or otherwise do not generate reported decisions. See id. at 830. Some state appraisal statutes permit the trial court to appoint
an appraiser to fix fair value in the first instance. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92A.490(4)
(Michie Supp. 1997) (authorizing trial court to appoint appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a decision as to fair value). When this is done, decisions are generally not reported
unless the case reaches the appellate level. See Seligman, supra note 6, at 830.
Furthermore, in many transactions that might otherwise give rise to an appraisal remedy,
the acquiring party pays a price greatly in excess of the pre-transaction market price. To the
extent the acquiring party pays a substantial premium over market price, the likelihood that a
dissatisfied shareholder will seek to litigate over the acquisition price is diminished. See id.; see
also Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 598 (1989)
(noting that takeover premiums averaged 50% in the 1980s); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover
Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235,
1259 (1990) (stating that target company shareholders receive, on average, 50% more than the
prevailing price in a takeover or merger transaction).
34. Acquisition activity accelerated with the rising stock market of the 1960s, and the attendant conglomerate merger wave. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON,
BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN’S CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 652-54 (4th
ed. 1993). The bear market and recession of the 1970s slowed this process, but the 1980s
brought a booming stock market, leveraged acquisition transactions financed with junk bonds,
and the acceptance of hostile takeovers as an acquisition technique. See id. Merger activity
continues today at very high levels. See Steven Lipin, Gorillas in Our Midst: Megadeals Smash
Records as Firms Take Advantage of Favorable Climate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1997, at R8
(“Merger-and-acquisition activity in 1996 smashed records . . . .”).
35. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464-67 (1977) (noting that a federal securities law claim was used instead of a state law appraisal remedy to challenge the fairness of a cash-out merger transaction).
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cant advantages to a federal forum, and increasingly brought federal
securities law claims, rather than appraisal or other state court proceedings, to challenge acquisition transactions.36 Since the mid-1970s,
however, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to allow the
federal securities laws to substitute for state corporate law in the absence of a federal disclosure violation.37 As federal securities law
remedies became less available, shareholders more often turned to
state court remedies, including the appraisal remedy.
Despite the increase in capital market activity noted above,
statutory limitations on the availability of the appraisal remedy continue to inhibit its more frequent use. The appraisal remedy is available only when a statutory triggering event occurs, and different
states have adopted different triggering events. Although the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA or Model Act) is drafted fairly
broadly to grant an appraisal remedy in the event of a merger transaction, a sale of assets transaction, a share exchange, and certain
amendments to a corporation’s certificate of incorporation,38 states
that do not follow the Model Act often have more limited statutory
triggering events. In Delaware, for example, appraisal rights arise
only in the event of a merger or consolidation.39 A transaction that is
substantively equivalent to a merger or consolidation—for example,
a sale of all of a corporation’s assets—does not trigger appraisal

36. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 50 (“Rule 10b-5 for a short time became a vehicle to
attack unfair use of majority power in squeeze-out situations when state law was viewed as ineffective.”).
37. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1985) (holding that there is no
federal securities law remedy in connection with tender offer absent misrepresentation or nondisclosure); Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 474, 479 (holding that as long as the transaction “was
neither deceptive nor manipulative” then there was no violation of federal law because “we
[the Court] are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities”); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S.
69, 86-87 (1987) (finding that federal law does not preempt an Indiana statute making takeovers more difficult). The Supreme Court’s attempt to narrow the role played by federal securities law in the acquisition context has not, however, been wholly successful. Litigants have, at
times, managed to avoid the holdings of the Supreme Court and assert federal securities law
challenges to acquisition transactions. See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700,
705-10 (6th Cir. 1992) (allowing federal securities claim to be brought where allegedly faulty
going private disclosure may have affected minority shareholders’ decision not to seek appraisal in connection with a cash-out merger); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 220-21 (2d
Cir. 1977) (allowing federal securities claim to be brought where allegedly deceptive disclosures lulled minority shareholders into not seeking injunctive relief under state law).
38. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (1991).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
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rights under Delaware law. Undoubtedly, parties have used this
“flexibility” to try to avoid triggering appraisal rights.40
Many states also have adopted statutory exceptions that withhold appraisal rights in transactions that would ordinarily give rise to
such rights. The most common of these is the market exception,
which makes appraisal rights unavailable to shareholders of a corporation whose stock is traded on an active market.41 This type of statutory provision, which is still relatively common,42 further reduces the
number of appraisal cases.
Another explanation for the unpopularity of the appraisal remedy lies in the procedural requirements of the remedy itself. This was
particularly true before the adoptions of the 1978 amendments to the
MBCA (and the subsequent enactment of those amendments by
states whose statutes are based on the Model Act); this problem continues today, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent. For example, shareholders are required to comply with several notice provisions in order
to assert the right to an appraisal.43 Failure to comply strictly with
these provisions leads to a loss of the remedy.44
In addition, under the pre-1978 version of the MBCA,45 and in
Delaware46 and some other non-Model Act states today,47 a shareholder who seeks appraisal following a triggering transaction receives
no payment from the corporation until the fair value of his stock is
determined in an appraisal proceeding, often years after the occur-

40. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 182 A.2d 22, 25-26 (Del. Ch. 1962) (holding that
a transaction structured as an arm’s-length sale of assets was not a de facto merger triggering
appraisal rights), aff’d, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963); cf. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25,
29-30 (Pa. 1958) (recharacterizing a transaction structured as a purchase of assets as a de facto
merger).
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23102(c) (1995).
42. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
44. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.21(b), 13.23(c), 13.28(b) (1991); see also, e.g., Pritchard v. Mead, 455 N.W.2d 263, 266-67 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming lower court’s entering
of summary judgment against shareholder who failed to comply with procedural requirements
of appraisal remedy). But cf. In re Fair Value of Shares of Bank of Ripley, 399 S.E.2d 678, 68284 & n.11 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that failure to timely tender share certificates does not bar
dissenters’ rights if delay is insubstantial and not prejudicial).
45. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.25 historical background (Supp. 1996) (“The
requirement that the corporation pay the dissenter its estimate of the fair value of his shares
when the proposed corporate action is effectuated was an innovation of the 1978 revision.”).
46. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)-(i) (1991).
47. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(B) (Anderson 1994).
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rence of the triggering event.48 This creates an incentive for defendants in such suits to delay as much as possible.49 In contrast, nondissenting shareholders receive the merger consideration as soon as
the merger takes place.50
The cost of pursuing the appraisal remedy also inhibits its widespread use. Dissenting shareholders typically bear the cost of hiring
their own experts and attorneys.51 The cost of the appraisal proceeding, balanced against the likely gains and the uncertainty involved, no doubt causes many shareholders to think twice about pursuing an appraisal remedy. Certainly for any small shareholder, the
costs would often seem to outweigh the likely benefits.52
The current version of the MBCA has eliminated some of the
procedural disadvantages of the prior version. Under the current
version, shareholders are entitled to receive payment, very early in
the process,53 of the amount the corporation deems to be the fair

48. For example, the transaction triggering appraisal rights involving Technicolor took
place in early 1983, see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1185 (Del. 1988), and
remains unresolved today. See infra note 403. The less complicated appraisal litigation involving Pabst Brewing continued for ten years. See infra note 326.
49. One court has fashioned a judicial solution to this problem by granting the shareholder
partial summary judgment, limited to the amount the corporation claimed the shares were
worth. See Hunter v. Vercellotti, 649 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). The shareholder, of
course, claimed the shares were worth more than that amount, see id. at 558, but by granting
partial summary judgment, the court required the corporation to pay the undisputed amount
immediately, while the parties continued to dispute the fair value of the stock. See id. at 560.
Although there was no direct statutory authority to, in effect, order an interim payment by the
corporation, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had the authority to order this
type of relief. See id.
50. These shareholders may still be able to bring a non-appraisal challenge to the transaction if they can avoid the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy. See supra note 21.
51. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(b)(2) (1991) (giving courts discretion to
shift attorney and expert fees to either party if such party “acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not
in good faith”).
52. See 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, ch. 4, reporter’s note 3. There are numerous
economic incentives for shareholders to challenge acquisition transactions in class action lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty, rather than in appraisal proceedings. See Siegel, supra
note 4, at 102-04. The Reporter’s Note to the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance states that the chapter on the appraisal remedy does not seek to model the
remedy after the class action, preferring instead to accept the prevailing “opt in” approach to
the appraisal remedy, requiring an affirmative act by a shareholder to assert appraisal rights.
See 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, ch. 4, reporter’s note 6. The ALI Principles do propose a
useful mechanism allowing dissenting shareholders to use common counsel as an efficiency
measure. See id. § 7.23(f).
53. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.23, 13.25(a). The payment must be made at the
time the corporate action giving rise to the appraisal right is taken, for example, at the time a
merger is effective. See id. § 13.25(a). “Section 13.25 changes the relative balance between
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value of the shares.54 If the shareholder does not agree with that
valuation, a process is provided to resolve that dispute, culminating in
judicial appraisal if necessary;55 while this process is ongoing, the
shareholder has not been completely deprived of all payment for his
shares. The MBCA also directs the court to assess the costs of the
appraisal proceeding, including the costs associated with a court appointed appraiser, against the corporation.56 Each party still typically
bears its own legal expenses and expert witness fees. 57
Despite the MBCA’s improved procedures for exercising appraisal rights, difficulties remain. A shareholder who wishes to exercise appraisal rights must first give written notice of his intent to dissent prior to the meeting at which the matter giving rise to appraisal
rights (e.g., a merger) will be voted upon.58 The shareholder must not
vote in favor of the action.59 If the action is approved, the shareholder must then timely demand payment for his shares and deposit
his share certificates with the corporation.60 The corporation must
then pay the shareholder the fair value of the shares.61 If the shareholder does not agree with the corporation’s determination of value,
the shareholder is then required to notify the corporation of his estimate of fair value and demand payment from the corporation.62 If
the corporation disagrees with the shareholder’s estimate, it must initiate a judicial appraisal proceeding.63 Any failure by a shareholder

corporation and dissenting shareholders by requiring immediate payment by the corporation
upon the completion of the transaction or (if the transaction did not need shareholder approval
and has been completed) upon receipt of the demand for payment.” Id. § 13.25 official cmt.
54. See id. § 13.25(a). The opportunity to receive this early payment is only guaranteed to
shareholders who owned their stock at the time the transaction giving rise to appraisal rights
was announced. See id. § 13.27(a). Shareholders who purchase their stock after a transaction is
announced are not assured that they will receive payment until the appraisal process is completed. See id. (giving corporations the option of withholding the early payment from such
shareholders).
55. See id. § 13.30.
56. See id. § 13.31(a).
57. See id. § 13.31(b). This provision does give the court the authority to engage in fee
shifting in favor of one party or the other if there is a failure to comply with the statutory provisions or if one party acts in bad faith, but the usual rule is that unless the court orders otherwise, each party bears its own legal and expert costs.
58. See id. § 13.21(a).
59. See id.
60. See id. § 13.23(a).
61. See id. § 13.25(a).
62. See id. § 13.28(a).
63. See id. § 13.30.
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to clear these procedural hurdles in a timely way results in a loss of
the appraisal remedy.64
If a shareholder successfully surmounts the procedural hurdles
and obtains an appraisal remedy, is that shareholder likely to get a
positive result in the appraisal process? The answer, prior to Wein65
berger, was generally “no.” This answer powerfully explains the
relative dearth of pre-1983 appraisal proceedings.
Before Weinberger, appraisal proceeding valuations were typically conducted pursuant to the Delaware block method, which utilizes a weighted average of three separate valuations, one based on
asset value, one based on earnings value, and one based on market
value.66 This mechanical approach to appraisal was not very hospitable to the claims of dissenting shareholders,67 and did not accord with
current financial methods of valuation.68 As a result, the court in
64. See id. §§ 13.21(b), 13.23(c), 13.28(b).
65. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. At least some courts relied heavily on
market price in determining fair value in appraisal proceedings, thereby diminishing the utility
of the remedy to dissenting shareholders. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
66. To calculate fair value under the Delaware block method, it is first necessary to value
the corporation based on its asset value, its earnings value, and its market value. Next, each of
these three valuations is accorded a percentage weight. The fair value of the corporation is
deemed to be the weighted average of the three separate valuations. See, e.g., Francis I.
duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348-52 (Del. Ch. 1973)
(determining fair value by Delaware block method), aff’d, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975).
67. See, e.g., Elmer J. Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value and Earnings Value
in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1036-40 (1982) (discussing how
“[t]he weighting method always undervalues corporate stock”); Note, Corporate Law – Chipping Away at the Delaware Block: A Critique of the Delaware Block Approach to the Valuation
of Dissenters’ Shares in Appraisal Proceedings, 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 191, 210-22 (1986)
(discussing weaknesses in the Delaware block approach); cf. Fischel, supra note 6, at 890-93
(criticizing Delaware block method); Seligman, supra note 6, at 854-56 (criticizing the weighting process for being “indefensibly arbitrary and capricious”). The basic concept of a weighted
average disadvantages dissenting shareholders because it assumes the corporation will not be
operated to achieve its highest valuation. For example, if a corporation’s highest value is based
on its asset value, rational owners of the corporation would seek to achieve that value, yet the
Delaware block method averages that value with lesser values. See Schaefer, supra, at 1038-39.
In addition, courts frequently have applied the Delaware block method in rigid fashion, often
to the disadvantage of the dissenting shareholder. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc., 312
A.2d at 347-49 (calculating earnings value based on average earnings over prior five years despite evidence that earnings from most recent year better represented future earnings prospects).
68. For example, the discounted cash flow method of valuation is “considered by experts
to be the preeminent valuation methodology.” Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No.
CIV.A. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (citing SHANNON P. PRATT,
VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES (2d ed.
1989)), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991). Despite its preeminent role in valuation, there was no
place for discounted cash flow analysis under the Delaware block method; its use did not be-
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Weinberger cast aside the block method as the exclusive means of
valuation, opening the process up to all methods of valuation
“generally considered acceptable in the financial community.”69
In sum, although impediments remain to more widespread use of
the appraisal remedy, a number of events have combined to make it a
more commonly used remedy: transactions that give rise to appraisal
rights occur more frequently; federal securities law remedies are
available less frequently; appraisal statutes have been amended to
reduce somewhat the procedural burdens placed on dissenting shareholders; and, perhaps most significantly, Weinberger has fundamentally changed the way in which dissenting shares are appraised. As a
result, the number of reported appraisal decisions has expanded
greatly,70 as has scholarly interest in the appraisal remedy.71
II. HOW COURTS DETERMINE FAIR VALUE
A. Approaches to Valuation
The key to the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy in protecting minority shareholder interests lies in the way in which courts appraise minority shares. If courts do not appraise shares in a manner
consistent with the appraisal remedy’s purpose of protecting minority
shareholders, such shareholders will ignore the appraisal remedy in
favor of other means of challenging fundamental transactions, principally breach of fiduciary duty claims, which may be less efficient and
more time consuming to resolve.
The statutory command in an appraisal proceeding is to find the
“fair value” of the dissenting shares,72 or sometimes the “fair market
come permissible in Delaware until Weinberger discarded the block method as the exclusive
means of valuation. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 259, at *23 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
69. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
70. Thus, although Professor Seligman only found 19 reported appraisal cases in the decade prior to Weinberger, see Seligman, supra note 6, at 829-30 n.3, in the post-Weinberger decade, Professor Thompson found 103 reported appraisal cases, see Thompson, supra note 6, at
25.
71. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 79. Of course, the number of appraisal cases being brought
continues to be limited by statutes that limit the events that trigger appraisal, or provide that
appraisal rights do not apply in the case of securities traded on an active market. In order for
the appraisal remedy to achieve its full utility, these statutory inhibitions must be removed. See
infra notes 476-505 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a)
(Supp. 1996).
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value” or “fair cash value.”73 Fair value is typically defined by statute
as “the value of the shares immediately before the effectuation of the
corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action.”74
Statutes generally provide no further guidance with respect to ascertaining fair value in an appraisal proceeding.75
Before Weinberger, the traditional means of determining fair
value was the Delaware block method of valuation.76 After Weinberger opened up the valuation process to “any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community,”77 the most prominent method of valuation in Delaware has
been the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. This valuation technique operates on the premise that the value of a company is determined by the present value of its projected future cash flows.78 The
DCF method has been described by the Delaware courts as “the preeminent valuation methodology”79 and “[i]n many situations . . .
[theoretically] the single best technique to estimate the value of an
economic asset.”80 As described by the Delaware Court of Chancery:

73. See infra note 213.
74. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3). The Model Act further provides that appreciation or depreciation resulting from the corporate action does not have to be excluded from consideration if it would be fair and equitable to take account of such effects. See id. The Delaware statute directs the court to determine fair value of the dissenting shares “exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation,” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991), and goes on to state that in determining fair
value, “the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.” Id.
75. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01 cmt. (3) (“The definition of ‘fair value’ . . . leaves
to the parties (and ultimately to the courts) the details by which ‘fair value’ is to be determined . . . .”).
76. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of this method. Prior to
Weinberger, the Delaware block method was the exclusive means of appraising shares in Delaware. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 934 n.6 (Del. 1985).
77. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
78. See Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7
(Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991).
79. Id. (citing PRATT, supra note 68).
80. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *23
(Oct. 19, 1990) (stating that DCF technique has “become prominent”), rev’d on other grounds,
684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
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The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation
of net cash flows that the firm will generate and when, over some
period; a terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of
the end of the projection period, of the firm’s cash flows beyond the
projection period; and finally a cost of capital with which to discount
to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the esti81
mated terminal or residual value.

The DCF method, although probably the most prominent and
frequently used post-Weinberger method of appraisal, has not been
the exclusive valuation method employed. The Delaware courts have
continued to use a variety of valuation techniques, depending on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case, including the Delaware
block method,82 valuation based on a comparison to other companies

81. Id. Dean Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., recognizing the importance of the DCF method in
appraisal proceedings (as well as for purposes of fairness opinions, disclosure documents, etc.),
has written a “lawyer’s guide” explaining the nuts and bolts of this valuation technique. See
generally Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in
Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457 (1996).
82. Weinberger did not prohibit use of the Delaware block method, and this method has
continued to be used in Delaware and elsewhere. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493
A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985) (noting that “Weinberger did not abolish the block formula, only its
exclusivity”); Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A.8474, 1996 WL 696936,
at *4-8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996) (noting that Weinberger “did not invalidate the Delaware
Block Method,” and ultimately adopting the valuation calculated by the corporation’s expert
using that method), rev’d on other grounds, 701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997); Elk Yarn Mills v. 514
Shares of Common Stock of Elk Yarn Mills, 742 S.W.2d 638, 640-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)
(applying the Delaware block method); cf. Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130, 135
(Utah 1997) (suggesting that the appraisal valuation should consider each of three measures of
value used in the Delaware block method); Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1126-27
(N.D. Miss. 1985) (considering each of the three Delaware block measures of value, but not
employing a weighted average approach), aff’d, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986).
In fact, it appears that at least one state, Tennessee, may still insist on the exclusive use
of the Delaware block method even after Weinberger. See Blasingame v. American Materials,
Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 668 n.1 (Tenn. 1983) (opinion on petition to rehear) (affirming the court’s
pre-Weinberger decision based on the “weighted average method,” which is essentially the
Delaware block method, and noting that “[w]e do not find anything in Weinberger that causes
us to alter the adoption of the weighted average method”); Elk Yarn Mills, 742 S.W.2d at 640
(“The parties all agree that the correct method for calculating the value of the shares in this
case is the Delaware Block method adopted by our Supreme Court in [Blasingame]”). But cf.
Genesco, Inc. v. Scolaro, 871 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the
Delaware block method is neither required nor prohibited when valuing preferred stock, but
that its use was appropriate in the instant case). Tennessee’s strict adherence to the Delaware
block method is certainly not mandated by statutory language, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-23101(4), 48-23-102(a) (1995), nor does it make sense to prohibit other relevant appraisal evidence as a matter of general policy. See generally Clardy, supra note 5.
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(the “comparable company approach”),83 valuation based on net asset
value,84 valuation based on earnings and book value,85 and valuation
based on combinations of these techniques.86
The valuation technique used by a court is highly dependent on
the valuation evidence presented by the parties. “The parties, not the
court, establish the record and the court is limited by the record created.”87 Thus, if both parties present evidence of fair value utilizing
the DCF method, the court’s resolution of the dispute will likely employ a DCF analysis.88 Similarly, if the parties agree that a net asset
value approach is called for, the court typically will adopt such an approach.89
There are problems endemic to an appraisal proceeding that
cannot be eliminated by the choice of appraisal methodology. Each
appraisal technique is but a way of estimating the “fair value” or
“true value” or “intrinsic value” of a company, and undeniably,
“‘[v]aluation is an art rather than a science.’”90 The valuation
“answer” given by each of these techniques is very dependent on the
assumptions underlying the calculations employed.91 For example,
even though the DCF approach is highly regarded, it relies heavily on
a guess as to the future cash flows of the enterprise. This “guess”
may be informed by looking at historical data, operating trends, and
other relevant factors, but it is still nothing more than a prediction of
future events. Once these future cash flows are predicted, they must
83. See Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 800-01 (Del. 1992); Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., No. CIV.A.11265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *4-5, *10 (Dec. 7, 1992).
84. See Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991) (quasiappraisal proceeding); Campbell v. Caravel Academy, Inc., No. CIV.A.7830, 1988 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 86, at *14-16 (June 16, 1988), aff’d, 553 A.2d 638 (Del. 1988); Robbins & Co. v. Israel,
No. CIV.A.7919, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 498, at *27-30 (Oct. 2, 1985).
85. See Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. CIV.A.7499, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at
*48-50 (Nov. 8, 1989).
86. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. CIV.A.11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *10
(Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (assigning a percentage weight to the DCF model and a percentage
weight to a comparable company approach).
87. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *26
(Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
88. See id. at *4, *23-26.
89. See Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1983), aff’d, 734
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984).
90. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. CIV.A.8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *16
(Dec. 11, 1990) (quoting testimony of expert witness), aff’d, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992).
91. See id. (“While the assumptions had a basis, almost every figure used . . . could have
just as well been a different figure and the selection of the figure to be used necessarily involved a choice or guess by the witness . . . .”).
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be discounted to a present value. What discount rate should be employed? Again, there is much room for guesswork and subjectivity.92
The DCF technique also requires that a terminal value be established
and then discounted to a present value; both are further exercises in
guesswork and subjectivity.93
As a practical matter, this means that both parties to the appraisal proceeding will present expert testimony of valuation. Because of the inherent subjectivity and estimation involved, the parties’ experts can compute dramatically different valuations, even if
they utilize the same methodology.94 Of course, each expert is
“handsomely paid by one side or the other”95 such that, “whether
consciously or unconsciously, the opinions expressed by the expert
witnesses significantly reflect[ ] the desires of their clients.”96 Thus,
the expert retained by the dissenting shareholder invariably concludes that the corporation has a very high fair value, while the cor-

92. Factors courts have looked at to determine the discount rate include the firm’s cost of
equity capital, the risk-free rate of return as reflected in United States treasury bill rates, and
the riskiness of the firm’s business. See, e.g., Technicolor, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *90-93
(using the cost of capital to supply the discount rate); Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No.
CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *20 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (accepting capital asset pricing
model to determine the discount rate), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991).
93. These criticisms are not unique to the DCF method. The Delaware block method and
other valuation techniques are susceptible to similar criticisms. Under the Delaware block
method, it is necessary to determine a company’s asset value on a going concern basis. This
requires estimation and guesswork. Determining earnings value requires the selection of a
price/earnings multiplier, an inherently imprecise and subjective endeavor. After these tasks
are accomplished, and a market value is selected, the various valuation factors must be
weighted. The selection of the appropriate weight to be accorded each type of valuation is almost wholly arbitrary. See Seligman, supra note 6, at 854-56. As a result, huge discrepancies in
the value of companies, as determined by each party’s expert, are common under the Delaware
block method. See Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 346
(Del. Ch. 1973) (illustrating how two parties, each employing the Delaware block method, obtained substantially different values: the plaintiff argued for a per share value of $131.89, while
the defendant argued for a $52.36 per share value), aff’d, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975).
94. For example, differences in future cash flow assumptions can yield very different
valuations under the DCF method. For illustrations of the variance in expert valuations, see
Technicolor, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *4; Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *7-8; Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. CIV.A.7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *32-36, *7072 (Feb. 22, 1988), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989). Sometimes the respective experts use different valuation methodologies, which also can lead to significant variance in their valuation
conclusions.
95. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *16.
96. Id.; see also Salomon Bros., Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., No. CIV.A.10054, 1992
Del. Ch. LEXIS 100, at *20 (May 1, 1992) (“It appeared to me, both from the experts’ reports
and their testimony, that their assumptions and choices of multiples were colored by their respective clients’ interests.”).
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poration’s expert determines that the fair value of the corporation is
much lower. It is not unusual for the opinions of the experts to differ
by a factor of ten.97 It is, therefore, not surprising that courts have
evidenced frustration with this process.98
B. The Role of Market Price in Valuation
The proper role, if any, to be accorded market price in an appraisal proceeding has long been controversial. Dean Manning noted
in his 1962 article that courts have virtually refused to extend the appraisal inquiry beyond market price, so that shareholders realized no
benefit by using the appraisal remedy for actively traded stock;
shareholders were better off just selling in the market.99 There are
97. See, e.g., Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., No. CIV.A.11265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252,
at *7, *9 (Dec. 7, 1992) (involving expert opinions ranging from $68 per share to $896.37 per
share); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. CIV.A.7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS
28, at *34, *54 (Feb. 22, 1988), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (involving expert opinions
ranging from $44.45 per share to $676.80 per share); see also infra Appendix.
98. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. CIV.A.11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *5
(Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (noting the “adversarial hyperbole that inevitably influences an expert’s opinion in valuation proceedings”); Salomon Bros., 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100, at *20
(noting that experts’ views were “colored by their respective clients’ interests”); In re Appraisal
of Shell Oil Co., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *14 (noting that the adversary system’s
“‘procurement and presentation of expert testimony is widely considered a sore spot in judicial
administration’” (quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 17 (3d ed. 1984))); Technicolor, 1990
Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *4 (“The evidence . . . was structured around the elaborate testimony of
dueling experts.”); Charlip v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 5178, 1984 WL 8248, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov.
27, 1984) (“The breadth of the dispute that has developed in this [appraisal] proceeding tends
to border on the absurd.”); Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 512 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 1994) (“What we have
here is the usual stand off inherent in stock valuation cases. Both parties believe their expert’s
stock valuation calculations are the ‘correct’ ones.”).
99. See Manning, supra note 6, at 231-32. Dean Manning was largely critical of the appraisal remedy, suggesting that it may not be needed at all, and that if not altogether eliminated, it should be restrictively employed. See id. at 260-61. Manning did note one possible
scenario where appraisal might be of some value: where a transaction is announced, and, as a
result of the announcement, the market price of the stock of one of the participants plummeted.
See id. at 233. In that situation, a shareholder owning stock in the company whose shares had
plummeted could seek appraisal, and ask the court to value the shares without taking into account the effects of the proposed transaction, thereby factoring out the drop in stock price following the announcement of the transaction. See id. Professor Eisenberg also wrote of the
need for an appraisal remedy, even for publicly traded companies, when the effect of the structural change depressed the market price because it is “an ill-considered one.” EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 81-82.
The idea of providing a remedy for the shareholder of a company whose stock has declined as a result of a merger announcement has little relevance today. The acquired company
in a merger is invariably purchased at a premium to its pre-merger market price. It is only the
acquiring company’s share price that might, and often does, fall when a merger is announced.
See Black, supra note 33, at 602-05 (summarizing studies on stock price of bidding companies
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certainly cases in which courts have found market value dispositive of
fair value for appraisal purposes.100
The ultimate extension of Manning’s argument is found in statutory market exceptions to the availability of the appraisal remedy.
These exceptions, found in the statutes of some states,101 provide that
the appraisal remedy is not available to shareholders owning publicly

following takeover announcement; stock price of bidder tends to decline in the period immediately following the announcement; returns of zero to slightly negative over longer period).
Under modern corporation statutes and practice, however, acquiring corporation shareholders
will virtually never obtain appraisal rights. Appraisal rights generally are granted only to
shareholders who have the right to vote on a merger, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
13.02(a)(1)(i) (1991), and the shareholders of the acquiring corporation often do not obtain the
right to vote on merger transactions, see id. § 11.03(g). Even if the transaction might otherwise
confer voting rights on acquiring corporation shareholders, the common practice is for the acquiring corporation to form a subsidiary to engage in the merger transaction. The subsidiary
merges with the acquired company in a forward or reverse triangular merger. When this structure is used, the acquiring corporation is not a party to the merger; the merging parties are its
wholly owned subsidiary and the acquired corporation. Thus, when the acquiring corporation
uses a triangular merger structure, its shareholders do not vote on the merger transaction and
do not obtain appraisal rights. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 32.
100. See Gallois v. West End Chem. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 596, 600-01 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(applying a statute entitling dissenting shareholders to “fair market value”); In re Paterson &
Hudson River R. Co., 94 A.2d 657, 660 (N.J. 1953) (applying a statute entitling dissenting
shareholders to “full market value”); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 787-90
(Ohio 1987); cf. Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130, 132-35 (Utah 1997) (holding
that the trial court erred in relying exclusively on market value, but that the error was harmless
in this instance); Jones v. Healy, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349, 359-60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) (holding that
market value was entitled to “particular weight,” but it was not the only measure employed),
aff’d mem., 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946). In his response to Dean Manning, Professor Eisenberg disputed Manning’s contention that courts defer entirely to market price when
appraising stock. See EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 70 & n.5.
101. Twenty-four states have a market exception. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 96 n.85. This
includes Delaware, whose market exception actually is only a partial exception. See infra notes
110-12 and accompanying text. The Model Business Corporation Act, which once embraced a
market exception, no longer does. See infra note 104. Similarly, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance have rejected a market exception. 2 ALI, P RINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 7.21 &
cmt. d. Most commentators have argued against a market exception, at least for transactions
initiated by a controlling shareholder or insider. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 79-84
(arguing that market prices do not adequately protect public shareholders and that the appraisal remedy should be retained for public corporations); Seligman, supra note 6, at 840-41
(arguing that the market exception should not apply to conflict of interest transactions); Siegel,
supra note 4, at 124-29 (recommending that the market exception apply only to non-conflict
transactions); Stout, supra note 33, at 1286-95 (arguing that the market exception “is an unwise
doctrinal development”); Thompson, supra note 6, at 54 (concluding that “if market exceptions
are continued they should not apply to conflict transactions”). But see Manning, supra note 6,
at 261 (arguing that if the appraisal remedy is to exist at all, it should apply only when there is
no market for the shares).
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traded shares.102 There are two possible explanations for the market
exception in appraisal statutes. First, consistent with Manning’s arguments, legislatures may have felt that the market adequately valued corporate stock, making the appraisal remedy unnecessary for
publicly traded stock.103 Another possibility, however, is that the
market exception was incorporated into law based on the historical
liquidity rationale for the appraisal remedy.104 Why have an appraisal
remedy to serve a liquidity function with respect to publicly traded
companies, when liquidity already exists? The appraisal remedy,
however, is no longer primarily motivated by a liquidity purpose,105
and the market exception can no longer be defended on that basis.
Today, the market exception is applicable only in some jurisdictions, and the trend appears to be a movement away from market ex-

102. The typical language provides that the appraisal remedy is not available to holders of
stock that is registered on a national securities exchange or held of record by not fewer than
2000 shareholders. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(k) (1995). States are, in some instances, expanding the exception to include NASDAQ traded securities, see Thompson, supra
note 6, at 29-31, a development that is not necessarily desirable, see id.
103. The adoption of market exceptions to the appraisal remedy coincided with the ascendancy of modern financial theory and the efficient capital market hypothesis. See Stout, supra
note 33, at 1285-86. This hypothesis states that market prices reflect investors’ estimates of the
intrinsic value of securities. See id. at 1286. As a result, proponents of this theory have argued
that appraisal is unnecessary for publicly traded companies, because the shareholders may obtain true value by selling in the efficient market. See id.; Seligman, supra note 6, at 837-38, 84246 (asserting that an appraisal valuation greater than market value would award a windfall to
dissenting shareholders); Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder’s Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1976). By the 1970s,
the drafters of the Model Act were no longer confident of the ability of market prices to adequately protect shareholders. See infra note 119. For arguments that market prices do not sufficiently protect shareholders, see infra Part II.C.; see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 29-30
(arguing that it is not necessary to resolve the debate over the efficiency of markets because
market price, even in an efficient market, does not compensate for self-dealing).
104. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 29. A market exception was originally included in the
1969 version of the Model Business Corporation Act; it was removed in the 1978 revisions. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 historical background (1985). The official comment to
the 1969 Model Act notes the addition of the market exception, but contains no explanation for
its inclusion. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 80 cmt. (1971). An explanation for the inclusion appears in Willard P. Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 BUS.
LAW. 291 (1968). The explanation notes that the appraisal right was designed to fit the needs
of a minority shareholder in corporations where there exists a limited market, and serves that
purpose well, but that it is not useful for large corporations with an established market for their
shares. See id. at 302-03. Thus, Scott’s explanation seems grounded in the liquidity rationale
for the appraisal remedy. The explanation also discusses the pricing prowess of established
markets, indicating that a belief in the adequacy of market prices is also behind the inclusion of
the market exception. See id.
105. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text; Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 3.
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ceptions.106 Although the Model Business Corporation Act once contained a market exception, that provision was subsequently deleted,107
and states that have adopted the current version of the Model Act
typically do not employ a market exception.108 In eliminating the
market exception, the drafters of the Model Act concluded that an
ability to sell in the market did not adequately protect the interests of
minority shareholders.109
Delaware law incorporates a market exception,110 but the exception is rendered inapplicable to shareholders who, pursuant to a plan
of merger or consolidation, are required to accept anything other
than stock in the surviving corporation or stock in another publicly
traded corporation.111 The appraisal remedy is therefore available to
shareholders of a public Delaware corporation who receive cash in a
merger; as a result, a large number of post-Weinberger Delaware appraisal proceedings have involved publicly traded corporations whose
minority shareholders have been cashed out.112
The remaining question is whether courts should defer to market
price when fixing fair value. In answering this question, it is important again to recognize that most of the transactions now generating
appraisal claims are cash-out mergers.113 Cash-out mergers are typically accomplished at a premium to the prevailing market price.114 As
a result, if a court defers to market price in assessing fair value, the
appraisal remedy will be of no value to a dissenting shareholder.115
106. See supra note 101.
107. See supra note 104.
108. But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-102(c) (1995) (retaining market exception even
though statute based on current version of MBCA).
109. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 historical background (1985) (stating that
“access to market value is not a reasonable alternative for a dissenting shareholder” (quoting
Alfred F. Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters’ Rights
(Sections 73, 74, 80, and 81), 33 BUS. LAW. 2587, 2595 (1978))). The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance similarly reject a market exception. See 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, §
7.21 & cmt. d.
110. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (Supp. 1996).
111. See id. § 262(b)(2). Payment of some cash in lieu of fractional shares will not cause the
inapplicability of the market exception. See id. § 262(b)(2)(iii).
112. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 4, 25-28.
113. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 33. The persistent willingness of purchasers to pay large premiums over
existing market prices is at odds with the efficient capital market theory, see Stout, supra note
33, at 1259-60, and therefore undercuts the efficient market rationale for a market exception to
the appraisal remedy. See supra note 103.
115. Under many existing appraisal statutes, courts are directed to ascertain fair value
“immediately before the effectuation of the [merger,] . . . excluding any appreciation or depre-
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Presumably, legislatures in the many states that have enacted
appraisal statutes without market exceptions, and legislatures such as
Delaware’s which make the market exception inapplicable to cashout mergers,116 did not intend to provide a useless remedy. It necessarily follows that courts should not rely exclusively on market price
to determine fair value. Further, minority shareholders that have
been cashed out of their investment at a time not of their choosing,
typically by a controlling shareholder, will not be protected if courts
rely exclusively on market price in appraisal proceedings; a remedy
that relies on a market price that is less than the merger price is no
remedy at all.
C. Why Market Price Alone Is Not Sufficient
Legislatures that have enacted appraisal statutes without market
exceptions appear to have recognized that the market does not always adequately protect minority shareholders, and that minority
shareholders cashed out at a price at or above the market price may
require additional protection. There are, in fact, good reasons why
reliance on market price does not adequately protect the interests of
minority shareholders.
Market prices swing rather widely. It takes only a brief look at
the fifty-two week high and low prices for publicly traded securities
to see that there can be a great deal of variance in a corporation’s
stock price over the course of a year,117 even when no major changes

ciation in anticipation of the [merger].” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3) (1991). Under
such statutes, a court applying a valuation standard deferential to market price could proceed
in two possible ways. First, the court could look to the market price immediately before the
consummation of the merger. Under this approach, fair value would invariably be very close to
the merger price because the market price and the merger price will converge right before the
merger is consummated. Alternatively, a court might construe the statutory requirement that
“appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the [merger]” be excluded from fair value to
require an adjustment of the market price to exclude the increase in price that resulted from
the announcement of the merger. In that event, the court would look to the market price prior
to the announcement of the merger, which would invariably be below the merger price. Thus,
in either case, a shareholder opposed to the merger would be in a worse position by dissenting
than by going along with the cash-out merger transaction. The best the dissenting shareholder
could hope for would be to receive something very near the merger price, and the shareholder
would also bear the expenses of the appraisal proceeding. Therefore, reliance on market price
to determine fair value renders the appraisal remedy useless to shareholders.
116. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
117. The high and low prices for the 52-week period ending on July 10, 1997, for the first 10
stocks, alphabetically, that make up the Dow Jones Industrial Averages were as follows:
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have taken place within the corporation or its industry. If appraised
value is to be derived from market price alone, should it be the high
market price over the last year, or the low market price? Or, should
it be the price that happens to prevail around the time of the merger?
Is there any reason to believe that the market price on any given day
of the year is a more accurate measure of fair value than the price on
some other day?
Because market prices can swing rather dramatically over relatively short periods of time, if market price is to be relied upon in determining fair value, the timing of the transaction giving rise to dissenters’ rights is crucial. The timing of the transaction is controlled,
however, by those who propose the transaction; often, it is the controlling shareholder who proposes the transaction. Those in control
have the ability to manipulate the timing of the transaction to their
own advantage, and to the detriment of the minority shareholders.
This potential for abuse provides a sound reason to look beyond prevailing market price at the time of the transaction in determining fair
value.
In fact, reported cases demonstrate that controlling shareholders
do sometimes attempt to time cash-out mergers to their advantage.
For example, in Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp.,118 a merger cashing
out minority shareholders was timed to coincide with the historical

AT&T
Allied Signal
Alcoa
Am Express
Boeing
Caterpillar
Chevron
Coca Cola
Disney
DuPont

High

Low

$ 42 5/8
89
80 7/16
83 1/2
58
112 1/4
77 1/4
72 5/8
85 1/8
66

$ 30 3/4
52 3/4
55 1/8
39 3/8
39 15/16
62 3/4
55 7/8
44 1/4
53 1/4
36 7/16

See New York Stock Exchange Composite Transactions, WALL ST. J., July 11, 1997, at C3-4.
This phenomenon is not unique to 1997. High and low price data from 1968 and 1974 for 10
random New York Stock Exchange traded companies exhibited similar, if not greater, annual
fluctuations. See EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 81-82. Lesser known, smaller corporations are
probably even more volatile. For example, as of July 10, 1997, the first 10 stocks alphabetically
listed on the NASDAQ exchange showed a high price on average more than 2.5 times greater
than the low price over the prior 52 weeks. See NASDAQ National Market Issues, WALL ST. J.,
July 11, 1997, at C7.
118. 342 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
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low point in the market price for the corporation’s stock.119 Not only
did the insiders propose a cash-out merger at a time when the corporation’s market price was at its nadir, the merger was also timed to
take place before an improvement in operating results had been adequately disclosed to the public.120 The ability of insiders to time a
transaction to their benefit counsels against reliance on market price
in an appraisal proceeding.121

119. Power/Mate went public at a price of $5 per share in 1968. See id. at 568. The price
fluctuated between $2.25 and $21 during the period 1968-1970. See id. The price declined in
the 1971-1974 period, and in 1975 it was quoted at $1.25 bid and $2 asked. See id. at 569-70. At
this point, insiders proposed a cash-out merger at $2 per share. See id. at 570.
The Berkowitz transaction was not unique in this respect. As the Berkowitz court
pointed out:
Numerous privately-held companies which were taken “public” by their insiders
during the boom market for new issues that prevailed during the 1960’s are now, as a
result of the current stock market depression, seeking—through the same insiders—
to buy back the public’s interest at a fraction of the price paid by the public for its
stock.
Id. These same concerns, initially generated by the depressed market conditions of the mid1970s, led the Securities Exchange Commission to propose a rule governing “going private”
transactions. As first proposed, the rule would have placed a substantive fairness requirement
on going private transactions. See Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their
Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 5884, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 81,366, at 88,746-47 (Nov. 17, 1977); Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation and
Rulemaking Proceeding in the Matter of “Going Private” Transactions by Public Companies
and Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,104, at 85,092-93 (Feb. 6, 1975). Ultimately, however, the Commission
adopted a rule without a substantive fairness requirement, opting instead for a disclosureoriented rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e) (1996); Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 6100, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,166, at 82,124-25 (Aug. 2, 1979). One of the items that must be disclosed,
however, is “whether the issuer . . . reasonably believes that the . . . transaction is fair or unfair
to unaffiliated security holders.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 8(a) (1996). The issuer is required to “[d]iscuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon which the belief . . . is based.”
Id., Item 8(b).
The ability of insiders to take advantage of a “demoralized market” to take companies
private at unfair prices, as evidenced by the market experience in the 1970s, also lay behind the
decision to eliminate the market exception to appraisal rights from the Model Business Corporation Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 historical background (1985) (quoting
Conard, supra note 109, at 2595).
120. Toward the end of 1974, the two individuals who were the principal officers, directors,
and controlling shareholders of Power/Mate caused the corporation to pay to each of them a
$100,000 bonus. See Berkowitz, 342 A.2d at 568-69. As a result, the reported earnings for the
six-month period ending December 31, 1974, were $.41 per share, as opposed to the $1.01 per
share figure that would have been reported had the bonuses not been paid. See id. As the
court noted, “it may be doubted whether the market price of Power/Mate stock would have
remained at $1.25 bid and $2 asked had the company announced earnings for the six-month
period ending December 31, 1974 in excess of $1 a share.” Id. at 573-74.
121. See id.
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The Berkowitz case also illustrates some of the other arguments
that can be made against reliance on market price in an appraisal
proceeding. The insiders proposing a cash-out merger have the potential to manipulate the corporation’s actions in the period leading
up to the proposed merger. Insiders may conduct the corporation’s
affairs in a manner that depresses share prices, thereby allowing the
insiders to acquire the minority’s interest at a depressed price. In
Berkowitz, for example, the insiders paid to themselves $200,000 in
bonuses in the financial reporting period prior to the proposed cashout merger.122 These bonuses lowered the corporation’s reported
earnings and probably kept its stock price from rising.123
Another powerful argument that counsels against reliance on
market price to determine fair value stems from informational
asymmetry. Insiders proposing a cash-out merger are likely to have
access to information that is not available to minority shareholders,
and that is not reflected in market prices.124 It is unfair to allow insiders to use such information to their benefit, and unfair to relegate
dissenting shareholders to a market price that does not reflect information known only to insiders.125 For example, there is little doubt
that the insiders proposing the merger in Berkowitz had a far greater
appreciation of the fact that the company had turned the corner toward greater profitability than did the market or the minority shareholders.126
The argument has been made that as long as shareholders receive a higher price in a cash-out merger than the pre-merger market

122. See supra note 120.
123. See supra note 120; see also Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1336 (Del.
Ch. 1987) (suggesting a “calculated effort to depress the price of Sealy until the minority stockholders were eliminated by merger or some other form of acquisition”); In re Spang Indus.,
Inc., 535 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (affirming the trial court’s holding that the corporation understated its assets and overstated its liabilities in preparation for a cash-out merger).
124. One court has recognized that insiders may possess exclusive “bits and pieces of nonmaterial information” that, when put together, have value and provide insight into the company’s future. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 n.8 (Del. 1988); accord
Kanda & Levmore, supra note 6, at 467 (“A firm’s market value is not always a good . . . predictor of its real value because the market by hypothesis is unaware of the firm’s secrets.”); see
also 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 7.21 & cmt. d (rejecting “stock market exclusion” in
part because “management may be in a position to know that the current market price of a
company’s stock undervalues the corporation”).
125. See Technicolor, 542 A.2d at 1187 n.8 (“Information and insight not communicated to
the market may not be reflected in stock prices; thus, minority shareholders being cashed out
may be deprived of part of the true investment value of their shares.” (citations omitted)).
126. See Berkowitz, 342 A.2d at 568-69 (discussing trends in financial results).
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price they are better off, and that any legal rule that mandates a
merger price in excess of some bare minimum over market price will
unnecessarily and unwisely discourage efficiency-enhancing mergers.127 This argument, however, assumes that all mergers are engaged
in to unlock hidden efficiencies; it is impaled by the sword of informational asymmetry. If insiders can personally profit by engaging in
cash-out mergers based on their informational advantage, they have
not created efficiencies by engaging in the merger. They have merely
transferred wealth from the prior shareholders to themselves.128
In sum, there is a risk that insiders will take advantage of their
positions and propose cash-out mergers to benefit themselves because they control the timing of transactions, can conduct or manipulate corporate affairs in a manner that depresses market prices
prior to mergers, and maintain informational advantages over minority shareholders. As Professor Coffee has recognized, it is extremely important to examine this problem from an ex ante point of
view:
[T]he more the minority fears transactions structured by the majority, which expropriate their proportionate share in the corporation,
the less they will be willing to pay for equity in corporations that are
subject to such risks. Thus, at least to the extent that the controlling
shareholder expects to raise capital by selling equity, it too will share
an interest in an adequate appraisal remedy that deters uncompensated wealth transfers.
This perspective leads quickly to the realization that stock market
value alone cannot be the standard for determining fair value in circumstances where a controlling shareholder is cashing out the mi127. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE. L.J. 698, 698 (1982) (“We argue . . . that those who produce a gain [those who propose efficiency-enhancing corporate transactions] should be allowed to keep it, subject to the
constraint that other parties to the transaction be at least as well off as before the transaction.
Any attempt to require sharing simply reduces the likelihood that there will be gains to
share.”); Fischel, supra note 6, at 886 (arguing that giving shareholders a premium over pretransaction market price would “decrease the number of value-increasing transactions by
making them more expensive”); Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 355 (1996) (“[F]or companies whose shares trade widely
enough to have a market price[,] . . . efficiency is achieved . . . by awarding the shareholder the
preinvestment market price of the firm’s shares.”); see also Berkowitz, 342 A.2d at 574
(“Defendants urge in effect that any price offered the minority in excess of the market price is
per se fair and reasonable.”).
128. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 359, 410-11 & n.239 (1996).
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nority. The stock price, particularly in an efficient market, inherently factors in the likelihood that the majority will overreach the
129
minority.

Further, courts have recognized that market price is particularly
unreliable when a control block of stock resides in the hands of a controlling shareholder.130 The presence of a large block of stock leads to
less liquidity, fewer trades, and a less reliable market price. As one
court has stated, its presence has a “controlling and restrictive” effect
on trading.131
Apart from the effect a control block has on market price, one
might also ask exactly what market price measures, and how that
measure relates to appraised fair value. The market price for a security is the price at which relatively small blocks of shares change
hands.132 In other words, it is the price at which noncontrol or minority shares change hands, and therefore reflects a “minority discount.”
As a result, the Delaware courts have cautioned against placing “too
much emphasis on market value.”133 The courts have stated that an
appraisal proceeding seeks to determine a corporation’s intrinsic
value, and an overstated reliance on market price to determine intrinsic value is a defective approach.134 The role that minority discounts
(and, conversely, control premiums) play in valuing shares for appraisal purposes is a matter of continuing controversy.

129. Id. at 407 (footnotes omitted).
130. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., Nos. CIV.A. 10229, 11977, 1996 WL 936160, at *9
n.14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1996) (stating that the market price for shares of Tad’s Enterprises, Inc.
reflected the existence of a 72.6% control block and therefore was not a reliable measure of the
fair value of the corporation), aff’d 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997); In re Spang Indus., Inc., 535
A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (agreeing with the trial court that it is appropriate to accord
minimal weight to market value where there is a large control block outstanding); see also Coffee, supra note 128, at 401-05, 408 (discussing empirical evidence suggesting that presence of
control block of stock has negative effect on market value); cf. In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 555
A.2d 129, 133-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (concluding that the trial court erred in completely disregarding market value, but that according low weight to market value would be appropriate in
light of the presence of a large control block of stock that affects market price).
131. See In re Spang Indus., Inc., 535 A.2d at 90.
132. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).
133. Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992); see also Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d at 875-76 (finding that the use of market price to determine “true value” of company
was “clearly faulty”).
134. See Rapid-American Corp., 603 A.2d at 806.
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D. Minority Discounts and the Confusion Over “Control Premiums”
1. Minority Discounts. Perhaps the most fundamental issue in
appraisal valuation is whether the court should attempt to value the
minority interest held by the dissenting shareholder or should instead
attempt to value the corporation as a whole. The former approach
would permit the application of a minority discount to the dissenting
shares, while the latter approach would not. The Delaware courts
have emphatically embraced the latter approach, concluding that the
appraisal process should seek to value the corporation as a whole,
with a pro rata share of that value awarded to the dissenting
shareholder.135
The appraisal process almost always begins with an attempt by
each party to establish the value of the corporation as a whole; the
issue of minority status does not arise until the corporation and its
expert contend that, having arrived at a valuation for the corporation
as a whole, a minority discount should be applied to arrive at the
value of the dissenting shareholder’s stock.136 Delaware has rejected

135. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. 1992) (stating that
the shareholder is entitled to his proportionate interest in a going concern); Cavalier Oil Corp.
v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (stating that the shareholder is entitled to his proportionate interest in the corporation, appraised as an entity).
136. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. CIV.A. 7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 28, at *24-25 (Feb. 22, 1988) (noting that after valuing companies, companies’ experts employed 55% discount to value dissenters’ shares); Richardson v. Palmer Broad. Co.,
353 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Iowa 1984) (stating that corporation’s expert attempted to discount
valuation by 30-40% based in part on dissenting shareholder’s minority status); see also Robert
B. Heglar, Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DUKE L.J. 258, 260 (discussing two-step process of valuing corporation as a whole, then deciding whether to reduce value of minority shareholders’ shares). The term “minority discount” refers to a valuation of minority shares at less
than their proportionate share of the value of the corporation as a whole, reflecting the minority shareholder’s inability to exercise control over corporate decisionmaking. See id.
Closely-held corporations involved in appraisal proceedings sometimes contend that dissenting minority shares also should be discounted for their lack of marketability. See, e.g.,
Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 974-75 (N.Y. 1995). A “lack of marketability” discount is another form of minority discount in that, if permitted, the dissenting shareholder receives less than a proportionate share of the value of the corporation as a whole. It
therefore should be rejected for the same reasons minority discounts should be rejected. See
infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, two courts that have rejected minority
discounts in the appraisal context inexplicably have permitted a lack of marketability discount.
See Friedman, 661 N.E.2d at 975-77; Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 209
(Or. Ct. App. 1988). But see Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 568 N.W.2d 794, 800 & n.3 (Iowa 1997) (noting
trial court’s conclusion that lack of marketability discount was not permitted by Iowa law, but
declining to rule on this issue because it was not raised on appeal). The New York position is
particularly difficult to understand. Friedman provides a powerful rejection of minority dis-
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any attempt to saddle dissenting shares with a minority discount,137 as
have the majority of other courts,138 including New York’s,139 but some
counts for all of the correct reasons, see infra note 144 and accompanying text, yet permits a
lack of marketability discount. The dissenting shareholder in Friedman apparently did not pursue on appeal the issue of a lack of marketability discount. See Friedman, 661 N.E.2d at 975.
Lack of marketability discounts crept into New York law in two intermediate appellate level
cases that arose in the context of a dissolution proceeding, rather than an appraisal proceeding.
See infra note 138. Hopefully, the New York Court of Appeals will rethink this issue when it
next arises.
137. See Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1145 (“The application of a discount to a minority
shareholder is contrary to the requirement that the company be viewed as a ‘going concern.’”).
138. See, e.g., Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding that district court’s imposition of minority discount was erroneous under Minnesota law, and noting
that this conclusion is “in accordance with the approach of the majority of states which have
addressed” the issue); Walter S. Cheesman Realty Co. v. Moore, 770 P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the trial court erred in applying minority discount); Sieg Co. v.
Kelly, 512 N.W.2d 275, 284 (Iowa 1994) (noting that “caselaw prohibits applying a discount
because of the stockholder’s status as a minority shareholder”); Palmer Broad. Co., 353 N.W.2d
at 379 (viewing minority discounts as “contrary to spirit of ‘fair value’ determinations for dissenting minority shareholders” under Iowa law); In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon
Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1004 (Me. 1989) (stating that appraisal remedy should not incorporate
minority discount); MT Properties, Inc. v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383, 386-88
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (prohibiting minority discount, and noting that this is the majority view);
Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519, 524-26 (Neb. 1994) (finding that appraisal statute disallowed minority discount); Woolf v. Universal Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093, 1095
(Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (arguing that “since the Delaware court has rejected the discount rule,
Oklahoma should follow the same rule”); Columbia Management Co., 765 P.2d at 212-14
(rejecting minority discount under Oregon law, though accepting marketability discount for
shares of closely held corporation); see also Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289, 1293-95 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting minority discount in a valuation performed pursuant to a private division of assets agreement, analogizing to appraisal law); Coffee, supra note 128, at 364 n.11
(collecting caselaw on minority discounts). Compare Hunter v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 721 F. Supp.
1102, 1106-07 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (declining to impose minority or lack of marketability discount,
but noting that under Missouri law, the imposition of such discounts is within the discretion of
the trier of fact), with King v. F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301, 305-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that application of minority and marketability discounts is within trial court’s discretion, and
affirming trial court’s decision to reject marketability discount and apply minority discount only
to that portion of the corporation’s value attributable to non-saleable assets that were integral
to the corporation’s business).
Another context in which courts are called on to value corporate stock is in a dissolution
proceeding. If a minority shareholder requests that a court dissolve a corporation, the court
has the power to order the buyout of that shareholder in lieu of ordering dissolution. See Davis
v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 378-80 (Tex. App. 1988, writ denied). In addition, under the Model
Business Corporation Act, if a shareholder petitions the court for dissolution, the corporation
or the other shareholders can elect to purchase the shares owned by the petitioning shareholder
at fair value. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a) (1991). Buyouts in the context of dissolution proceedings present similar issues to buyouts in the context of dissenters’ appraisal rights.
Most courts have rejected the imposition of minority discounts when determining fair value in
the context of a dissolution buyout. See, e.g., Ronald v. 4-C’s Elec. Packaging, Inc., 214 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Charland v. Country View Golf Club., Inc., 588 A.2d 609,
612 (R.I. 1991); cf. Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
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courts have allowed the appraised value of stock to reflect a minority
discount.140
Courts that have declined to apply a minority discount in the appraisal context have correctly focused on the purpose of the appraisal
remedy to justify their conclusion. The primary purpose of the appraisal remedy today is to protect minority shareholders from wrong(rejecting minority discount, but approving lack of marketability discount). But see McCauley
v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 243-45 (N.M. 1986) (finding it within the discretion of the trial court to apply minority discount to shares). Discounts in the dissolution context, both minority and lack of marketability, should be rejected for the same reasons discounts
are inappropriate in the dissenting shareholder context. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text; see also Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425,
428-29, 478-89 (1990) (arguing that minority discount is not justified). In fact, given that dissolution proceedings are often triggered by oppressive and inequitable conduct, see id. at 455-71,
475-78, courts should be very skeptical of discounting minority shares in dissolution proceeding
buyouts.
139. See Friedman, 661 N.E.2d at 975-77.
140. See Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (applying Mississippi law and concluding that “in the present case a minority discount is proper”), aff’d, 796
F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986); Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 230-32 (N.D. Ind.
1983) (concluding that under Indiana law the appraising court must consider evidence that the
plaintiff’s shares represent a minority interest or lack marketability, and finding that the minority and lack of marketability discounts applied by the corporation’s expert were proper),
aff’d, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245, 251
(Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that trial court not prevented by statute from considering minority interest factor and devaluing stock accordingly); Weigel Broad. Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d
745, 750-51 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that application of minority and lack of marketability discounts is within trial court’s discretion, and affirming trial court’s decision to apply such discounts), appeal denied, 689 N.E.2d 1147 (Ill. 1997); Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 535
N.E.2d 927, 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (stating that “the trial court properly considered both the
minority factor and the illiquidity factor”); see also Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d 167,
177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (pre-Weinberger) (concluding that trial court’s acceptance of appraiser’s valuation, which included a minority discount, was not improper). A significant portion of the precedent permitting minority discounts, therefore, has been generated by federal
courts, attempting to guess as to the appropriate state court rule in a diversity case.
Atlantic States is one of the few decisions of a state court to embrace the notion of minority discounts, and the corresponding notion that the purpose of the appraisal proceeding is
to value the dissenting shareholders’ minority interest rather than to accord the dissenting
shareholder a pro rata share of the corporation as a whole. See Atlantic States Constr., 314
S.E.2d at 250-51. Interestingly, the only authority cited by the Georgia court in reaching this
conclusion was the trial court decision in Jones v. Healy, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349, 356-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1945) (stating that the valuation process should find the value of the dissenting shareholders’
stock, not simply give those shareholders a pro rata interest), aff’d mem., 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1946). No mention was made of better known, yet contrary, authority, such as Bell v.
Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730, 735 (Del. Ch. 1978) (holding shareholder entitled to proportionate interest in going concern), modified, 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), and Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (same). The New York courts have since concluded
that a dissenting shareholder is entitled to a proportionate share in the going concern value of
the corporation, without a minority discount. See Friedman, 661 N.E.2d at 975-77.
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ful conduct.141 If this purpose is to be fulfilled, the dissenting shareholder must receive a pro rata share of the value of the corporation.142
As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in rejecting the application of
a minority discount, “fail[ure] to accord to a minority shareholder the
full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty for lack of
control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may
reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting
shareholder, a clearly undesirable result.”143
If a minority shareholder did not receive a full pro rata share of
the value of the corporation, those engaging in the cash-out merger
would, by definition, receive more than their pro rata share of the
value of the corporation. This would permit them to “profit” from
engaging in a cash-out merger, and would encourage controlling
shareholders to attempt to take advantage of minority shareholders.
The New York Court of Appeals recognized this policy concern when
it rejected the imposition of a minority discount:
[A] mandatory reduction in the fair value of minority shares to reflect their owners’ lack of power in the administration of the corporation will inevitably encourage oppressive majority conduct,
thereby further driving down the compensation necessary to pay for
the value of minority shares. “Thus, the greater the misconduct by
144
the majority, the less they need to pay for the minority’s shares.”

Imposing a minority discount in the appraisal process145 encourages controlling shareholders to take advantage of minority share-

141. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
142. See Friedman, 661 N.E.2d at 976; Cawley v. SCM Corp., 530 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (N.Y.
1988).
143. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989).
144. Friedman, 661 N.E.2d at 977 (quoting Murdock, supra note 138, at 487).
145. Appraisal is a fairly specialized proceeding requiring the valuation of minority shares.
The other context in which minority shares are frequently “valued” is for tax purposes, and
more specifically, for estate and gift tax purposes when minority shares are transferred at death
or by gift. As Professor Murdock has written: “Valuation theory is essentially conservative.
This is in large measure due to the fact that it has been tax driven. Most of the cases and articles in the field are generated by the taxing process.” Murdock, supra note 138, at 471
(citations omitted). It is not surprising that the owners of minority shares argue in favor of a
minority discount when those shares are valued in the tax context, in order to minimize their
tax burden. This type of tax creates a need for liquidity (to pay the tax) at a point in time when
the shares have not been disposed of for value. “[P]ublic policy and equity dictate a conservative valuation process” in such circumstances. Id.
Although minority discounts make sense in a tax setting, it does not follow that they
should be imported into the appraisal setting. See id. at 472. This is not merely because the
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holders, and allows them to appropriate a portion of the value of the
corporation from the minority shareholders.146 This problem is exacerbated when the corporation’s value as a whole is initially determined by reference to market price. Because market price reflects
the value of a small quantity of stock, market price already reflects a
minority discount. If a court values a corporation by reference to
market price, and then imposes a minority discount, it in effect discounts the stock twice to reflect its minority status, and confers a further windfall on the majority shareholder.147

discount benefits the minority shareholder in one context, and burdens it in another, but because the nature and purpose of the two proceedings are so different.
In the tax context, the minority shareholder’s interest in the corporation is maintained in
the hands of the transferee, who is typically related to the transferor, and who remains a minority shareholder. The shares being valued remain minority shares. The person suffering the
detriment from the minority discount is the tax collector. The harm, however, is not necessarily
permanent, because if the shares are later disposed of without a minority discount, taxes will
likely be due on the full, non-discounted value, less the taxpayer’s basis.
In the appraisal context, the minority shareholder’s interest in the corporation typically is
being terminated. That shareholder will have no other opportunity to dispose of the shares and
receive their full pro rata value. The person suffering the detriment from a minority discount is
the minority shareholder, and the benefit flows to those doing the cashing out. As a result, it is
appropriate to value minority shares differently for appraisal and tax purposes. See Robbins &
Co. v. Israel, No. CIV.A.7919, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 498, at *9 (Oct. 2, 1985) (according estate
tax valuation no independent weight in later appraisal proceeding).
146. It might be argued that if a dissenting shareholder acquired his stock taking advantage
of a minority discount, for example by purchasing the stock at a market price, the shareholder
should similarly be saddled with a minority discount at the time of exit via an appraisal proceeding. This argument is misguided for several reasons. First, as noted above, if minority
shareholders receive less than their pro rata share of the value of the corporation, those engaging in the cash-out merger would necessarily receive more than their pro rata share. This
would violate tenets of fundamental fairness, and encourage wrongful conduct. Second, shareholders willing to invest their capital and purchase a minority position in a corporation do so
with the expectation that if the corporation is acquired or taken private, they will realize their
pro rata share of the corporation’s value. If such shareholders can be involuntarily removed
from their investments through a cash-out merger without receiving a pro rata share of the corporation’s value, they will be less willing to make such investments. This would result in an
increase in the cost of capital for corporations. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Finally, shareholders who are able to acquire corporate stock at a minority discount “pay” for
that discount by virtue of their inability to control or influence corporate decision making.
They should not have to pay again by virtue of a discount in connection with a forced exit from
the corporation.
147. See Coffee, supra note 128, at 407-08.
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2. The Confusion over “Control Premiums.” The goal of the
appraisal proceeding in most states is to determine the dissenting
shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation as a whole,
without any discount for minority status.148 Another issue that has
arisen in the appraisal context is whether an upward adjustment to
the appraised value should be made to allow the dissenting
shareholder to obtain a proportionate share of the control premium
that would be reflected in a sale of control of the corporation. When
the corporation as a whole is valued by comparison to the stock price
of a publicly traded company, the resulting valuation necessarily is of
a minority interest.149 In that event, it would be logically consistent to
make an upward adjustment to remove the inherent minority
discount reflected in a “market price based valuation.”150
This issue was raised in the appraisal proceeding in Rapid151
Rapid-American’s controlling shareAmerican Corp. v. Harris.
holder engaged in a cash-out merger of the minority shareholders,
some of whom dissented from the merger and sought appraisal of
their shares.152
Rapid-American was a holding company that derived virtually
all of its income and revenue from three wholly-owned subsidiaries,
each of which was engaged in a different business.153 Because RapidAmerican was a holding company, and no other company was comparable in terms of its mix of different businesses, the expert engaged
by the minority shareholders separately valued each of RapidAmerican’s three subsidiaries, using a “comparable company” approach.154 Similar publicly traded companies were examined to determine pricing multiples, and those multiples were then applied to
148. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
150. “Market price based valuation” is used to refer to valuing a company by reference to
the price of its own publicly traded shares, or valuing a company by comparing it to other,
similar publicly traded companies. This would typically be done by looking at the ratios of
market price to certain financial measures (e.g., price/earnings ratio) for similar public companies, and utilizing those ratios to value the company in question. For example, the
price/earnings ratio of a similar company could be multiplied by the earnings of the company
being appraised to generate a valuation that is based on a comparable publicly traded company.
151. 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
152. See id. at 798-800.
153. See id. at 799. One subsidiary, McCrory, was engaged in retailing and merchandising.
See id. Another, Schenley, was a “distiller, importer and distributor of alcoholic spirits.” Id.
The third, McGregor, was a clothing manufacturer and distributor. See id.
154. See id. at 800-01.

WERTH

1998]

07/15/98 11:57 AM

SHAREHOLDERS’ APPRAISAL REMEDY

647

the financial results of the Rapid-American subsidiaries.155 This resulted in a valuation for each of the Rapid-American subsidiaries that
was derived from a comparison to similar publicly traded companies.
The value attributed to each subsidiary was therefore a market price
based valuation.
The dissenting shareholder argued that a control premium
should then be added to the valuations generated by a comparison to
public companies.156 The Delaware Court of Chancery rejected the
inclusion of a control premium,157 but the Delaware Supreme Court
disagreed with the chancery court, holding that “Delaware law compels the inclusion of a control premium under the unique facts of this
case.”158 A rejection of the control premium would “place[ ] too
much emphasis on market value.”159
The Delaware Supreme Court carefully attempted to limit its
holding to the “unique facts of [the] case.”160 Failure to add a control
premium in Rapid-American “artificially and unrealistically treated
Rapid as a minority shareholder” of its subsidiaries, when in fact
those subsidiaries were wholly owned by Rapid.161 As a result, the
court concluded that the addition of a control premium in this case
would not be at the shareholder level, which might be impermissible,
but instead would be at the parent or corporate level, which was not
only permitted, but required.162
155. These multiples were based on revenues, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT),
earnings before depreciation, amortization, interest and taxes, and tangible book value of invested capital. See id. at 800. The expert located, for example, a publicly traded company with
a business similar to McCrory. It then determined the amount by which the aggregate market
price of this similar company exceeded its annual revenues (or its annual EBIT). This generated a revenues multiplier (or an EBIT multiplier) based on a comparable publicly traded
company. That multiplier was then applied to McCrory’s revenues (or EBIT), thereby generating a value for McCrory based on a comparable publicly traded company. See Harris v.
Rapid-American Corp., No. CIV.A.6462, 1990 WL 146488, at *9-16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
156. See Rapid-American, 603 A.2d at 798, 804.
157. See Harris, 1990 WL 146488, at *7.
158. Rapid-American, 603 A.2d at 806.
159. Id.; see also id. at 806-07 (stating that the trial court’s rejection of a control premium
“implicitly placed a disproportionate emphasis on pure market value”).
160. Id. at 806. In Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No. CIV.A.13414, 1998 WL 44993
(Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998), the corporation argued that Rapid-American should be limited to its
“unique” facts involving subsidiaries in different industries. See id. at *11. The court rejected
this construction of Rapid-American as “too narrow.” Id.
161. Rapid-American, 603 A.2d at 806.
162. See id. The court discussed Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950),
and Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989), as standing for the general
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Because the court carefully limited its holding, it might be possible to argue that Rapid-American stands for the proposition that the
addition of a control premium is appropriate only when valuing a
holding company that has more than one wholly-owned subsidiary.
Then, the premium could be added at the corporate level, rather than
at the shareholder level. This argument, however, does not withstand
careful analysis and is inconsistent with the rationale for the decision
in Rapid-American.
If Rapid-American operated its three distinct businesses through
separate divisions rather than separate subsidiaries, and each line of
business was valued by a comparison to comparable public companies, then under the rationale of Rapid-American a control premium
should be added to the value of each division to avoid undue emphasis on market value, which reflects a minority discount. RapidAmerican should not be valued differently if it operates its businesses
as divisions rather than subsidiaries. If Rapid-American had only
one line of business and no subsidiaries, and the corporation was valued based on a comparable public company, a control premium
similarly would have to be added to alleviate the inherent minority
discount reflected in the market price based valuation.
The need to add a control premium is therefore generated by the
type of valuation method used. If a market price based valuation is
used, with its inherent minority discount, it is necessary to adjust the
valuation upward in order to establish the value of the company as a
whole, not the value of a minority interest in the company. The fact
that Rapid-American had multiple, wholly-owned subsidiaries was
really irrelevant. It was the use of a market price based valuation
that triggered the upward price adjustment.
Logical consistency requires that any valuation based on market
prices be adjusted upward to eliminate the minority discount embodied in market prices. This is merely the flip side of the conclusion
163
that minority discounts in appraisal proceedings are inappropriate,
as is reliance on market price.164 Unfortunately, the courts and liti-

proposition that shareholder level adjustments, either discounts or premiums, are not permitted. See Rapid-American Corp., 603 A.2d at 805-06. This presumably is because of the established Delaware principle that the dissenting shareholder is entitled to a proportionate share of
the value of the corporation as a whole, rendering shareholder level adjustments inappropriate.
The court also noted another chancery court decision rejecting the addition of a control premium, but expressed no views on the merits of that decision. See id. at 806 n.2.
163. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 99-134 and accompanying text.
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gants have confusingly phrased the issue in terms of whether the addition of a control premium is appropriate. This is unfortunate because the real question is not whether to add a control premium, but
is instead whether a market price based valuation should be adjusted
upward to correct for the inherent minority discount reflected
therein.165 This confusion in phrasing the issue has led to confusion in
analyzing the issue.
The following principles should therefore guide appraisal proceedings: dissenting shareholders should be entitled to receive a pro
rata share of the value of the corporation as a whole, rather than the
value of their minority interest; dissenting shares should not be subject to a minority discount; and a market price based valuation should
receive an upward adjustment to eliminate the minority discount inherent therein.
The Delaware courts have, at times, acted consistently with these
principles. For example, in In re Radiology Associates, Inc.,166 the
corporation was valued based on a discounted cash flow model.167
The dissenting shareholder argued that this valuation should be adjusted upward to compensate for an implicit minority discount.168 The

165. The term “control premium,” when properly used, refers to a premium received by a
controlling shareholder selling a controlling block of stock. See Coffee, supra note 128, at 360.
The buyer is willing to pay that premium to obtain control, and the selling shareholder typically
has the legal ability to accept such a premium. See id. But see Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173, 176-78 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding director/controlling shareholder of steel producer breached
fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders by selling controlling block at a premium to a
steel end-user, thus depriving the corporation of its opportunity to take advantage of a wartime
steel shortage). Several different “values” are therefore possible for corporate stock. The
“market price” of stock values a minority interest in the corporation. See supra notes 132-34
and accompanying text. Alternatively, the corporation as a whole can be valued, and the corporate stock assigned a proportionate share of that value. This is the “value” used by most
courts in the appraisal context. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text. This proportionate share of the corporation as a whole will typically exceed market value. It therefore contains a “premium” over market value, but it is not a control premium; rather, it represents the
elimination of a minority discount. Finally, a shareholder selling a controlling block of stock
may command a share price that is greater than a proportionate share of the corporation as a
whole, the excess being a true control premium. See generally Coffee, supra note 128
(evaluating how corporate law should treat control premiums in light of the economic goal of
encouraging efficient transactions).
166. 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991).
167. See id. at 490-91.
168. See id. at 494. A similar approach was taken by the dissenting shareholders’ expert in
Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No. CIV.A.13414, 1998 WL 44993, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan.
29, 1998) (adding control premium to DCF valuation). The court did not address the appropriateness of this approach because it rejected both parties’ DCF valuations on other grounds.
See id. at *10-11. The decision whether to adjust upward a DCF valuation to reflect an acquisi-
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court correctly rejected this argument because the discounted cash
flow analysis utilized was not a market price based valuation and
therefore did not embody an inherent minority discount.169
In Hodas v. Spectrum Technology, Inc.,170 however, the court implicitly accepted the addition of a control premium to both a DCF
valuation and a comparable company valuation.171 Only the latter is a
market price based valuation. The logic requiring an upward adjustment to a market price based valuation to compensate for its inherent minority discount does not apply to the DCF valuation.172
173
Salomon Brothers Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp. is more
troubling. In this case, one of the valuation methods used by the dissenting shareholder’s expert was an historical earnings approach, apparently using multipliers based on publicly traded companies.174 The
expert made a 15% upward adjustment to the value obtained with
this technique in order to compensate for the “implicit minority discount” embodied in this approach.175 The court rejected this adjustment, expressing doubt that “a market value adjustment to compensate for an implicit minority discount is a valuation method that is
generally accepted in the financial community.”176 It went on to state
that the expert did not “adequately distinguish between an implicit
minority discount adjustment and a control premium”177 and that to
the extent the expert was proposing, “in whole or in part, a control
premium adjustment, it is inappropriate.”178 These statements evition premium should depend on whether a third-party purchaser would pay a premium above
DCF value in order to acquire the company as a whole.
169. This was not, however, the rationale used by the court. The court rejected the argument because it believed that permitting an upward adjustment would be an impermissible attempt to include a premium. See id. Because this case pre-dates the Delaware Supreme
Court’s acceptance of premiums at the corporate level in Rapid-American, this reasoning is
somewhat suspect.
170. No. CIV.A.11265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252 (Dec. 7, 1992).
171. See id. at *6-7, *10.
172. To be completely fair to the court, the corporation’s expert applied a control premium
to both types of valuation, see id. at *6-7, and no one appears to have objected to this approach.
173. No. CIV.A.10054, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 (May 1, 1992).
174. See id. at *8-9.
175. Id. at *14.
176. Id. at *14-15 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983)).
177. Id. at *15.
178. Id. at *16; see also Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL
109243, at *9 n.6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (pre-Rapid-American) (questioning, in dicta, addition
of “acquisition premium” to valuation based on historical earnings and multiplier derived from
comparable publicly traded companies “in the circumstances of this case”), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255
(Del. 1991).
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dence confused thinking; the court did not recognize that by using
multipliers based on publicly traded companies, a market price based
valuation method had been adopted, and that it did, in fact, embody
an implicit minority discount. The use of the control premium nomenclature seemed to throw off both the court and the expert.179
The issue arose again in Kleinwort Benson, Ltd. v. Silgan Corp.180
In this appraisal proceeding, both parties’ experts included a valuation based on comparable public companies.181 The shareholders’ expert then added an 86% premium to adjust for the inherent minority
discount embodied in the market price based valuation.182 The court
stated that a “decision to remove the minority discount embedded in
the market price does not violate Delaware law,” but that
“[p]etitioners cannot add a premium to the market price unless they
prove that publicly traded shares include a minority discount.”183 Because both parties’ experts testified that publicly traded shares trade
below the proportionate enterprise value of the corporation, the
court concluded that “the record compels [the court] to find that the
market price for publicly traded stock includes a minority discount.”184 The court reconciled the difference with Salomon Brothers
by stating that the record in Salomon Brothers did not satisfy the
Vice Chancellor that an adjustment to compensate for implicit minority discount was required,185 whereas the record in Kleinwort Ben186
son compelled the opposite conclusion.
In the wake of these two cases, it is not clear whether dissenting
shareholders are required, in each case, to build a record demonstrating that publicly traded shares include an inherent minority discount. Certainly, a prudent shareholder who wants to upwardly ad-

179. See Salomon Bros., 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100, at *16-17.
180. No. CIV.A.11107, 1995 WL 376911 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995).
181. See id. at *2.
182. See id.
183. Id. at *3.
184. Id.; see Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No. CIV.A.13414, 1998 WL 44993, at
*7-8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998) (concluding that valuation based on pricing multiples derived
from selected publicly traded companies improperly resulted in valuation of minority interest).
185. See id.
186. The court ultimately rejected the dissenting shareholders’ argument that an 86% upward adjustment was required to compensate for the inherent minority discount, and instead
applied a 12.5% adjustment. See id. at *3-4. The court stated that the 86% “premium” argued
for by the dissenting shareholder impermissibly contained elements of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger. See id. For a discussion of this statutory limitation on fair value, see infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text.
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just a market price based valuation method to eliminate the inherent
minority discount should try to build such a record. It is also not
clear exactly what shareholders can do to build such a record, other
than to offer expert testimony.187 It is even less clear why this should
have to be done in each case. The basic question whether a market
price based valuation method embodies a minority discount should
be answered affirmatively, and that answer should not change from
case to case.188
Another recent case, Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers,
189
Inc., demonstrates continued confusion in the Delaware courts over
whether it is appropriate to add a control premium (or, more properly phrased, whether an adjustment should be made to compensate
for the inherent minority discount in a market price based valuation).
Gonsalves was an appraisal action involving the corporation, Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc. (SAP), that published Rolling Stone magazine.190 The controlling shareholder of SAP proposed a cash-out
merger transaction that eliminated the minority shareholders, and
Gonsalves dissented.191
Gonsalves’ expert determined the value of the corporation using
an earnings capitalization method.192 He first calculated an adjusted
earnings base,193 and multiplied that by a price/earnings ratio derived
from transactions involving sales of comparable magazines and companies.194 The resulting value was not based on the publicly traded
market prices of comparable companies, but rather on the sales
prices of comparable companies as a whole. The court, in a footnote,
stated that this technique “masks a complex issue: whether in an ap187. If so, future cases can be expected to involve partisan expert testimony on this issue.
See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
188. Of course, the amount by which any given market price based valuation should be adjusted upward to eliminate its inherent minority discount will have to be resolved on a case-bycase basis, undoubtedly with the benefit of expert testimony. Nonetheless, the focus should be
on the amount of upward adjustment, rather than on the propriety of making any adjustment at
all.
189. No. CIV.A.8474, 1996 WL 696936 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996), rev’d, 701 A.2d 357 (Del.
1997).
190. See id. at *1.
191. See id.
192. See id. at *3.
193. The adjusted earnings base was calculated using 1985 earnings, adjusted to eliminate
taxes and non-recurring expenses, to add an incremental yearly increase in deferred subscription income, and to add back administrative costs associated with discontinued operations. See
id.
194. See id. at *4.
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praisal action ‘fair value’. . . includes a pro rata share of a control
premium.”195 The court stated that by determining a multiple with
reference to sales of other companies, Gonsalves’ expert had in effect
included a control premium.196 The court concluded, however, that it
was not required to address the control premium issue in the instant
case.197
Instead, the court ultimately accepted the valuation provided by
the corporation’s expert.198 This valuation was based on the Delaware block method, with most of the weight (80%) attributed to a
capitalized earnings measure.199 The defendant’s expert used a fiveyear earnings average,200 and multiplied that by a price/earnings multiple generated by a comparison to public companies.201 In other
words, the valuation accepted by the court was a market price based
valuation, and therefore embodied an implicit minority discount. Although the court professed not to address the question whether a
control premium was permissible, its holding implicitly rejected such
a premium, and in fact, adopted a valuation method reflecting a minority discount.202

195. Id. at *4 n.9.
196. See id.
197. Id. This issue arose again in Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No. CIV.A.13414,
1998 WL 44993 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998). The court in Le Beau held that valuation of a corporation by reference to the sales prices of comparable companies is a valid technique that does
not include an impermissible control premium. See id. at *11. The court correctly analyzed
and applied the rationale of Rapid-American to reach this conclusion. See id.
198. See Gonsalves, 1996 WL 696936, at *6. This decision was reversed by the Delaware
Supreme Court because of the trial court’s decision, announced just prior to trial, to choose in
its entirety the valuation evidence of one party or the other, “hook, line and sinker.” Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 358 (Del. 1997). The “choose one
party’s” valuation aspect of this decision is discussed infra at notes 447-60 and accompanying
text. The Delaware Supreme Court did not address the trial court’s control premium analysis.
199. Market value received a 10% weighting, as did asset value. See Gonsalves, 1996 WL
696936, at *5. The defendant’s expert calculated asset value based on an earnings capitalization method, which, at least as described in the opinion, seems to make little sense. See id. at
*5 & n.16.
200. The plaintiff’s expert had used only 1985 earnings rather than a five-year average. See
id. at *4.
201. The expert actually used multiples that were lower than the median multiples of comparable public companies. See id.
202. The court deflected attention from this by pointing out, correctly, that much of the difference between the valuation conclusions of the plaintiff’s expert and the defendant’s expert
resulted from a difference in the earnings base, rather than the multiplier. See id. at *6. This
difference in earnings base arose because one side used a five-year earnings average and the
other side used a single year’s earnings. See id. at *7. The court then pointed out that the defendant’s expert used a multiplier of 13, which was quite close to the multiplier of 14 chosen by
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In sum, Delaware and most jurisdictions have concluded that a
dissenting shareholder is entitled to a proportionate share in the
value of the corporation as a whole. This standard accords with the
minority shareholder protection rationale of the appraisal remedy.
As a necessary corollary, courts adopting this approach have generally rejected attempts to impose a minority discount on dissenting
shareholders. At the same time, there is support for the proposition
that it is appropriate to upwardly adjust a market price based valuation to correct for the inherent minority discount included in such a
valuation. The courts have not, however, always acted consistently
with this proposition.
E.

The Role of Third-Party Sales Value

Another recurring issue in appraisal litigation is the effect, if any,
that should be accorded the “third-party sales value” of the corporation being valued. Third-party sales value refers to the price at which
the corporation, as an entity, could be sold to a third party in an
arm’s-length transaction. Because transactions triggering appraisal
generally involve a merger, or “sale” of the company, third-party
sales value may include the price paid in the actual transaction that
triggered the appraisal claim. The use of third-party sales value in
appraisal proceedings raises questions related to those surrounding
the application of minority discounts and control premiums.
An appraisal proceeding is a valuation proceeding intended to
determine what something is worth. The common sense answer to
the question “what is an asset worth?,” is “whatever someone is
willing to pay for it.”203 If you want to know what a home or car is
worth, put it up for sale and its value will be determined. Anything
short of third-party sales value is merely theoretical, or guesswork.
An appraiser’s opinion that a home is worth $100,000 will not do the
the plaintiff’s expert, thereby implying that the choice of multiplier was really not very important in this case. See id. at *6. The court’s observation is, however, extremely misleading because the defendant’s expert used a multiplier of 13 in calculating asset value, which in this case
received only a 10% weighting. See id. When the defendant’s expert calculated earnings value,
which comprised 80% of the value as ultimately calculated, he used multipliers of 8.5-9.5, see
id. at *5, *7; these multipliers were significantly different from the multiplier of 14 chosen by
the plaintiff’s expert. Thus, although the difference in earnings base certainly accounted for
much of the variation in the experts’ conclusions, differences in the multipliers were also very
important.
203. See GLENN M. DESMOND & RICHARD E. KELLEY, BUSINESS VALUATION
HANDBOOK 1 (1988) (“Everything is worth what its purchaser will pay for it.” (quoting Publius
(1st Century B.C.))).
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seller much good if the best offer it receives from potential buyers is
$90,000.
It is not always feasible to put an asset up for sale to determine
its worth, and in those circumstances it is necessary to settle for second best—an appraisal of the asset. For example, if someone wants
to refinance a home, the lender will be interested in the value of that
home. Because the owner does not intend to sell the property, an
appraiser will be retained to provide a best guess as to its value. The
appraiser may look at comparable home sales, replacement value, or,
if it is an income producing property, the appraiser might use a capitalized earnings or discounted cash flow analysis to appraise the
property. Any one of these methods, however, is merely a second
best substitute for valuing the property in an actual third-party sale.
If the asset being appraised is an interest in a corporation, the
same principles should apply. The best evidence of value, if available, is third-party sales value. If such evidence is not available, there
is no choice but to resort to less precise valuation techniques. Despite the compelling sensibility of this argument, courts conducting
appraisal proceedings have accorded third-party sales value a mixed
and confusing reception. Although third-party sales value appears to
204
be gaining greater acceptance as a valuation method, courts have
not accorded it the weight it deserves. Five problem areas have impeded the acceptance of third-party sales value as a valuation technique.
1. The Issue of What Is Actually Being Valued. It is first
necessary to determine what is actually being valued in the appraisal
proceeding. This is essentially the same question as whether to
permit a minority discount. The Delaware approach, and the one
followed by the vast majority of jurisdictions, is to value the
corporation as a whole, and award the dissenting shareholder a
proportionate share of that value.205 As a result, if third-party sales

204. The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance have strongly endorsed third-party sales value. They provide that for third-party arm’s-length transactions, the
acquisition price should be presumed to be the fair value of the corporation, absent proof to the
contrary by clear and convincing evidence. See 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 7.22(b). In
addition, if the transaction is not a third-party arm’s-length arrangement, the ALI Principles
state that “the court generally should give substantial weight to the highest realistic price that a
willing, able, and fully informed buyer would pay for the corporation as an entirety.” Id. §
7.22(c).
205. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
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value is to be employed in such a jurisdiction, the court should look
to the value of the corporation as a whole in an arm’s-length sale to a
third party, and accord the dissenting shareholder a proportionate
share of that value.206
The minority approach is to place a value on the specific shares
held by the dissenting shareholder, as a minority interest. Under this
approach, a court would ask what a third party would be willing to
pay for the actual minority block of stock owned by the dissenting
shareholder. The resulting value would embody a minority discount.207

206. This issue was tackled most directly by the court in BNE Massachusetts Corp. v. Sims,
588 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). The court stated that the task assigned under the appraisal statute was “not to reconstruct an ‘intrinsic value’ of each share of the enterprise but,
rather, to determine what a willing buyer realistically would pay for the enterprise as a whole
on the statutory valuation date.” Id. at 19. Importantly, the court went on to tie this conclusion
to the minority shareholder protection rationale for the appraisal statute by asserting that
“[o]nly in this fashion can minority stockholders be assured that insiders in control of a company, burdened by conflicting interests, may not purchase the enterprise at a price less than
that obtainable in the marketplace of qualified buyers and avoid paying a full and fair price to
the minority.” Id.
207. This approach is embodied in Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio
1987). In Armstrong, the intermediate appellate court had stated a view consistent with BNE
Massachusetts, concluding that the appraisal process should not look to the value of a single
share of stock in an isolated sale, but the per share value of all shares of the corporation on the
basis of a hypothetical sale of all of its shares. See id. at 789. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, rejected this approach as a mistaken view of the statute and the court’s prior holdings.
See id.
The Ohio Supreme Court viewed the calculation of a per share value based on a hypothetical sale of all shares as impermissible because it would allow a dissenting shareholder to
share in a premium from the transaction. See id. Instead, the court held that, as long as a significant trading market for the stock exists, appraisal should be based on market price adjusted
to offset the impact of the proposed transaction, see id. at 790, in effect, calling for valuation of
the minority interest owned by the dissenting shareholder. In addition, the requirement that
the market price be adjusted to eliminate the effect of the merger effectively confined the dissenting shareholder to the market price prior to the merger announcement. The court thereby
rendered the appraisal remedy useless to minority shareholders of publicly traded corporations,
and guaranteed that it will not be invoked in this context in the future. No matter how low the
merger price, it will invariably exceed the prevailing market price prior to the announcement of
the merger; thus no sensible shareholder would elect to dissent, and the appraisal remedy in
Ohio has been rendered largely impotent by judicial construction.
To make matters worse, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the appraisal remedy is
the exclusive remedy available to minority shareholders complaining about the fairness of a
merger price. See Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (Ohio 1990); Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d
at 798. The appraisal remedy in Ohio is thus both useless and exclusive. In effect, as long as
the controlling shareholder pays any amount over the prevailing market price, it is free to cash
out the minority shareholders and appropriate to itself any value not accurately reflected in the
market price.
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The minority approach would allow those engaging in the
merger to acquire the dissenting shareholders’ stock at less than its
full pro rata value, thereby obtaining a windfall. This would encourage controlling shareholders to cash out minority shareholders at unfair prices. In short, all of the arguments against minority discounts
apply with equal force to this approach.208 Third-party sales value
should apply with respect to a sale of the corporation as a whole, and
not to a sale of the dissenting shareholders’ minority interest.
2. Problems of Semantics. To some extent, the third-party sales
value approach has been a victim of semantics. There is a tendency
to view the third-party sales value approach as a “willing buyer,
willing seller standard.”209 In other words, what price would a willing
buyer and willing seller reach in an arm’s-length negotiation? This
has caused confusion, however, because at times courts have equated
a willing buyer, willing seller approach with a market price
approach.210 This has led courts to reject the willing buyer, willing
seller standard, believing that it inappropriately and unduly relies on

The court in Armstrong relied on a change in the Ohio statute, apparently made in response to case law that had adopted an intrinsic value test under which all factors relevant to
value were to be considered. See id. at 784-85. The revised statute defined fair cash value in
terms of a willing seller, willing buyer test. See id. Although it is not a necessary conclusion
that the statute’s willing seller, willing buyer test should be applied with respect to a minority
block of shares, rather than the corporation as a whole, this statutory amendment makes the
Ohio situation sui generis, and a poor precedent for other jurisdictions.
The fact that the Ohio appraisal remedy is both useless and exclusive probably explains,
in part, Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., in which minority shareholders engaged in a lengthy
dispute in federal court trying to assert a federal securities law claim in the absence of an effective state law remedy. See generally Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.
Ohio 1985), rev’d, 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987); Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263
(6th Cir.), vacated, 502 U.S. 801 (1991); Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir.
1992).
208. For a discussion of the arguments against minority discounts, see supra notes 135-47
and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. CIV.A.7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at
*23 (June 8, 1993) (discussing the significance of actual offers to buy the company at issue, and
noting that “[o]rdinarily, the value of any commodity in a competitive market is what a willing
buyer would pay a willing seller for that commodity”). The willing buyer, willing seller test is
typically employed in valuations undertaken in the tax context, where fair market value is the
standard for valuation. See Murdock, supra note 138, at 479-80. Tax law, however, generally
seeks the value of minority interests, rather than the value of a proportionate share of the corporation as a whole. See supra note 145. Confusion resulted when this same terminology was
carried over to the dissent and appraisal context.
210. See, e.g., Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245, 249 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984); Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 789.
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market price.211 Because the willing buyer, willing seller standard has
sometimes been equated with a third-party sales value approach,
judicial rejection of the former could cast aspersion on the latter.
This is merely a problem of nomenclature and a failure to clarify
what the willing buyer is buying and what the willing seller is selling.
If it is the corporation as a whole, the willing buyer, willing seller
standard is appropriate and consistent with the majority approach to
valuation. If it is the dissenting shareholder’s minority block of stock,
however, the standard would inappropriately adopt a market
price/minority discount212 approach to valuation.213 Thus, if courts are
clear that it is the corporation as a whole that is being valued, the
price reached by a willing buyer and willing seller in an arm’s-length
transaction should be strong indicia of fair value.
3. The Statutory Command to Ignore the Effects of the
Transaction Giving Rise to Appraisal Rights. Appraisal statutes
almost universally include a statement that the value of the dissenting
shares is to be determined without regard to any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action giving rise to the

211. See Atlantic States Constr., 314 S.E.2d at 249; Genesco, Inc. v. Scolaro, 871 S.W.2d 487,
490-91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). For a critique of undue reliance on market price, see supra Part
II.C.
212. Ironically, after the court in Atlantic States rejected the willing buyer, willing seller test
because it was unduly tied to market value, it went on to approve the imposition of a minority
discount. See 314 S.E.2d at 249-51.
213. Some of the semantic confusion results from statutes that adopt different terminology
to describe what shareholders are entitled to receive in an appraisal proceeding. Today, the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions provide that dissenting shareholders are entitled to receive “fair value.” See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:11-3(2) (West Supp. 1997); N.Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW § 910(a) (McKinney Supp.
1997-1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.554(1) (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-102(a) (1995).
Many of these statutes are based on the Model Business Corporation Act, which also adopts a
fair value standard. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (1991). A small number of states
do not use the fair value standard, but use terms such as “fair market value,” see CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1300(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998), “fair cash value,” see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:131(C) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(A)(2) (Banks-Baldwin
1994), and “value,” see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(b) (1995 & Supp. 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 156, §§ 46, 46E (Law. Co-op. 1992). Although only a few states now depart from the fair
value formulation, there may have been more variation prior to the widespread use of the
Model Act. See In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 60
n.5 (Me. 1979) (discussing states whose statutes then used fair market value and other formulations).
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right to dissent.214 Much of the difficulty in determining fair value
Courts have been
revolves around this statutory language.215
reluctant to use third-party sales value on the grounds that it would
award to the dissenting shareholder part of the merger consideration,
or a control premium, in violation of the statutory command to
exclude any appreciation in anticipation of the merger.216 This
reasoning is not consistent with the purpose of the statutory
language, it is not consistent with economic realities, and it is
certainly not compelled as a matter of statutory interpretation. The
statutory appraisal standard should not be construed to prevent
courts from placing greater reliance on third-party sales value in
appraisal proceedings.
214. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991).
The Model Act states that the effects of the transaction need not be excluded if it would be fair
and equitable to take such effects into account. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3).
215. The Delaware Supreme Court has recently given this statutory language a fairly narrow construction. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 299 (Del. 1996). Technicolor was acquired in two stages. See id. at 293. First, pursuant to a tender offer, the buyer acquired control of Technicolor. See id. After control was obtained, but before the cash-out
merger was completed, the buyer began to implement its new business plan for Technicolor.
See id. The issue in the appraisal proceeding was whether to value the company with the new
business plan in place, or as it had existed prior to the commencement of the two-stage acquisition. See id. at 293-94. The court held that the company was to be valued as of the time at
which the merger took place, i.e., after the implementation of the new business plan. See id. at
298-99. The court construed narrowly the statutory directive to exclude elements of value
arising from the accomplishment of the merger, concluding that it is designed only to
“‘eliminate use of pro forma data and projections of a speculative variety.’” Id. at 299 (quoting
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983)). It is unclear whether Technicolor is a
unique case limited to two-stage acquisitions where interim changes have been accomplished,
or whether the court is signaling an increased willingness to consider merger-related changes.
216. See, e.g., Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. CIV.A.11107, 1995 WL 376911, at
*3-4 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (rejecting evidence of premiums paid in similar transactions because such premiums include potential synergies from merger; that portion of the “control
premium” cannot be included in the appraised value because it represents value from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger); Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. CIV.A.7244,
1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *24 (June 8, 1993) (noting that “Delaware courts . . . have been
unwilling to consider just the results of an ‘auction’ between competing tender offerors as evidence of a firm’s value because such offers ordinarily contain a control premium unrelated to
the value of the firm as a going concern” (citations omitted)); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at 68-70 & n.41 (Oct. 19, 1990) (discussing with
approval case law indicating that third-party sales value incorporates a control premium that
should not be included in appraisal valuation), rev’d, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996); Armstrong v.
Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 789 (Ohio 1987) (noting that dissenting shareholders are
not entitled to receive “any of the premium value offered as consideration to those who in fact
tendered their shares”). But see Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No. CIV.A.13414, 1998
WL 44993, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998) (holding that valuation by reference to sales of comparable companies is permissible, does not add improper control premium, and does not violate statutory command to exclude effects of merger).
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The statutory provision excluding appreciation or depreciation
in anticipation of the merger has its roots in the history of the appraisal remedy. When the remedy originated, it was intended to provide liquidity to shareholders whose investment had been fundamentally altered by a transaction those shareholders did not choose.217
The paradigm transaction was a stock-for-stock merger where, absent
appraisal, the shareholder’s investment would continue in a fundamentally changed enterprise, and the shareholder would be trapped
in an illiquid and altered investment.
By dissenting, a shareholder elected to be bought out rather than
to participate in the new, merged entity. As a result, appraisal statutes required that appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the
merger be excluded.218 This operated in the nature of an estoppel. By
exercising appraisal rights, a shareholder “dissented” from or declined to participate in the merger and thus was “estopped” from
claiming any benefit from the merger in the resulting appraisal proceeding.219 This meant that in determining the fair value of the company, the court was not to value the merged entity on a pro forma basis, but instead was to value the corporation as it existed before the
merger.
The cash-out merger, unanticipated when appraisal statutes were
drafted,220 presents an entirely different situation. The shareholder
dissenting from a cash-out merger is not dissenting from or declining
to participate in the merger and in no sense can be said to be estopped from claiming the benefit of the merger. The cashed out
shareholder is eliminated, without choice, from continued participation in the investment.221 The merger prevents the shareholder from
participating in the corporation.222 The shareholder in this context
217. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
218. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 20-21.
219. Similarly, if the merger was a bad deal, and caused the corporation’s stock price to
drop, the appraisal process allowed a shareholder to avoid the negative effects of the merger.
See supra note 99.
220. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text; Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 20-21.
221. Historically, a merger combined two “operating” companies, resulting in a different
enterprise. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 9-10. A cash-out merger, on the other hand, is a
merger in form only. The company whose shareholders are being cashed out, an “operating
company,” is combined with a shell corporation, a “nonoperating company,” solely for the purpose of cashing out the shareholders. See id. The resulting business is not changed, although it
has different owners. The owners may or may not have different plans for the operation of the
business, but that is another matter.
222. This can also be true in a cash-out sale of assets. If the corporation sells all or substantially all of its assets for cash, and distributes the cash to its shareholders, the shareholders
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only dissents from being cashed out at the stated price. Thus, the estoppel rationale for the exclusion of appreciation or depreciation in
anticipation of the merger carries no force with respect to a cash-out
merger.223
The argument that third-party sales value incorporates a control
premium and therefore allocates appreciation in anticipation of the
merger is also flawed from an economic perspective, and finds no
support in the statutory language. Third-party sales value is simply a
method of valuing an asset (in the case of a statutory appraisal, the
corporation as a whole). It does not depend on “appreciation in anticipation of the merger,” but rather is based on the fair price on
which a willing buyer and willing seller of the corporation agree.224 It

similarly are prevented from participating in the continuing enterprise. This situation occurred
in Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130 (Utah 1997). The court in Oakridge Energy
did not seem to recognize this fact, however, because it stated that the shareholder, having decided to dissent, could not rely in any way on the sales price for the assets, and that the shareholder could not seek to benefit both from the corporate action and the dissent. See id. at 13334. These statements evidence outdated reasoning dependent on the liquidity rationale for the
appraisal remedy and “estopping” shareholders who chose not to stay in the venture. The dissenting shareholders in Oakridge Energy, however, did not have the option to stay in the venture.
223. For this reason, Professor Thompson has argued that in the context of a cash-out
merger, fair value should not exclude consideration of the effects of the transaction. See
Thompson, supra note 6, at 35-38. In this vein, New York’s statute no longer prohibits consideration of the effects of the transaction when determining fair value. See N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney 1986); Thompson, supra note 6, at 36. Professor Thompson has
argued that “[the] Delaware Supreme Court [has] interpreted its statute to achieve the same
result without a statutory amendment.” Id. Although the Delaware courts have certainly
moved in that direction, see supra note 215, Professor Thompson somewhat overstates the case.
Delaware courts, at times, have continued to rely on the statute’s exclusion of the effects of the
transaction. See supra note 216 and infra notes 280-81 and 405-30 and accompanying text.
The Model Business Corporation Act states that fair value should exclude “appreciation
or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action” giving rise to the appraisal remedy, unless such “exclusion would be inequitable.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3) (1991)
(emphasis added). As a result, courts in Model Act states have a statutory basis to take into
account the effects of the transaction that gives rise to the appraisal remedy, as equity requires.
It would be especially appropriate to do so in the context of a cash-out merger where the estoppel rationale for the exclusion does not apply. Unfortunately, the comment to the Model
Act fails adequately to make this point. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 37-38.
224. See Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (noting that
purchase offers for a company or comparable companies are relevant and not precluded by
statutory command to ignore effects of merger, and that such offers have “particular relevance”
because going concern value equals what the corporation is worth as an operating business to a
third party), aff’d, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986); Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No.
CIV.A.13414, 1998 WL 44993, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998) (holding that valuation on basis
of sales of comparable companies is valid and not precluded by statutory command to ignore
effects of merger).
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does not depend on the inherently subjective testimony of experts,
but is based on the objective testimony of market forces.225
The question again boils down to “what is actually being valued?” If it is a proportionate interest in the corporation as a whole,
as Delaware and most states have concluded, third-party sales value
with respect to the corporation as a whole is strong evidence as to the
value of the corporation. If such evidence exists, it should be used.
The statutory exclusion of merger-related appreciation should not
prevent a court from taking into consideration the market value of
the corporation, as determined by third-party sales value.226
4. Existing Case Law on the Applicability of a Third-Party Sales
Value Standard. Existing case law is another impediment to the full
utilization of third-party sales value. The starting point for this
analysis is Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.227 Kirby Lumber owned a
substantial amount of forest land, which it harvested on a “sustained
yield” basis.228 It also operated a sawmill and plywood plant and, at
the time of the dispute, had a new plywood plant and a particleboard
plant under construction.229 Kirby had been controlled by Santa Fe
Industries or its predecessors for many years.230 By 1973, Santa Fe

This point continues to be lost on some courts. In Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937
P.2d 130 (Utah 1997), the court ignored the price paid for substantially all of the assets of the
corporation because the court thought that price included appreciation in anticipation of the
corporate action. See id. at 133-34. The court awarded the dissenting shareholder a price per
share well below the price per share paid for the assets of the corporation, reasoning that the
assets must have had some “unique value” to that purchaser justifying the inflation of the
“value of the assets above their realistic pre-sale value.” Id. at 134. In other words, the court
thought the purchaser overpaid for the assets, despite a lack of evidentiary basis for this conclusion, and ignored the general principle that an asset is worth what someone will pay for it. See
supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text. The court also stated that it did not trust this evidence of third-party sales value because there were not several bidders competing to purchase
the assets. See Oakridge Energy, 937 P.2d at 134.
225. See Van de Walle v. Unimation, No. CIV.A.7046, 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 7, 1991) (“The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market
reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a valuation expert)
is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair.”).
226. The Delaware statute specifically directs the court, when determining fair value, to
“take into account all relevant factors.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991). Third-party
sales value should certainly qualify as a relevant factor in determining the value of a corporation.
227. 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified, 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
228. See id. at 733.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 732.
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owned 95% of Kirby.231 Santa Fe then engaged in a short form
merger to cash out the shareholders owning the remaining 5% of
Kirby at a price of $150 per share.232 Some of these shareholders
perfected their right to an appraisal.233 Under the procedures existing
at that time, the court appointed an appraiser, who used the
Delaware block method to determine that the fair value of Kirby was
$254.40 per share.234
Both parties disagreed with the appraiser’s conclusions.235 The
major dispute between the parties concerned the value of Kirby’s assets, and the weight to be assigned to that asset value.236 The shareholders claimed the asset value of Kirby was $682 per share, and argued that a 90% weight should be attached to the asset value; the
corporation claimed the asset value was $456 per share and should
carry a weight of 5%; the appraiser valued the assets of Kirby at $456
per share and assigned the asset value a 40% weight.237
Both sides agreed that the value of Kirby’s assets far exceeded
both its earnings value and the price at which its shares traded in the
market.238 The dissenting shareholders argued that Kirby should be
valued based on what the shareholders would receive in a merger negotiated at arm’s length with a third party.239 They asserted that any
third party acquiring a natural resource company like Kirby would
pay a price based on the value of its assets, and that to be treated
fairly, the minority shareholders should be paid based on that value.240
The court “appreciated the logic of this argument,” but concluded
that the appraiser did not err in rejecting it.241
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 732-33.
235. See id. at 732.
236. See id. at 733.
237. See id. The parties also disagreed with respect to earnings value, see id., but the larger
part of their dispute revolved around asset value.
238. See id. The highest market price for Kirby stock in the years prior to the cash-out
merger was $92.50, and this represented purchases by Santa Fe. See id. at 740. Undoubtedly,
given Santa Fe’s dominant ownership position, trading in Kirby stock was very thin, and its
market price not a very reliable indicator, thereby explaining why the appraiser gave market
value no weight. See id. at 733. The corporation presented two valuation scenarios, one with
market value weighted at 55%, and, in case the court agreed with the appraiser that market
value was entitled to little or no weight, another with market value receiving no weight. See id.
239. See id. at 734-35.
240. See id. at 734.
241. Id. at 735.
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The court based its conclusion on existing Delaware case law,
which held that dissenting shareholders were entitled to a
“proportionate interest in a going concern.”242 This meant that value
was to be fixed on a going concern basis rather than a liquidation basis.243 The court recognized that the shareholders’ third-party sales
value argument was not exactly a liquidation value argument, but
thought it was too close to one, stating that it “seem[s] to go beyond
the ‘going concern’ standard.”244 The court defined a company’s
“going concern” value as its value “as long as [it] continue[s] in business,”245 and concluded that an arm’s-length sales analysis was inappropriate because it “presupposes an acquisition value based on the
very fact that the company will not continue in business on the same
basis.”246
The court failed to explain why the company, if acquired in an
arm’s-length merger, would not continue in business in the same
manner. Perhaps the court thought that an acquiror buying Kirby at
a price based on the value of its assets would have to liquidate it in
order to realize that value. It seems just as likely, however, that a
buyer would continue the business as it was then being run, believing
that to be the best use of those assets over the long run.247
Kirby Lumber thus stands for the proposition that a dissenting
shareholder is entitled to a proportionate interest in a going concern,
and that fair value should not be based on liquidation value (at least
if the corporation had no plan, as of the time of the transaction giving
rise to appraisal rights, to liquidate). It is generally cited for this
proposition.248 In so holding, however, the court rejected the shareholders’ third-party sales argument; this remains an impediment to
the use of such an approach today.
Kirby Lumber, of course, was decided before the Delaware Supreme Court’s makeover of the appraisal remedy in Weinberger v.

242. Id. at 735 (citing Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. Ch. 1950)).
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 736 (citing Tri-Continental Corp., 74 A.2d at 76).
246. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Vice Chancellor’s conclusion, quoting
his opinion without additional analysis. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 142
(Del. 1980).
247. Of course, the buyer could always pursue a liquidation at a later date, or resell the
company or its assets to another third party in order to realize on the value of the assets.
248. See Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802-03 (Del. 1992).

WERTH

1998]

07/15/98 11:57 AM

SHAREHOLDERS’ APPRAISAL REMEDY

665

249
Weinberger requires that fair price be established by
UOP, Inc.
“consideration of all relevant factors involving the value of a company.”250 The question is whether Kirby Lumber’s rejection of the
dissenting shareholders’ third-party sales value argument survives
Weinberger. The Delaware Supreme Court has not directly addressed this question. Kirby Lumber has been cited approvingly by
the Delaware Supreme Court after Weinberger as a case in which the
dissenting shareholders’ “liquidation value” argument was rejected,
but the citing opinions have not directly addressed the third-party
sales value question.251 The issue has arisen several times in the
Delaware Court of Chancery, with mixed results.
In In re Radiology Associates, Inc.,252 the dissenting shareholder’s
expert made the argument that her discounted cash flow analysis included an implicit minority discount, and therefore should be adjusted upward to remove that discount.253 This argument is suspect
because a DCF analysis is not a market price based valuation.254 The
court stated that the DCF analysis “arguably may have left out a
premium that normally accrues when shareholders sell a company,”
but that “‘the appraisal process is not intended to reconstruct a pro
forma sale’” of the company.255 The court concluded “[p]laintiff is
not entitled to the proportionate sales value of Radiology. Plaintiff is
entitled to the proportionate value of Radiology as a continuing
256
shareholder.” Thus, in a discussion of whether it is appropriate to
adjust upward a DCF analysis to correct for an implicit minority discount, the court cast doubt upon the utility of third-party sales value,
an issue not really presented in the case.
The Radiology court misapplied precedent when it stated that
“the appraisal process is not intended to reconstruct a pro forma sale
but to assume the shareholder was willing to maintain his investment

249. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
250. Id. at 713 (citing Tri-Continental Corp., 74 A.2d at 72).
251. See Rapid-American Corp., 603 A.2d at 803; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) (citing both Kirby Lumber and Rapid American for the proposition that a shareholder is entitled to a proportionate share of the corporation as a going concern, rather than on a liquidated basis).
252. 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991).
253. See id. at 494.
254. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
255. In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d at 494 (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,
564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989)).
256. Id.
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position, however slight, had the merger not occurred.”257 The court
cited Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett258 as its sole authority for this
proposition.259 In Cavalier, however, the court was rejecting the argument that a minority discount should be applied in an appraisal
proceeding.260 The pro forma sale that the Cavalier court refused to
reconstruct was a pro forma sale of the dissenting shareholder’s minority interest, at a minority discount. The court in Cavalier made no
statement about the applicability of third-party sales value with respect to the company as a whole. Cavalier thus stands for the proposition that the appraisal court should not attempt to ascertain the
third-party sales value of a minority block of stock. It does not stand
for the proposition that the appraisal court should not attempt to ascertain the third-party sales value of the corporation as a whole. The
Radiology court’s citation to the contrary is simply incorrect.
The latest court of chancery opinion to discredit third-party sales
value is Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc.261 In this proceeding, the dissenting shareholder in a cash-out merger argued that
the chief executive officer of the corporation was paid more than the
market price for someone that could be hired to do a comparable
job.262 The dissenting shareholder contended that any purchaser of
the corporation, or its assets, would take this into account in deciding
what to pay for the company, and that this excessive compensation
should therefore be considered in valuing the company. 263
The court acknowledged that “in a sale of corporate control the
price that a buyer can pay may be affected by the compensation of
the CEO.”264 Nonetheless, the court concluded that testimony with
257. Id.
258. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
259. See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d at 494.
260. See Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1145.
261. No. CIV.A.8474, 1996 WL 483093 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1996), rev’d on other grounds,
701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997).
262. See id. at *1.
263. See id. The shareholder did not contend that the compensation was so high as to
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. The court indicated that if a derivative claim to that effect were pending, “there would be strong logic in including the net settlement value of such a
claim as an asset of the corporation for appraisal purposes.” Id. at *1.
264. Id. at *2. It is common practice in small corporations for the owners to extract some of
the benefits of ownership in the form of salary, in order to avoid double taxation. See id. It is
equally common that buyers of small corporations are aware of this practice, and carefully look
at the amount of compensation being paid to shareholders in determining the value of the corporation. See SHANNON P. PRATT, VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICES 57, 92-93 (2d ed. 1993).
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respect to the corporation’s ability to replace the CEO at a lesser salary was irrelevant because the appraisal remedy “does not define fair
value as the change in control value of the firm.”265 No authority was
cited for this proposition.266 Thus, the court of chancery again cast
doubt on the validity of third-party sales value in a case not actually
involving evidence of third-party sales value.267
Despite the negative implications of Radiology and Gonsalves
with respect to third-party sales value,268 other Delaware Court of

265. Gonsalves, 1996 WL 483093, at *2.
266. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that, in the absence
of a derivative claim attacking excessive compensation, the appraisal proceeding may not take
into account the level of compensation paid to executive officers or the possibility that the corporation could reduce such payments in the future. See Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 362-63 (Del. 1997). The main concern of both the trial court and the
supreme court seemed to be that taking into account changes that might be made by new management would include value arising from accomplishment of the merger, in violation of the
statute. Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 293-99 (Del. 1996) (permitting consideration of changes planned by purchaser that had acquired control of the target corporation
several months prior to the transaction giving rise to appraisal rights.).
267. Although the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court decision to exclude consideration of the level of executive compensation, it did so without casting aspersions
on the use of third-party sales value. See Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 362-63. The decision of the
court with respect to the relevance of the salary of the CEO/controlling shareholder is, however, questionable. Under Weinberger, appraisal requires consideration of all relevant factors.
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983). If a shareholder has been, in
essence, withdrawing corporate income in the form of salary, that should be a relevant factor,
even if no derivative claim has been asserted. Any buyer of the corporation would find the
level of compensation paid to the CEO/controlling shareholder highly relevant (as even the
chancery court conceded). Prior to Gonsalves, other decisions addressing this issue had uniformly concluded that, in determining fair value, it is appropriate to make adjustments to account for distributions to shareholders in the form of salary that might otherwise have constituted corporate income. See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 491 (Del. Ch. 1991);
see also Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., No. CIV.A.11265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *10-12
(Dec. 7, 1992) (refusing, based on a finding that the salaries were not excessive, an adjustment
for excessive salaries paid to shareholders, but expressing no doubts about the propriety of
making an adjustment when salaries are found to be excessive); cf. Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc.,
514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (stating, in a case involving a buyout in the context of a dissolution rather than a merger, that “net income is adjusted by eliminating from the
corporate expenses a portion of the officer-shareholders’ salaries that is considered excess
compensation”).
268. Another possible example might be Campbell v. Caravel Academy, Inc., No.
CIV.A.7830, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86 (June 16, 1988), aff’d, 553 A.2d 638 (Del. 1988), where
the court stated that “the market price of a proprietary school is a particularly inappropriate
method of valuation.” Id. at *9 (citing 1 BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 419 (1st
ed. 1937)). The petitioner argued for a “willing buyer, willing seller” standard with respect to
the corporation as a whole. See id. at *8. The court did not reject this standard out of hand, but
seemed to find it inappropriate in the particular factual context. Although the court did not
really explain its reasoning, it seemed troubled with petitioner’s evidence of third-party sales
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Chancery decisions have taken a much more favorable approach to
this valuation technique. The strongest statement in support of thirdparty sales value in the appraisal context in Delaware is Cooper v.
269
Pabst received a proposal to be acquired at a
Pabst Brewing Co.
price of $16 per share at a time when its public share price was in the
$14-15 range.270 The proposed acquisition price was soon raised to
$20.50 per share.271 Pabst rejected the offer, but after consulting with
its investment banker, indicated a willingness to be acquired at $25
per share.272 Before long, a bidding war broke out, with four different
bidders attempting to acquire Pabst, at escalating prices.273
Heileman ultimately prevailed in this war, acquiring Pabst with a
two-tier offer, paying $32 per share in a front-end tender offer and
then consummating a back-end merger to acquire the rest of the
Pabst shares, paying for these shares with a $24 principal amount
subordinated debenture.274 The court determined that the blended
value of the consideration paid by Heileman was $29.50 per share.275
Pabst shareholders dissented from the merger and sought an appraisal of their shares.276
Both parties presented appraisal evidence, but the court concluded that neither party had established a persuasive value, requiring the court to conduct its own analysis.277 In its analysis, the court
relied extensively on the price actually paid by Heileman and used
language very supportive of a third-party sales value approach.278 The
court stated that:
“[o]rdinarily, the value of any commodity in a competitive market is
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for that commodity. . . . Therefore, under conventional principles of economics, the
results of the auction for Pabst might be expected to provide a rea-

value. See id. (stating that petitioner’s expert “gave no basis for [his] novel assumption” with
respect to the market price of the corporation on a third-party sales value basis).
269. No. CIV.A.7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91 (June 8, 1993).
270. See id. at *2-3.
271. See id. at *3.
272. See id.
273. See id. at *3-6.
274. See id. at *5-6.
275. See id. at *22.
276. See id. at *6.
277. See id. at *21 (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992)).
278. See id. at *21-24.
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sonable indication of Pabst’s value that this Court can con279
sider . . . .”

The court indicated some discomfort considering the results of
an “auction” between competing bidders, noting that Delaware
courts in the past had been reluctant to do so because “such offers
ordinarily contain a control premium unrelated to the value of the
firm as a going concern.”280 The court cited Bell v. Kirby Lumber
281
Corp. at this point. Nonetheless, clearly swayed by the third-party
sales value, the court concluded that the fair value of Pabst for appraisal purposes was $27 per share.282 The court went on to test its
conclusion against other evidence in the record, and, after considering all of the evidence, was satisfied with the $27 per share valuation.283
Another Delaware case providing strong support for a thirdparty sales value approach is Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc.284 Condec owned 78.4% of Unimation; the remaining 21.6% was publicly
held.285 Condec, in need of cash, consulted its investment banker for

279. Id. at *23-24. The court also found that there was a competitive market for the acquisition of Pabst. See id.
280. Id. at *24.
281. See id. (citing Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. 413 A.2d 137, 140-42 (Del. 1980)). Kirby
Lumber was also cited by the chancery court in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No.
CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *68 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
The chancery court in Technicolor viewed third-party sales value as incorporating a control
premium and concluded that, under Kirby Lumber, intrinsic value to be received by the dissenting shareholders should not include a proportionate share of a control premium. Id. at *6869. The chancery court considered the possibility that Weinberger may have signaled a departure from Kirby Lumber, but concluded that it did not. See id. at *69-70. Although the chancery court’s decision in Technicolor was later reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court, the
supreme court did not discuss the third-party sales value issue. It did, however, narrowly construe the statutory requirement that fair value be determined exclusive of any element arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the transaction. See Technicolor, 684 A.2d. at 29799; see also supra notes 215, 223.
282. See Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *21. The difference between the
$29.50 third-party sales value and the $27 value adopted by the court can be explained in two
ways. One way to explain the price differential relates to concerns over “setting a floor price.”
See infra notes 317-30 and accompanying text. The second explanation is the court’s desire to
skirt the holding of Kirby Lumber by not relying exclusively on third-party sales value; this was
accomplished by backing out $2.50 per share as the maximum control premium incorporated in
the $29.50 price. See Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *25. The court of chancery was not free to reject outright Kirby Lumber, a supreme court decision, and hold that
third-party sales value is an accurate measure of the value of the corporation.
283. See Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *25-28.
284. No. CIV.A.7046, 1991 WL 29303 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991).
285. See id. at *1.
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advice on how to raise capital.286 The banker suggested a sale of
Unimation at a price of $110-120 million.287 Condec did not believe
that Unimation could be sold for that price, but authorized the investment banker to explore a sale of Unimation with an asking price
of $120-150 million.288
Over seven months, fifty to sixty potential purchasers were contacted, culminating in an initial offer from Westinghouse to buy
Unimation for $85 million, which was then raised to $95 million, and
then to $107 million.289 Condec accepted the offer at $107 million.290
Condec and the public shareholders of Unimation both received
equivalent consideration for the shares of Unimation they owned.291
Subsequently, a class action suit was commenced on behalf of the
public shareholders of Unimation to challenge the Westinghouse acquisition.292 This was not an appraisal case, but one asserting that the
merger was unfair and that the approval of the merger constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty by Unimation and its board of directors.293
Because the acquisition of Unimation was a bona fide arm’slength transaction, the court concluded that the business judgment
rule, rather than the intrinsic fairness test, should be utilized to
evaluate the transaction.294 Nonetheless, the court gave the plaintiffs
the benefit of the doubt and applied the intrinsic fairness test, concluding that the standard to be applied did not matter because the
transaction passed muster under either test.295 Under Delaware law,
intrinsic fairness incorporates both fair dealing and fair price.296 Ad-

286. See id. at *2.
287. See id.
288. See id. at *2-3.
289. See id. at *3, *5-6. The only other potential purchaser that offered to buy Unimation
was General Electric, and its highest bid was $65 million. See id. at *4. After the receipt of
Westinghouse’s $107 million proposal, an attempt was made to induce General Electric to top
that bid. General Electric responded that it might be prepared to offer as much as $85-90 million, but it never did so. See id.
290. See id. at *6.
291. See id. at *13.
292. See id. at *1.
293. The plaintiffs alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty, duty of care, and the duty of candor. See id. at *8.
294. See id. at *11.
295. See id.
296. See id.; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); Ryan v. Tad’s Enters.,
Inc., Nos. CIV.A.10229, 11977, 1996 WL 936160, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1996), aff’d, 693 A.2d
1082 (Del. 1997).
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dressing the latter, the court concluded that the merger price was fair,
stating:
The most persuasive evidence of the fairness of the . . . merger
price is that it was the result of arm’s-length negotiations between
two independent parties, where the seller (Condec and Unimation)
was motivated to seek the highest available price, and a diligent and
extensive canvas of the market had confirmed that no better price
was available.
The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of
objective market reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably
subjective thought process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong
297
evidence that the price is fair.

Although “fair price” for purposes of intrinsic fairness analysis may
not be the same as “fair value” for appraisal purposes,298 the court’s
discussion of the accuracy and validity of third-party sales value rings
equally true in either context.
Courts outside of Delaware, unconstrained by Kirby Lumber, often have been willing to consider evidence of fair value derived from
reliable third-party sales value data.299 Probably the most articulate
statement in favor of third-party sales value is found in BNE Massa300
chusetts Corp. v. Sims. In that case, a corporation engaged an investment banker to explore a merger, and received acquisition proposals from six potential buyers.301 The corporation agreed to merge
with one of the six suitors; some of its shareholders dissented from
the merger.302

297. Unimation, 1991 WL 29303, at *17; see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc.,
638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (noting, in a nonappraisal challenge to a cash-out merger engaged in by controlling shareholder, that minority shareholders are in need of procedural protections because “no court could be certain whether the transaction terms fully approximate
what truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm’s-length negotiation”).
298. The Delaware courts have consistently left open the possibility that the measure of
damages in an intrinsic fairness/breach of fiduciary duty case may be greater than in an appraisal case, including elements of “rescissory damages.” See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
542 A.2d 1182, 1187-88 (Del. 1988); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099,
1107 (Del. 1985); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Professor Coffee has persuasively argued that
“fair value” and “fair price” should be integrated and given equivalent meanings. See Coffee,
supra note 128, at 412-18.
299. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
300. 588 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
301. See id. at 16.
302. See id.
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The corporation argued that the merger was an arm’s-length
transaction resulting from a “controlled auction.”303 The court stated
that, assuming this was true, “the trial judge could appropriately consider whether the . . . merger price should be binding upon both parties” in the appraisal proceeding.304 The court rejected the corporation’s argument that the dissenting shareholders should get less than
the merger price, characterizing this as a penalty for dissenting, and
also rejected the dissenting shareholders’ argument that they should
get more than the merger price, characterizing this as a reward for
dissenting.305
Given the untainted nature of this merger transaction—if that is the
fact of the matter—we are unable to perceive any sound reason why
dissenting stockholders should receive any more or less than the
amount received by all other stockholders in a transaction approved
by the board of directors upon the advice of investment bankers.
The purpose of [the appraisal statute], as we have said, is to assure
minority stockholders that those in control of the enterprise will not
obtain unfair advantage. In this case, neither party has suggested
306
that unfair advantage was sought or obtained.

The court went on to state that the merger agreement provides
the information required for an appraisal: the “price a knowledgeable
buyer would pay for the entire corporation.”307 Finally, the court
noted that experts’ opinions “cannot match the reality experienced
by this institution in setting the terms of the merger with the actual
buyer who prevailed over five competing institutions.”308
There are many other non-Delaware cases recognizing the value
of third-party sales value, sometimes explicitly, and at other times,
without much discussion of the appropriateness of that approach.309
303. Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Id.
305. See id. at 20-21.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 21 (quoting Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d
1122, 1125 (Mass. 1986)).
308. Id. The case was remanded, at which time the dissenting shareholders would be able
to test whether the merger was, in fact, the product of an arm’s-length bidding process, or
tainted by conflicts of interest at the board or officer level. See id. The trial judge was instructed that he could determine fair value based on the testimony of experts if he was not persuaded that the financial terms of the merger agreement should prevail. See id.
309. See, e.g., Hunter v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 1989)
(holding that a negotiated financial transaction with a third party bears on what a company as a
whole is worth); Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1126-27 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (finding
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There is little contrary authority,310 with the exception of those courts
that have adhered to the notion that the purpose of the appraisal
process is to value a minority interest.311
It is time for the Delaware Supreme Court to disapprove the
language in Kirby Lumber that casts doubt on the utility of thirdparty sales value.312 The Weinberger approach to valuation, which
particular relevance in purchase offers for company or comparable companies), aff’d, 796 F.2d
803 (5th Cir. 1986); Knight v. Pine Island Fruit Corp., 445 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (finding that where corporation sold its only asset at fair market value, dissenting shareholder entitled to proportionate share of sales price); Institutional Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v.
Hughes, 562 N.E.2d 662, 664, 666 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (affirming the trial court’s reliance, in
part, on offer from third party to buy entire company); Ely, Inc. v. Wiley, 546 N.W.2d 218, 220
(Iowa 1996) (accepting the argument that actual transaction price with third party should be
considered); In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1004-05 &
n.7 (Me. 1989) (finding relevant the inquiry as to the highest price a buyer would reasonably
pay for the whole enterprise); Cawley v. SCM Corp., 530 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (N.Y. 1988) (noting
that the lower court properly used a third-party merger price to arrive at a figure that was fair
and “comparable to an amount that would have been set by arm’s-length negotiations”); Alpert
v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 29 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that the stock price was fair
because it was tied to fair market value of corporation’s only asset, as determined in arm’slength negotiation); Chrome Data Sys., Inc. v. Stringer, 820 P.2d 831, 832-33 (Or. Ct. App.
1991) (concluding that a preliminary offer from a third party was relevant and provided a floor
on the value of the corporation, and noting that an “offer to buy the assets of a business is a
good indicator of the value of the business as a whole”); cf. Spinnaker Software Corp. v.
Nicholson, 495 N.W.2d 441, 444-45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (considering application of thirdparty sales value standard, but finding that the evidence did not show an arm’s-length negotiated price).
310. But see supra note 224.
311. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 789 (Ohio 1987) (finding
“no reason to consider . . . any of the premium value offered as consideration to those who in
fact tendered their shares”).
312. Kirby Lumber is subject to criticism on several other grounds as well. Because Kirby
Lumber was predominately a natural resources company, the value of its assets should have
been extremely relevant in the appraisal proceeding. See, e.g., Walter S. Cheesman Realty Co.
v. Moore, 770 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding net asset value entitled to great
weight where business is devoted to possession of assets—here, a real estate holding company);
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 933-36 (Del. 1985) (stating that parties placed heavy
emphasis on value of assets in oil and gas company); Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 215 A.2d
242, 245-46 (Del. Ch. 1965) (noting that it is appropriate to place heavy emphasis on asset
value where corporation has emphasized capital appreciation rather than current income, as
was the case with the instant real estate holding company). Even though the minority shareholders were cashed out at $150 per share, the corporation’s own expert, hired for purposes of
the appraisal proceeding, valued the corporation’s assets at $456 per share, but argued that asset value only should receive a 5% weighting. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730,
733 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified, 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). The dissenting shareholders argued
for a 90% weighting of asset value. See id. The court itself recognized that asset value was important in valuing Kirby Lumber, and justified a higher weighting than would typically be the
case, but it was unwilling to second guess the conclusion of the court-appointed appraiser who
accorded a 40% weight to asset value. See id. at 741. In addition, another appraiser hired by
the corporation, in advance of and in preparation for the cash-out merger, valued the com-
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pany’s assets at over $600 per share. See id. at 737-38. There was also evidence indicating that
in deciding whether to cash out the minority shareholders, the controlling shareholder itself
took into account “the overriding asset value feature.” Id. at 734. Thus, there was powerful
evidence in the record that $150 per share did not fairly represent the value of the corporation,
and that, based on asset value, the corporation was worth at least $456 per share, and probably
more. See id. at 740-41.
Further problems are evidenced in the court’s analysis of the corporation’s earnings
value. The usual approach to fixing earnings value at the time Kirby Lumber was decided was
to determine average earnings over the prior five years and multiply that amount by a
price/earnings multiplier chosen by reference to comparable public companies. See, e.g., Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 347-50 (Del. Ch. 1973) (noting
that “[t]he five-year period immediately preceding the merger is ordinarily considered to be
the most representative and reasonable period of time over which to compute the average”
earnings), aff’d, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975). The court adopted this approach in Kirby Lumber.
See 395 A.2d at 739-40. There were, however, two glaring problems with this approach as applied by the court—one with the calculation of earnings, and the second with the choice of multiplier. First, Kirby Lumber was, at the time of the merger, in the process of completing a new
plywood plant and a new particleboard plant. See id. at 733. The two new plants were scheduled to be completed in the year following the merger. See id. Prior to the merger, Kirby
Lumber had very little manufacturing capacity, so the two new facilities promised to add significantly to earnings. See id. at 733, 739. Nonetheless, the earnings potential from these new
facilities was not taken into account in establishing the “earnings value” of the corporation,
because the facilities did not contribute to the earnings of the company over the prior five
years. See id. at 734. Although the dissenting shareholders pointed this out, the court found no
reason to depart from the usual five-year earnings average approach. See id. at 739-40; cf. Bell
v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 151 (Del. 1980) (Quillen, J., concurring) (questioning the
use of five-year averaging approach in this case, but unwilling to conclude that it constituted
reversible error). Thus, earnings value, which was weighted by the court at 60%, did not accurately measure the value of the company going forward. See Kirby Lumber, 395 A.2d at 740.
In addition, a significant error appears to have been made in the methodology for
choosing an appropriate multiplier. The multiplier was chosen based on the market multipliers
of comparable companies. See id. at 739. These multipliers represented the market price of
those comparable companies, divided by the earnings of those companies. The earnings figures
used in determining comparable multipliers, however, appear to have been earnings from the
most recent year, rather than a five-year average of earnings. See id. Because these companies, like Kirby Lumber, had shown steadily increasing earnings over the prior five years, the
multipliers based on the most recent year’s earnings were much lower than they would have
been had a multiplier been calculated based on a five-year average of earnings. Because Kirby
Lumber was being valued on a five-year average of its earnings, logical consistency required
that the multiplier derived from comparable companies be calculated in the same manner. The
dissenting shareholders attempted to make this point, arguing that the “multiplier should have
been based on the five-year average prices of the comparable companies.” Id. The court’s reply to this argument was simply that it would not disturb the appraiser’s choice of a multiplier
so long as it was within the range of reason, and the court said it was in this case. See id. at 740.
There are strong arguments that the dissenting shareholders in Kirby Lumber did not receive fair value in the appraisal proceeding. At the same time, Kirby Lumber presents exactly
the kind of transaction that should draw the attention of courts—a cash-out merger engaged in
by a controlling shareholder. This was a classic conflict of interest transaction that would ordinarily be strictly scrutinized by courts under the intrinsic or entire fairness test. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937. The final result in Kirby Lumber can best be explained as a compromise verdict on the part of the appraiser, and a substantial reluctance by both the court of
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calls for consideration of any valuation technique generally acceptable in the financial community,313 requires courts to use reliable evidence of third-party sales value. Further, the Delaware statute does
not support the Kirby Lumber position on third-party sales value; instead it requires that courts take into account “all relevant factors” in
conducting a valuation.314 Although Delaware courts have tentatively
explored the use of third-party sales value, sometimes giving effect to
it when it appears persuasive,315 Kirby Lumber currently impedes the
full use of this valuation technique.316
chancery and the supreme court to second guess the appraiser. Perhaps the courts’ unwillingness to deviate from the appraiser’s opinion was unduly influenced by the fact that the cash-out
merger was proposed at an amount, $150 per share, that exceeded prior market prices by a fair
margin. See Kirby Lumber, 395 A.2d at 735. The appraiser found fair value to be $254.50 per
share, well below the $639 per share asked for by the dissenting shareholders, but well above
the $150 merger price, and well above the $126-$135 per share amount the corporation claimed
to be fair value in the appraisal proceeding. See id. at 732-33. In short, a compromise result
was reached by the appraiser, and the opinions of both the court of chancery and the Delaware
Supreme Court are liberally laced with references to deference to the appraiser. See id. at 73741; Kirby Lumber, 413 A.2d at 146-48; see also id. at 151 (Quillen, J., concurring).
313. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
314. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991).
315. See supra notes 269-98 and accompanying text. In the cases discussed in the text, Cooper, Unimation, and BNE Massachusetts Corp., the courts have indicated a willingness to rely
on third-party sales value in situations where the use of third-party sales value worked to the
benefit of the corporation, rather than the dissenting shareholder. See supra notes 269-98 and
accompanying text; see also Ely, Inc. v. Wiley, 546 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 1996) (accepting the
corporation’s argument that third-party sales value should be considered in appraisal). In other
words, the price paid in a bona fide arm’s-length transaction acted as a limitation on the
amount the shareholder could recover in an appraisal proceeding, see Cooper v. Pabst Brewing
Co., No. CIV.A.7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *23-24 (May 14, 1993); BNE Massachusetts
Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d 14, 20 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), or to demonstrate the fairness of the
price in a nonappraisal challenge to the transaction. See Van de Walle v. Unimation, No.
CIV.A.7046, 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991). If courts are willing to use thirdparty sales value when it favors the corporation, they should also be willing to utilize that approach when a dissenting shareholder is able to provide evidence that the third-party sales
value exceeds the transaction price.
316. Ironically, although the Delaware courts have been somewhat reluctant to embrace
true third-party sales value as a valuation technique, the same courts have placed heavy emphasis on the use of procedural devices that purportedly simulate arm’s-length negotiations.
Thus, in cases involving a cash-out merger by a controlling shareholder, the Delaware courts
have attached significance to whether procedures were used to approximate true bargaining,
and have encouraged corporations to appoint an independent committee of the board of directors to negotiate with the controlling shareholder, and make available to that committee independent legal and financial advice. See Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937-38; Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983); Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d
490, 504 (Del. Ch. 1990); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. CIV.A.7499, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 50, at *20 & n.7 (Nov. 8, 1989). It is difficult, however, for any such arrangement truly
to approximate third-party bargaining. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d
1110, 1117-21 (Del. 1994) (finding that use of independent committee did not simulate third-
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5. The Problem of Setting a Floor Price. One final hurdle to the
increased utilization of third-party sales value as a valuation
technique is that by using this approach, the price paid in the
transaction that triggered the appraisal claim could effectively
become a floor on the appraised fair value of the corporation.317 If
such a floor price is set, shareholders might be encouraged to bring
meritless appraisal suits, knowing that the worst possible result would
be receipt of the consideration offered in the triggering transaction.
Bringing the appraisal litigation therefore might be viewed as a nolose situation,318 thus encouraging baseless litigation brought to
extract settlements based on the nuisance value of the lawsuit.
Although this is a potential problem, and two Delaware chancery
court opinions have expressed concern over this point,319 it can be
addressed directly, and is not a valid reason to exclude reliable
evidence of third-party sales value.
One response to the concern that a floor price will encourage
undesirable litigation is that it may actually have the opposite effect.
If it is clear to potential litigants that courts will rely on third-party
sales value, shareholders will have nothing to gain by bringing an appraisal action if the triggering transaction involves a bona fide thirdparty sale. In fact, an appraisal proceeding will lead to an inferior result because the shareholders will have to bear their expenses in the
appraisal proceeding, typically including attorney and expert fees.
Thus, use of third-party sales value may actually discourage undesirable litigation.
The other response to the floor price problem is to police directly meritless litigation through existing or improved procedural
devices. First, courts must be willing to rapidly dispose of appraisal
litigation, generally by summary judgment, if it is clear that a bona
fide third-party sale has taken place. If the corporation produces
evidence that a true third-party sale has occurred, and the dissenting
shareholder cannot establish a genuine issue of fact as to the exis-

party transaction); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106 n.7 (Del. 1985)
(referring to “quick surrender” by special committee). One would think that if the Delaware
courts find simulated third-party bargaining to be persuasive, they would not ignore authentic
third-party bargaining.
317. See Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. CIV.A.7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *24
(June 8, 1993); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at
*70 n.41 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
318. See Cooper, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *24-25.
319. See supra note 317.
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tence of a true third-party sale, the corporation should be entitled to
summary judgment.
Second, courts must be willing to use the authority granted to
them to shift fees and costs to deter meritless appraisal litigation.
Most appraisal statutes give courts the authority to assess costs
against the dissenters in some circumstances.320 Many statutes also
grant to courts the authority to assess against either party the fees
and expenses of counsel and experts.321 The Delaware statute permits
shifting of costs, but unfortunately does not allow courts to assess
fees and expenses of counsel and experts.322 Courts should consider
exercising the authority to shift costs, fees, and expenses when it is
clear that a third-party sale has occurred, and the dissenting shareholders are unable to put forth any credible evidence disputing the
existence of a true third-party sale.
323
Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co. presents a case in which the thirdparty sales value approach could have been profitably adopted. In
Cooper, a fairly spirited bidding war erupted for Pabst, culminating in
a merger and an appraisal proceeding.324 In the absence of any conflicting evidence as to the bona fides of the third-party sale, this
should have warranted a quick disposition of the case, an award of
the merger consideration to the dissenting shareholders, and consideration of the appropriateness of shifting fees onto the dissenting
shareholders. Although the court stated that, “under conventional
principles of economics, the results of the auction for Pabst might be
expected to provide a reasonable indication of Pabst’s value,” the
court felt unable to rely on third-party sales value because of Kirby
325
Lumber, and because of the “floor price” problem. As a result, the

320. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(a) (1991) (stating that courts may assess
costs against dissenting shareholders if they act “arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith in
demanding payment”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (1991) (stating that the court may tax
costs of proceeding “upon the parties as the Court deems equitable in the circumstances”).
321. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(b).
322. Although the Delaware statute expressly permits the court to assess costs against either party, it does not contain the same authority to assess attorney and expert fees and expenses. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No.
CIV.A.7499, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at *21-24 (Nov. 8, 1989); Technicolor, 1990 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 259, at *112-14. The Delaware legislature should consider granting courts increased
authority to shift attorney and expert fees and expenses in appropriate cases.
323. No. CIV.A.7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91 (June 8, 1993).
324. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
325. See Cooper, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *24-25.
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corporation was forced to endure ten years of litigation and a full appraisal trial complete with abundant expert witness testimony.326
Two Delaware cases have expressed concern with the floor price
problem.327 Both cases involved what was arguably an acquisition by
an unrelated third party, as opposed to a cash-out merger by an existing controlling shareholder. It is no coincidence that in both of
these cases the trial court fixed the appraised fair value at slightly
below the merger consideration.328 In both cases, it seems clear that
the courts were sending a message to potential dissenting shareholders that there is a risk in dissenting; it is not a “no-lose” tactic.329
These courts delivered the message that it is possible for a dissenting
shareholder to obtain less than the merger consideration, particularly
if the facts show the presence of a true third-party sale. Unfortunately, these courts were unable to directly embrace third-party sales
value, and were also prevented by Delaware law from fully utilizing
fee-shifting to send their message.330
F.

The Role of Inequitable Conduct

If the primary purpose of the appraisal remedy is to protect minority shareholders from wrongful conduct,331 the reported appraisal
cases should evidence this purpose. In fact, the reported cases evidence a fairly consistent pattern. In cases where the dissenting
shareholders achieve a favorable result, there almost invariably is
evidence that the acquiring party acted inequitably or engaged in
overreaching. Virtually all of these cases involve an acquisition by a
controlling shareholder. On the other hand, in appraisal cases where
the acquiring party achieves a favorable result, there is evidence that
the acquiring party did not act inequitably. These cases typically involve a third-party, arm’s-length transaction, or other indicia of fair
dealing. In short, there is a strong correlation between the particular

326. The transaction that gave rise to the litigation was consummated on March 18, 1983,
see id. at *6, and the case was not finally disposed of until June 8, 1993, see id. at *1.
327. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
328. In Cooper, the merger consideration was $29.50 per share and the appraised fair value
was fixed at $27 per share. See supra notes 275-83 and accompanying text. In Technicolor, the
merger price was $23 per share and the court of chancery determined the appraised fair value
of $21.60 per share. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 259, at *1-2, *4-5 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
329. See Cooper, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *25.
330. See supra note 322.
331. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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equities of each case and the result reached. Given the purpose of
the appraisal remedy, this is a desirable outcome.
Most of the appraisal cases decided since Weinberger that have
been litigated to a final disposition have resulted in favorable verdicts
for the dissenting shareholders.332 These cases share some common
traits. At issue in nearly all of them was a transaction initiated by a
controlling shareholder. In many of these cases there was evidence
that the price offered in the transaction triggering appraisal rights
was obviously unfair. When this was not the case, there was typically
some evidence that the controlling shareholder breached a fiduciary
duty or otherwise engaged in unfair conduct.
Three illustrative cases are Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,333 In re
334
Radiology Associates, Inc., and Neal v. Alabama By-Products
335
Corp. In Cavalier, the controlling shareholders wrongfully usurped
opportunities belonging to the corporation whose shares were being
appraised.336 In In re Radiology Associates, Inc., the insiders who
froze out the dissenting shareholder failed to fully disclose information with respect to the cash-out merger, and failed to use due care in
effecting the merger, constituting a breach of fiduciary duty.337 In
Neal, the dissenting shareholders raised allegations of inadequate
disclosure, self-dealing, and unfair dealing, that, “for the most part,
332. See infra Appendix; see also 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, introductory note at
298-99, reporter’s note 5 (noting several instances where courts awarded amounts exceeding
the offered merger price); Seligman, supra note 6, at 856 (noting that, in general, judicial determinations of fair value “virtually always exceed market value”). The valuation pattern in
these cases is predictable. The corporation claims that fair value for appraisal purposes is at or
near the price at which the acquisition, generally a cash-out merger, took place. The dissenting
shareholder claims that fair value exceeds the acquisition or merger price by a large amount.
See, e.g., Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., No. CIV.A.11265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *1, *7,
*9 (Dec. 7, 1992) (acquisition price of $70.57 per share; corporation alleged fair value equaled
$68 per share; dissenting shareholder alleged fair value equaled $896.37 per share); Neal v.
Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *1, *6, *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1,
1990) (acquisition price of $75.60 per share; corporation alleged fair value equaled $64 per
share; dissenting shareholder alleged fair value equaled $193.40 per share), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255
(Del. 1991). As used in the text, a result favorable to the dissenting shareholder means that
the judicial determination of fair value significantly exceeded the acquisition price.
333. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
334. 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991).
335. No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL 109243 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del.
1991).
336. See Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144. There were also allegations that the insiders
caused the corporation to assign them options to purchase additional stock for inadequate consideration. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. CIV.A.7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 28, at *8 (Feb. 22, 1988), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
337. See In re Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d at 487.
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went unchallenged by respondents.”338 In each of these cases, the appraisal result was very favorable to the dissenting shareholders.339
In Neal there was also evidence that the dissenting shareholders
were offered an obviously unfair price. First, the cash-out merger
was accomplished at a price well below the price paid by the controlling shareholder for its own stock.340 In addition, the controlling
shareholder had previously made and abandoned two specific proposals to engage in a cash-out merger: in one instance, an investment
banker recommended a minimum price for the merger transaction
that exceeded the price ultimately paid in the cash-out merger;341 in
the other instance, the controlling shareholder proposed a cash-out
merger that was deemed unfair by an investment banker.342

338. Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *3.
339. In Cavalier Oil Corp., the appraised value determined by the court was $347,000, compared to $93,950 offered by the corporation. See Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1139. In Radiology, the court determined the appraised fair value to be $1,084 per share, far greater than
the $457 per share argued by the corporation and the $400 per share paid in the original cashout merger. See In re Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d at 488-89, 501. In Neal, the court appraised
the stock at $180.67 per share versus $75.60 per share paid in the cash-out merger and $64 per
share asserted as the fair value by the corporation. See Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *1, *8, *21.
Other cases also illustrate the principle that wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary duty significantly impacts the outcome of appraisal proceedings. See, e.g., Harris v. Rapid-American
Corp, No. CIV.A.6462, 1990 WL 146488, at *1, *3, *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990) (noting that controlling shareholders engaging in cash-out merger were subject to several shareholder suits and
Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions; appraising value at $51 per share as
compared to $28 per share offer price), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992), on
remand, 1992 WL 69614, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 1992) (fixing fair value at $73.29 per share);
Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. CIV.A.7499, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at *1, *15 & n.5,
*63 (Nov. 8, 1989) (noting allegations of disclosure inadequacies and procedural unfairness;
finding fair value to be $2,819 per share compared to cash-out price of $1,935.75); In re Spang
Indus., Inc., 535 A.2d 86, 90-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (noting that corporation understated its
assets and overstated its liabilities in preparation for cash-out merger; remanding for recalculation of fair value); cf. Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., Nos. CIV.A.10229, 11977, 1996 WL 936160,
at *1, *2, *22 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1996) (evaluating fairness of price in context of fiduciary duty
claim; noting self-dealing and unfair dealing by controlling shareholder and determining a fair
value of $23.86 per share, compared to $13.25 merger price), aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997);
Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 N.E.2d 51, 55-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (looking to appraisal statute
in evaluating fair value for buyout pursuant to dissolution petition; noting corporation underreported revenues on tax records and financial statements and accepting minority shareholders’
valuation of corporation at $1,393,682, compared to controlling shareholders’ asserted value of
$102,279).
340. See Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *1.
341. Goldman Sachs and Company recommended a minimum price of $85 per share to engage in a cash-out merger, and the controlling shareholder determined not to pursue the transaction. See id. at *2.
342. The controlling shareholder’s $65 cash-out merger proposal was deemed to be “not
fair from a financial point of view” by Kidder, Peabody and Company, Inc. See id.
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Courts have looked at several different kinds of evidence indicating that the dissenting shareholders were offered an obviously unfair price. In some cases, evidence indicated that a third party had
been willing to pay more than the cash-out merger price.343 In other
cases, the cash-out merger was instituted at a price below the price
previously offered to the dissenting shareholder by the controlling
shareholder in an attempt to buy the dissenting shareholder’s
shares,344 or at a price below the low end of a price range deemed fair
by an independent investment banker.345 In each of these instances,
the dissenting shareholders received a favorable appraisal result.346
On the other hand, when the merger price is determined in
third-party, arm’s-length dealings, the appraisal result typically favors
the corporation rather than the dissenting shareholder. Cooper v.
Pabst Brewing Co. and BNE Massachusetts Corp. v. Sims, discussed
previously,347 are probably the best examples.348
Similarly, if there is other evidence of the fairness of the merger
price, the corporation is likely to achieve a better result in the appraisal proceeding. Kleinwort Benson, Ltd. v. Silgan Corp.349 illustrates this point. In Kleinwort, insiders owning the Class A stock of a
corporation engaged in a cash-out merger to eliminate the Class B
stock at a price of $6.50 per share.350 More than two-thirds of the
Class B stock was owned by The Morgan Stanley Group and related
parties.351 Morgan Stanley consented to the merger.352 Some of the

343. See Institutional Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v. Hughes, 562 N.E.2d 662, 664-66 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990); Chrome Data Sys., Inc. v. Stringer, 820 P.2d 831, 832-33 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
344. See, e.g., TV58 Ltd. Partnership v. Weigel Broad. Co., No. CIV.A.10798, 1993 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 146, at *5-6 (July 22, 1993).
345. See In re Shell Oil Co., No. CIV.A.8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *4-6 (Dec. 11,
1990), aff’d, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. CIV.A.7499,
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at *44-48 (Nov. 8, 1989).
346. See infra Appendix.
347. See supra notes 269-83, 300-08 and accompanying text.
348. Another good example is found in Cawley v. SCM Corp., 530 N.E.2d 1264, 1267-68
(N.Y. 1988) (noting that active bidding contest provided evidence that merger price was fair).
349. No. CIV.A.11107, 1995 WL 376911 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995).
350. See id. at *1.
351. See id. The Morgan Stanley Group and the Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund,
L.P. (MSLEF) owned more than two-thirds of the Class B stock. See id. The general partners
of MSLEF were Morgan Stanley Leveraged Capital Fund, Inc., L.P., another Morgan Stanley
affiliate, and CIGNA Leveraged Capital Fund, Inc., an affiliate of CIGNA Corporation. See
id.
352. See id.
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other Class B shareholders, unrelated to Morgan Stanley, elected to
dissent from the cash-out merger.353
The court fixed the fair value of the Class B stock at $5.94 after
hearing all of the appraisal evidence.354 Although the court did not
expressly rely on the fact that Morgan Stanley went along with the
transaction, it appears unavoidable that the court was strongly influenced by this fact.355 A significant shareholder, highly sophisticated in
financial matters, unrelated to the acquiring party, and with the likely
power to scuttle the transaction, was willing to accept $6.50 per share.
This provided a strong indicia of the fairness of that price.356
The significant role equity plays in an appraisal proceeding is
also demonstrated in Salomon Brothers Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries
357
Corp. In this case, Salomon Brothers acquired its ownership interest in a corporation after the announcement of a merger transaction
giving rise to appraisal rights, with full knowledge of the proposed
merger transaction and the fact that the acquiring company owned
sufficient shares to carry out the merger.358 In effect, Salomon bought
its stock in order to bring an appraisal action. The court rejected the
corporation’s argument that Salomon should not be able to demand
appraisal because it had acquired its stock after the announcement of
the merger.359 There is little doubt, however, that this equitable fact
affected the final result in the appraisal proceeding. Salomon was
awarded $32.50 per share in the appraisal proceeding, an amount well
below the merger price of $39.25 to $40.50 per share.360
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. The court described Morgan Stanley’s ownership interest and noted its consent to the
merger. See id. These facts were not related to the appraisal proceeding, other than to show
acquiescence in the merger transaction by a sophisticated, unrelated party.
356. See also Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 22, 24, 29 (N.Y. 1984) (finding
a transaction “fair” where the cash-out price was determined by looking at the price paid to
majority stockholders in arm’s-length transactions prior to the merger).
357. 576 A.2d 650 (Del. Ch. 1989) (denying corporation’s motion for summary judgment);
No. CIV.A.10054, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 (May 1, 1992) (decision after trial).
358. See Salomon Bros., 576 A.2d at 651.
359. See id.
360. See Salomon Bros., 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100, at *1, *4-5. A management-led buyout
group initially offered $38 per share for the company, after the company had been shopped for
about six months. See id. at *4-5. Following negotiations, the buyout group agreed to pay
$40.50 in cash for approximately 89% of the company and preferred stock with a liquidation
preference of $40.50 for the remaining shares. See id. at *5. Goldman Sachs opined that the
blended value of the consideration was between $39.25 and $39.75 per share. See id. The fact
that the company was actively shopped prior to the insider-led buyout no doubt contributed to
the corporation’s equitable position.
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Although it appears that equitable factors strongly influence the
outcome of appraisal proceedings, the argument might be made that
courts are not attempting to achieve “equity” in appraisal proceedings, but are merely appraising corporations. Where, after all, does
equity fit in a discounted cash flow analysis or similar number
crunching exercise?361 The nature of the appraisal process belies this
argument. As already pointed out, appraisal is not an exact science,
and entails much subjectivity, estimation, and prediction.362 The dissenting shareholder typically alleges that the stock has a fair value
between two and ten times the fair value claimed by the corporation.363 Equity has a lot of room to operate within such a large range
of fair value and the outcomes in these cases indicate that courts generally attempt to achieve equitable results.
The ability of a court to manipulate the numbers to reach a “fair
result” is demonstrated in In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.364 In Shell,
a controlling shareholder was interested in cashing out the minority
shareholders.365 It retained an investment banker who opined that
the value of the minority shares was $53 per share.366 A cash-out
merger at $55 was proposed.367 An independent committee of the
corporation was formed to evaluate the bid.368 The committee retained its own investment banker, Goldman Sachs, who opined that
$80-$85 was the “high confidence” range for the value of the corporation’s shares, with the lowest fair price being $70 per share.369 The
committee thus rejected the $55 proposal and indicated a willingness
to negotiate a $75 offer.370 The parent dropped the merger proposal
and launched a tender offer at $58 per share.371 Litigation ensued and
361. Similarly, the opinions in appraisal cases do not speak extensively about equity, but
instead primarily are devoted to dissecting experts’ valuation testimony. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. CIV.A.7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *8, *32-98
(Feb. 22, 1988) (making only a passing reference to equitable considerations and engaging in a
lengthy discussion devoted to valuation testimony), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989). It often is
necessary to read between the lines to ascertain the equitable posture of the proceeding.
362. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
363. See infra Appendix.
364. No. CIV.A.8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199 (Dec. 11, 1990), aff’d, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del.
1992).
365. See id. at *3-4.
366. See id. at *4.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id.
370. See id. at *4-5.
371. See id. at *5.
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was settled, and a cash-out merger ultimately took place at $58 per
share.372 Some of the shareholders asserted appraisal rights.373
In the appraisal proceeding, the dissenting shareholders, and
their expert, asserted that the shares had a fair value of $89.374 The
corporation, and its expert, asserted a fair value of $55.375 The court,
after chiding the parties for presenting biased expert testimony,376
concluded that the dissenting shareholders’ expert’s valuation was
the more credible of those presented, although it too was “not without error and distortion.”377 As a result, the court took the dissenting
shareholders’ valuation result of $89, discounted it by 20%, and concluded that fair value was equal to $71.20 per share.378 The court gave
no explanation for the 20% discount. Presumably, it was to correct
for the “error and distortion”379 found in the $89 valuation, but there
is no explanation as to why 20%, rather than 10%, or 30%, or any
other number, was chosen. The court did indicate that the resulting
valuation of $71.20 per share was not far from the $70 per share
“low” value arrived at by Goldman Sachs.380 This indicates that the
court had in mind an equitable solution, and found enough play in
the numbers to achieve the desired result.381

372. See id. at *6-9.
373. See id. at *10. In assessing the equities of this case, it is interesting to note that the
corporation was determined to have failed adequately to disclose all material facts to the minority shareholders. See id. at *2, *6; In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1215
(Del. 1992).
374. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *17.
375. See id. at *92.
376. See id. at *14-16, *93.
377. Id. at *94-95.
378. See id. at *95-96.
379. Id. at *95.
380. See id. at *96. It also was not far from the $75 price at which the independent committee was willing to strike a deal. See id. at *4-5. Presumably, if the independent committee’s
first offer was $75, the committee might have been willing to agree to a price somewhat below
$75. This, of course, lends credence to the equity of the $71.20 result reached by the court.
381. The corporation appealed from the court of chancery’s valuation determination and
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the chancellor’s valuation, applying a deferential standard of review. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1215, 1219 (Del. 1992). The
supreme court candidly noted that the chancery court had to sort out figures that were “poles
apart,” and chose a final value “very close to the mid-way mark between the two values.” Id.
at 1220.
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G. Limitations on the Ability of Courts to Achieve Equitable Results
Although courts generally have managed to conduct appraisal
proceedings with an eye to the underlying equities, certain doctrinal
problems interfere with the ability of courts to consistently reach equitable results. These doctrinal problems fall into three categories.
The first concerns the relationship between the appraisal process and
allegations of unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty. The second relates to whether courts conducting appraisal proceedings are permitted to consider events that take place after the transaction triggering
the appraisal remedy. The last deals with institutional concerns that
arise in appraisal proceedings.
1. The Relationship Between the Appraisal Remedy and
Allegations of Unfair Conduct or Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
Although it appears that courts consider unfair conduct or breaches
of fiduciary duty to reach equitable appraisal results,382 they are
restricted in their ability to do so under existing Delaware case law.
The Delaware courts have held that the appraisal remedy is a limited
legislative remedy and that the only litigable issue in an appraisal
proceeding is the value of the dissenting shareholders’ stock on the
date of the merger.383 As a result, the Delaware courts have
concluded that claims of unfair dealing may not be litigated within
the context of a statutory appraisal proceeding.384 The Delaware
Supreme Court has stated that “[a] determination of fair value does
not involve an inquiry into claims of wrongdoing in the merger.”385
382. See supra Part II.F. But see Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 568 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Iowa 1997)
(stating that appraisal “is not an equitable proceeding wherein the court assigns a value to the
dissenters’ stock that it considers ‘fair and equitable under all the circumstances’”) (citation
omitted).
383. See Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 256-57 (Del. 1991); Cavalier
Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Del. 1989); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542
A.2d 1182, 1187 (Del. 1988).
384. See Neal, 588 A.2d at 257; See also Sieg, 568 N.W.2d at 802 (agreeing with Delaware
courts that appraisal proceeding is limited to determining fair value).
385. Technicolor, 542 A.2d at 1189. The court stated that the proper forum to address
claims of “wrongdoing” is a “fraud action seeking monetary relief for unfair dealing.” Id. The
court has thus created a dual litigation model in which the fraud action is the remedy for
wrongdoing and the appraisal action is a mere legislative remedy to determine fair value. The
court’s analysis, however, fails to address the reason for the legislatively created appraisal remedy. The legislature must have had some minority shareholder protection rationale in mind,
and this purpose should inform the appraisal proceeding. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text. The appraisal proceeding does not exist in a vacuum merely to render a finding as
to fair value. Nor did the court explain its apparent retreat from Weinberger’s statement that
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The courts of other states have not taken as firm a stance on this
issue, and often permit claims of misconduct to be asserted in an
appraisal proceeding.386
The Delaware position presents an apparent paradox. Inequitable conduct should, and in fact does, appear to influence the results
of appraisal proceedings,387 yet the Delaware Supreme Court has
stated that claims of wrongdoing do not belong in the appraisal process.388 This apparent paradox has been resolved in two ways. First,
evidence of wrongdoing continues to find its way indirectly into the
appraisal process to impeach the credibility of the wrongdoer. Determining fair value in an appraisal proceeding depends very much
on the underlying factual assumptions made as to the future prospects of the business.389 Inevitably the corporation, through its
agents, will either testify as to those underlying assumptions, or provide information to an expert witness for use by that witness in determining fair value. In either case, the dissenting shareholder may
then challenge the underlying assumptions by attacking, with evidence of unfair dealing, the credibility of the corporation’s agents.390
As a result, although the dissenting shareholder may not submit evidence of unfair dealings in an appraisal proceeding directly to support an unfair dealing claim, that same evidence may be used indirectly to impeach the credibility of the valuation contentions of the
the appraisal remedy should ordinarily be the exclusive remedy to a shareholder objecting to a
merger transaction. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Obviously, there is some overlap between the appraisal remedy and the fraud action when both arise out of a contested fundamental corporate transaction. The exact relationship between the two remedies, and the degree to which the appraisal remedy is, or should be, an exclusive remedy, is beyond the scope
of this Article, and will be addressed in a forthcoming article by the author.
386. See, e.g., Czajkowski v. Jovanovich, No. 92-55787, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14153, at *11
(9th Cir. June 8, 1994) (permitting allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty to be considered in appraisal proceeding under New York law); Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683,
690 (Cal. 1986) (en banc) (holding that shareholder’s claim of misconduct can be vindicated in
appraisal proceeding); Sturgeon Petroleums Ltd. v. Merchants Petroleum Co., 195 Cal. Rptr.
29, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing misconduct affecting value of corporation to be asserted
in appraisal proceeding); cf. Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 1993) (taking into
account usurpation of corporate opportunity in valuing corporation). But see Sieg, 568 N.W.2d
at 802 (holding that an appraisal action is not the appropriate forum for recovery of damages
for wrongdoing).
387. See supra Part II.F.
388. See supra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
390. See Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 257 (Del. 1991) (holding that
evidence of unfair dealing is admissible to impeach respondents’ credibility); In re Radiology
Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 498 (Del. Ch. 1991) (noting that breach of fiduciary duty by defendant “undermines the credibility of the information” supplied to expert witness).
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opposing party.391 What is not permitted in the front door may freely
enter through the back door.
Further, the Delaware courts have consistently stated that they
will not, in conducting an appraisal proceeding, ignore the manner
and procedures used to determine the price offered in the transaction
triggering appraisal rights.392 Thus, if there is self-dealing, or the procedures utilized in setting the price are not calculated to yield a fair
price, this will be considered by the court in assessing the reliability
of the corporation’s valuation assertions.393 This provides another
means for courts to assess the conduct of the parties in the appraisal
process.
Second, the appraisal process has been used as a means of uncovering wrongdoing that can be asserted in separate litigation,
thereby providing a means to remedy the inequitable conduct. Dissenting shareholders in appraisal proceedings have been permitted to
conduct discovery aimed at uncovering evidence of unfair dealing or
breach of fiduciary duty. In Chang’s Holdings v. Universal Chemicals
394
for example, the court permitted the dissenting
& Coatings, Inc.,
shareholder in an appraisal proceeding to take depositions aimed at
determining whether that shareholder had a basis for asserting a
breach of fiduciary duty claim.395 The court reasoned that because
such information may affect the credibility of the board of directors
or other persons who supplied information used in valuing the company, it could be relevant to an appraisal proceeding.396
In addition to the limited permissible use of discovered wrongdoing in the appraisal proceeding itself, the shareholder may utilize
such wrongdoing to assert claims of unfair dealing or breach of fiduciary duty in separate litigation, instituted well after the appraisal

391. See Neal, 588 A.2d at 257.
392. See Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *5
(Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No.
CIV.A. 7499, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at *20 (Nov. 8, 1989).
393. See Pinson, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at *20.
394. No. CIV.A.10856, 1992 WL 301327 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1992).
395. See id. at *1-2.
396. See id. at *1. The court in Chang’s Holdings was influenced by the discussion in Neal.
The court recognized that “expert valuations are based on assumptions, . . . many of [which] are
derived from information provided by [the] board of directors.” Id. As a result, the credibility
of the board is at issue in an appraisal proceeding, making evidence of unfair dealing or breach
of fiduciary duty relevant to the appraisal proceeding, and a proper matter of discovery. See id.
at *1-2.
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claim has been brought.397 The Delaware Supreme Court has noted
that “only shareholders pursuing discovery during an appraisal proceeding are likely to acquire the relevant information needed to pursue a fraud action if such information exists,”398 and thereby has recognized the value of the appraisal proceeding as a discovery
mechanism aimed at uncovering evidence of wrongful conduct directed toward minority shareholders.399
2. The Ability of Courts to Consider Events Subsequent to the
An appraisal
Transaction Giving Rise to Appraisal Rights.
proceeding seeks to value a corporation as of the time immediately
before the effectuation of the corporate action giving rise to appraisal
rights.400 It is the future prospects of the corporation, however, that
are critical to the determination of what the corporation is worth at
that particular time,401 and the opposing experts typically take very
different positions with respect to these future prospects.402
An interesting dynamic of the appraisal process is that by the
time the appraisal proceeding comes to trial, some of those “future
prospects” no longer lie in the future, but are known. For example,
in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the initial appraisal proceeding
took place more than seven years after the merger that gave rise to
the appraisal proceeding.403 The obvious issue raised by such a delay
is whether the court that conducts the appraisal proceeding should
consider the actual events that have transpired after the consummation of the transaction that triggered the appraisal proceeding.404

397. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1188-92 (Del. 1988) (holding that
filing of appraisal claim does not preclude later filing of separate claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty).
398. Id. at 1189; see also Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1143-44 (Del. 1989)
(noting that dissenting shareholder lacked knowledge of usurpation of corporate opportunity
prior to instituting appraisal proceeding).
399. See Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 38-39 (discussing the discovery rationale for the appraisal remedy).
400. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3) (1991).
401. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
403. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259 (Oct.
19, 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). This appraisal proceeding is still
ongoing, having been remanded back to the chancery court by the Delaware Supreme Court
late in 1996. See Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 302.
404. See Technicolor, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *54 n.36 (noting that the appraisal action “imaginatively stands in the past and pretends to look toward a future that has already occurred”), rev’d on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). This is best illustrated by assuming
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At first blush, it would appear that courts should consider this
post-transaction information because the use of actual facts, rather
than predictions, would lead to more accurate appraisals. The countervailing argument, however, derives from the statutory directives
that the corporation should be appraised as of the time of the appraisal-triggering event, and that the appraised value must exclude
any appreciation or depreciation that arises from the expectation or
accomplishment of the event giving rise to the appraisal proceeding.405 The use of post-transaction financial results might be impermissible if such results include appreciation that was unforeseeable at
the time of the transaction or that arose from the accomplishment of
the transaction. As a result, several courts have concluded that it
would be inappropriate in the appraisal process to use information
acquired after the event giving rise to the appraisal proceeding.406
This conclusion is illustrated by Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.407
One issue in Technicolor was how to value Technicolor’s videocassette business.408 This business was only eighteen months old at the
time of the merger that triggered the appraisal proceeding, and had

that a corporation is being valued with the discounted cash flow method. Using this method,
the appraiser estimates future cash flows, as of the time the corporation is being appraised, and
discounts those future cash flows to a present value. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text. Much of the difficulty with this valuation method involves estimating the future cash
flows. One expert tends to take a dim view of future cash flows, and the other an optimistic
view. If the appraisal is done several years later, however, it would be possible to use the actual cash flows, rather than estimated ones.
405. See supra notes 214-26 and accompanying text.
406. See, e.g., Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A.8474, 1996 WL
696936, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996) (referring to hindsight as an “inappropriate” means of
determining whether earnings in the year preceding the merger were sustainable), rev’d, 701
A.2d 357 (Del. 1997); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS
259, at *53-55 (Oct. 19, 1990) (refusing to consider whether valuation model in fact approximated what actually occurred), rev’d, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996); Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991) (quasi-appraisal proceeding) (excluding from consideration post-merger offers for corporation); cf. Meadows v. Bicrodyne Corp., 785 F.2d 670, 67273 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that where parties stipulated that appraisal evaluation was to be
based on all the information at hand on the date before the merger was announced, evidence of
post-merger earnings was properly excluded). But see Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 362 (“[P]ostmerger evidence is not necessarily inadmissible to show that plans in effect at the time of the
merger have born [sic] fruition.”); Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990
WL 109243, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (taking into account post-merger accounting write
down), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991).
407. No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d, 684 A.2d 289 (Del.
1996).
408. See id. at *49-57.
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been profitable at that time for only six months.409 As a result, predicting its future prospects was difficult. The court rejected the dissenting shareholder’s expert’s analysis of this business as “too strikingly odd to be accepted.”410 In a footnote, the court stated that it was
“mindful of the fact that petitioner sought to show that its model
closely approximated the performance that in fact later occurred.”411
In other words, the dissenting shareholder attempted to show that its
expert’s valuation model, rejected by the court as “odd,” in fact
closely approximated the business results experienced in the intervening time period.412 The court rejected this evidence as “irrelevant
to a statutory appraisal.”413
The court noted several problems with this evidence. First, the
court stated that such evidence did not bear on the issue of what a
reasonable person would have been likely to expect as of the merger
date;414 the court did not, however, explain why this was the crucial
inquiry. Second, the court was concerned that the actual post-merger
results would incorporate the effects of the merger, in violation of the
statute.415 Finally, the court noted that if this sort of evidence was accepted, it would be too easy, after the fact, to fit an appraisal model
to mirror actual financial results.416 The court did not explain why
this necessarily was a problem.
The court’s analysis of this issue in Technicolor is incomplete.
As the court recognized, the appraisal proceeding seeks to establish
the fair value of the corporation as of the merger date.417 This requires the court to choose between competing expert appraisal models. The court’s focus on the expectations of a reasonable person at
the time of the merger makes sense because it is consistent with a
third-party sales value approach. The reasonable expectations of
third-party purchasers necessarily affect the price that a willing buyer
would be willing to pay for the corporation. The court was therefore
correct in refusing to rely exclusively on post-merger information to
determine what would have been reasonably expected by potential
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

See id. at *53-54.
Id. at *55.
Id. at *55 n.36.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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purchasers at the time of the merger.418 On the other hand, the fact
that one model more closely mirrored actual events seems relevant to
ascertaining which model was more reasonable in the first instance.419
Care should be taken not to rely excessively on actual, post-merger
financial results, but that does not mean that such results should be
entirely excluded from consideration.420
Similarly, given existing statutes, courts generally must ensure
that post-transaction financial results not be relied on to the extent
they embody appreciation that arises as a result of the transaction.421
Once again, however, this does not mean that post-transaction results
418. This analysis is also relevant to the court’s third objection to the use of post-transaction
information—that it would be too easy, after the fact, to fit an appraisal model to the events
that actually occurred. The problem with such a model is that, because it operates in hindsight,
it is not necessarily relevant to what a willing buyer would have been willing to pay for the corporation at the time of the transaction in question.
419. Post-merger financial data can thus operate as a “reality check” on the experts’ forecasts. The Delaware Supreme Court recently lent credence to this idea in Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997). In Gonsalves, the corporation’s expert had
used a five-year earnings average to compute the value for the corporation, and the dissenting
shareholder’s expert had used the most recent year’s earnings. See Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A.8474, 1996 WL 696936, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1996), rev’d
on other grounds, 701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997). The dissenting shareholder argued that earnings
for the most recent year were more probative of value than a five-year average because the
most recent year “was a precursor year and indicative of post-merger growth.” Gonsalves, 701
A.2d at 361. The court of chancery rejected this argument, concluding that there was no way to
judge whether the most recent year was aberrant or sustainable, “without the inappropriate aid
of hindsight.” Gonsalves, 1996 WL 696936, at *7. The supreme court “question[ed]” the chancery court’s “offhand rejection” of the most recent year’s earnings as not sustainable wit hout
the aid of hindsight, and, importantly, stated that “post-merger evidence is not necessarily inadmissible to show that plans in effect at the time of the merger have born [sic] fruition.” Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 362.
420. The Delaware statute requires that courts take into account “all relevant factors” in
determining fair value. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991).
421. See supra notes 214-26 and accompanying text. New York’s statute, however, no
longer requires exclusion of appreciation or depreciation arising from the corporate action
giving rise to the shareholder’s right to appraisal. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4) hist.
note (McKinney 1986) (noting 1982 amendment deleting the phrase “excluding any appreciation or depreciation directly or indirectly induced by such corporate action or its proposal”
from the subsection instructing the court to determine fair value). As a result, New York
courts are willing to look at “postmerger factors.” Cawley v. SCM Corp., 530 N.E.2d 1264,
1267 (N.Y. 1988).
Many other statutes today do not categorically prohibit the consideration of effects of the
merger or transaction giving rise to appraisal rights. For example, the Model Business Corporation Act permits consideration of such effects if exclusion of such effects would be inequitable. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3) (1991). Exclusion of the effects of the transaction
makes much less sense with respect to a cash-out merger than with respect to a transaction evidencing the historical liquidity rationale for the appraisal remedy. See supra notes 217-23 and
accompanying text.
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have no place in the calculation. It just means that courts must be
careful to distinguish between appreciation that results from the
transaction and that which would have been likely to occur in the absence of the transaction. In many cases, drawing this distinction will
not be difficult. For example, if Technicolor operated the videocassette business in the same manner after the merger as it did before
the merger, there is no reason to think that the actual, post-merger
results of that business were effected in any way by the merger.
To the extent this issue has been addressed in the cases, courts
have tended summarily to conclude, without much discussion, that it
is not permissible to consider post-merger developments,422 although
this view has not been universally adopted.423 The courts that have
refused to consider post-merger developments have failed to distinguish between post-merger developments that reflect effects of the
merger and post-merger developments that do not reflect effects of
the merger. The latter may in fact provide important evidence as to
the value of the corporation as of the merger date, to the extent such
post-merger developments could reasonably have been foreseen at
the time of the merger.
A particularly relevant form of post-merger information that
courts should consider is an offer to purchase the corporation made
by a third-party purchaser, especially if such an offer arises near the
time of the event giving rise to the appraisal proceeding. As previously noted, third-party sales value is probably the best evidence of
the fair value of a corporation,424 and reliable evidence of third-party
sales value near in time to the transaction triggering appraisal rights
should be assessed by courts determining fair value. Blind invocation
of a rule that post-merger events may not be considered would, however, prevent such consideration.
This precise problem is reflected in Kahn v. Household Acquisi425
Wien Air Alaska, Inc. was acquired via merger by its
tion Corp.
principal shareholder, Household Acquisition Corp.426 Wien minority
shareholders brought suit challenging the transaction,427 and were
422. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
423. See Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *14
(Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (taking into account post-merger write down of investment over objection that post-merger information should not be considered), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991).
424. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
425. 591 A.2d 166 (Del. 1991).
426. See id. at 168.
427. See id.
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deemed entitled to a quasi-appraisal remedy.428 The court in Household Acquisition approvingly stated that the chancery court “was
careful to exclude from its value consideration plaintiff’s evidence of
‘postmerger offers’ received by Household for Wien.”429 The problem with considering evidence of such “discussions and overtures,”
according to the court, was that this evidence “arose ‘from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.’”430 The court provided
no explanation for how or why the post-merger offers for Wien arose
from accomplishment of the merger. In fact, there was no evidence
of any relationship between the post-merger offers for Wien and the
accomplishment of the merger between Household and Wien. If
Household had reshaped Wien, or changed the way it was being run
in a way that made Wien more attractive to third-party purchasers,
this might have been a concern. There was no indication, however,
that any such changes had taken place.
Post-merger offers from unrelated third parties are strong indicators of the value of the corporation, and do not necessarily arise
from accomplishment of the merger. In the event that post-merger
changes to the corporation, in whole or in part, gave rise to the thirdparty offer, courts can take that into account. They can either discount the third-party offer to reflect the post-merger developments,
or ignore the third-party offer if post-merger developments render it
lacking in probative value with respect to the worth of the corporation as of the time of the merger. These possibilities, however, do not
justify a blanket prohibition of post-merger evidence of third-party
sales value, particularly if such evidence is near in time to the merger.

428. Household Acquisition was actually brought not as an appraisal proceeding, but as a
breach of fiduciary duty claim. See id. at 168. As part of its holding in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs in cases
pending at the time of that decision would be entitled to a quasi-appraisal remedy because it
was likely that such litigants, not anticipating the holding in Weinberger, had “abjured an appraisal” claim. Id. at 714-15. The court in Household Acquisition determined that the plaintiffs
fell into that protected category and were therefore entitled to a quasi-appraisal remedy. See
Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d at 172-73.
429. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d at 175. Within one year of cashing out Wien’s
minority shareholders at a price of $6 per share, Household entered into an agreement to sell
all of its Wien stock for $10.50 per share. See Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., No.
CIV.A.6293, 1983 WL 103279, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 1983).
430. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d at 175 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
262(h)); see also Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 568 N.W.2d 794, 803-04 (Iowa 1997) (relying on Household
in upholding trial court’s decision to reject consideration of corporation’s post-merger sale of
assets).
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Although Delaware courts generally have not been receptive to
arguments based on post-merger information in the appraisal context,431 a line of Delaware cases dealing with discovery issues in appraisal proceedings supports the proposition that post-merger information may be probative with respect to the value of a corporation at
the time of the merger. Delaware courts have permitted dissenting
shareholders to obtain discovery with respect to post-merger events
because such information may cast light on the value of the corporation at the time of the merger.432 The courts have permitted discovery
of two types of post-merger information: post-merger financial results433 and post-merger offers to purchase the corporation or a substantial portion of its assets.434 The reasoning of the courts in permitting discovery of both types of information supports the arguments in
favor of consideration of such information in the appraisal context.
In the first scenario, dissenting shareholders have sought discovery of documents relating to post-merger financial results. In Kaye v.
Pantone, Inc., the court stated that the plaintiff is entitled to review
documents that could be useful to a determination of whether financial gains registered within a reasonable time after the merger date
resulted from the merger, or were attributable to trends in earnings
that may have been known or foreseen by the corporation, its directors, or officers, prior to the merger.435 In the latter case, the data
would be relevant in determining fair value as of the date of the
merger.436 This supports the argument that post-merger information
should be considered in the appraisal proceeding to the extent it re-

431. See supra notes 406-30 and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. CIV.A.12207, 1994 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 67, at *10-11 (May 25, 1994) (holding that post-merger data may be relevant to the
valuation of shares at the time of the merger and thus are discoverable); Ross v. Proco Management, Inc., No. CIV.A.6146, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 494, at *6-7 (May 23, 1983) (permitting
discovery of post-merger events that are “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence”); Household Acquisition Corp., 1983 WL 103279, at *1 (same); Kaye v. Pantone, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.5466, 1981 Del. Ch. LEXIS 607, at *8 (Oct. 6, 1981) (permitting discovery limited to
time periods “reasonably related to the date of the merger” and stating that “[t]hree years after
the merger should be an adequate time period”); see also Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, Nos.
CIV.A.14514, 14515, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, at *14-16 (May 10, 1996) (permitting discovery
of post-merger information in connection with breach of fiduciary duty claim).
433. See Lane, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at *3; Kaye, 1981 Del. Ch. LEXIS 607, at *7-10.
434. See Ross v. Proco Management, Inc., No. CIV.A.6146, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 494, at
*2-3 (May 23, 1983); Household Acquisition Corp., 1983 WL 103279, at *1.
435. See Kaye, 1981 Del. Ch. LEXIS 607, at *9-10.
436. See id. at *10.
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flects appreciation, unrelated to the merger, that was foreseeable at
the time of the merger.
Similarly, in Lane v. Cancer Treatment Centers of America,
437
Inc., the court permitted discovery of financial information for the
one-year period following the merger that triggered the appraisal
claim.438 The court did so in response to the dissenting shareholder’s
argument that “comparisons between pre-merger projections made
by [the corporation’s] management and post-merger actual performance . . . could be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the premerger projections.”439 Again, this suggests that courts should be
willing to consider post-merger financial information in assessing the
reasonableness of competing valuation models.
In the second scenario, dissenting shareholders have sought and
obtained discovery with respect to post-merger offers received for
the corporation or its assets that were well in excess of the merger
price.440 In Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., the court stated
that if discovery were to disclose information showing that the corporation’s value had increased as a result of post-merger factors, the
post-merger offer would not be useful in the appraisal proceeding,
presumably because the appreciation arose from the accomplishment
of the merger.441 On the other hand, if the discovery revealed no
marked difference in the company’s performance or prospects since
the merger, the offer to purchase the company at a price well above
the merger price might lead to discovery of information or knowledge that existed at the time of the merger, and would have a bearing
on the fairness of the merger price.442 “[F]or purpose of discovery,
Delaware courts have considered evidence relating to large jumps in
value over short periods of time relevant to the true value of

437. No. CIV.A.12207, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67 (May 25, 1994).
438. See id. at *10.
439. Id. at *4.
440. See Ross v. Proco Management, Inc., No. CIV.A.6146, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 494, at *2
(May 23, 1983) (noting that assets valued at $17 million at time of merger were sold two years
later for almost $54 million); Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., No. CIV.A.6293, 1983 WL
103279, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 1983) (noting that corporation was sold for $10.50 per share
within one year of cash-out merger at price of $6 per share).
441. See Household Acquisition Corp., 1983 WL 103279, at *1.
442. See id. The court in Household Acquisition ultimately concluded that the post-merger
offer should not be considered. See supra notes 425-30 and accompanying text.
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shares.”443 Such evidence should also be relevant for purposes of assessing fair value in an appraisal proceeding.
3. Institutional Concerns in Appraisal Proceedings—The
“Dueling Expert” Problem. The primary institutional issue in
appraisal proceedings involves the court’s task of sorting through the
testimony of dueling experts to arrive at the fair value of a
corporation. The experts’ valuation opinions tend to be partisan, and
Accordingly, while recognizing that these
highly divergent.444
problems are “to be expected in an adversarial system,”445 courts have
expressed frustration with the use of competing experts to resolve
appraisal proceedings.446
The Delaware courts have gingerly explored two mechanisms to
alleviate some of the problems associated with the inevitable battle of
partisan experts. Although these mechanisms have some appeal in
reducing the courts’ task of resolving conflicting expert testimony,
they unfortunately import the risk that they will operate to frustrate
the achievement of equitable results in appraisal proceedings.
a. Choosing One Party’s Valuation. The first mechanism that has
been employed in appraisal cases to deal with the “dueling experts”
problem is a “rule,” adopted in two Delaware Court of Chancery
decisions, stating that a court should decide which of the experts’
opinions is the more credible, and then accept that expert’s model,
rather than attempt judicially to create a valuation model composed
of the more credible portions of each expert’s model.447 In other

443. Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, Nos. CIV.A.14514, 14515, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, at *13
(May 10, 1996).
444. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
445. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992).
446. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
447. See Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A. 8474, 1996 WL 696936,
at *1 n.2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996), rev’d, 701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *27 n.17 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d, 684 A.2d
289 (Del. 1996). But cf. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. CIV.A.7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988
Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *64 (Feb. 22, 1988) (stating that under the Delaware statute the court
has an obligation to appraise the shares, so that in the absence of adequate proof by either side,
the court may not simply rule against the party having the burden of proof), aff’d, 564 A.2d
1137 (Del. 1989). Another approach is to begin by choosing the expert’s analysis that best represents the corporation’s value, but to then adjust that value to correct for “adversarial hyperbole” that influenced the expert’s opinion, or other perceived inadequacies in the expert’s
analysis. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. CIV.A.11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *5
(Del. Ch. June 15, 1995).

WERTH

1998]

07/15/98 11:57 AM

SHAREHOLDERS’ APPRAISAL REMEDY

697

words, after each party presents its case, the court should choose the
more credible of the two and not attempt to craft a compromise
valuation (referred to as a rule requiring a court to “choose one
party’s valuation”).448 The benefit of this approach, as explained by
the Delaware Court of Chancery, is as follows:
Simply to accept one experts’ [sic] view or the other would have a
significant institutional or precedential advantage. . . . [I]f the court
will ultimately reject both parties [sic] . . . analysis and do its own,
the incentive of the contending parties is to arrive at estimates of
value that are at the outer margins of plausibility—that essentially
define a bargaining range. If it is understood that the court will or is
likely to accept the whole of one witnesses [sic] testimony or the
other, incentives will be modified. . . . [A]t least the parties will have
incentives to make their estimate of value appear most reasonable.
This would tend to narrow the range of estimates, which would un449
questionably be a benefit to the process.

The court was undoubtedly correct in stating that, if litigants understand that courts will (or at least are very likely to) choose one
party’s valuation, it would likely narrow the range of dispute, and
cause parties to provide more reasonable valuation estimates at the
outset. The problem is that no such understanding exists. Although
the court of chancery first articulated the concept of choosing one
party’s valuation in 1990,450 it was not applied in another case until
1996.451 In the meantime, courts routinely reached compromise results in appraisal proceedings,452 often “splitting the baby,” at times

448. The astute sports fan will recognize that this is the model used in baseball salary arbitration. See Robert C. Berry, Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports, in 1 LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 4.03[4] (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1997). The player
and the team each state the salary they believe the player should earn for the next year. See id.
The player, of course, proposes a higher salary figure than that proposed by the team. Each
side makes their case to the arbitrator, and the arbitrator chooses the salary proposed by either
the player or the team, but cannot split the difference or compromise between the two positions. See id. This is referred to as “final offer” arbitration. See id.
449. Technicolor, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *26 n.17.
450. See id.
451. See Gonsalves, 1996 WL 696936, at *1 n.2. In Gonsalves, the court informed the parties at a pretrial conference on August 21, 1996, that it intended to employ the “choose one
party’s valuation” technique at the trial set to begin on August 27, 1996. See Gonsalves v.
Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 358 (Del. 1997). Because this information appears to have been sprung on the parties with very short notice, it is unlikely that the technique
was useful in narrowing the range of dispute in this case.
452. See, e.g., In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 489, 501 (Del. Ch. 1991) (finding
fair value per share of $1,084 where plaintiff argued for fair value of $2,300 and defendant ar-
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expressly noting the compromise nature of the valuation decision
adopted.453 Under the splitting the baby approach, each party was encouraged to stake out the most favorable valuation position possible,
expecting the court to come down in the middle.454
The choose one party’s valuation concept can only work if it is
uniformly and consistently applied so that the parties know what to
expect when they put on valuation evidence. This probably would
require either a legislative directive, or at the least, the pronouncement of a firm rule from a state’s supreme court. Neither has occurred. In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court recently held that the
court of chancery committed reversible error by deciding in advance
of trial, and informing the parties, that it would employ the choose
one party’s valuation technique.455 The court reasoned that the use of
this technique contravened the statutory requirement that the chancery court “shall appraise” fair value.456 It was therefore impermissible for the Chancellor to “announce[ ] in advance that he intended to
choose between absolutes.”457 Without such an advance announce-

gued for fair value of $457); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. CIV.A.7499, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 50, at *7-12, *63 (Nov. 8, 1989) (finding fair value per share of $2,819 where plaintiff
argued for fair value of $3,465 or $4,679 and defendant argued for fair value of $1,218); see also
infra Appendix.
453. For example in In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., the Delaware Supreme Court stated
that the “final value chosen [was] very close to the mid-way mark between the two values the
court found to be most credible”; one of the two values was presented by the dissenting shareholder’s expert, and the other by the corporation’s expert. See 607 A.2d 1213, 1220 (Del.
1992); see also Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 174 (Del. 1991) (stating
that value chosen by chancery court was the “midpoint” between valuations reached by two
different pricing methods).
454. This probably overstates the case. It probably is never beneficial for a party to stake
out an outlandish valuation position, because it will damage that party’s credibility. It may be
more accurate to say that each party will stake out the most favorable valuation position that
can pass the “straight face” test. In Santa’s Workshop v. A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc., the dissenting shareholder alleged that the fair value was $16.80 per share, and the cash-out merger
took place at $3.50 per share. See 851 P.2d 264, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). The court fixed fair
value at $4.04 per share and upheld the imposition of attorney fees against the dissenting
shareholder, whose initial demand was deemed “unreasonable and arbitrary if not vexatious.”
Id.
455. See Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 358; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289,
299 (Del. 1996) (stating that the chancery court has the discretion to “select one of the parties’
valuation models as its general framework, or fashion its own,” and that “its choice of a framework does not require it to adopt any one expert’s model, methodology, or mathematical calculations in toto” (emphasis added)).
456. See Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 361.
457. Id.
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ment, however, the institutional benefits attributable to the choose
one party’s valuation approach cannot be realized.
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that it would not necessarily be arbitrary to choose one party’s valuation, but that to decide in
advance to do so was error.458 Future litigants therefore may be
forced to deal with the same random and arbitrary imposition of the
choose one party’s valuation concept that has applied over the last
eight years. In most cases, this valuation concept will not be applied,
in which case it makes sense to argue for the most aggressive valuation that is defensible.459 If a court does decide to invoke the choose
one party’s valuation concept, the parties will lack advance notice
that the game will be played in that fashion. This could lead to the
occasional arbitrary result, and diminish the utility of the appraisal
remedy because its application lacks predictability. It may also frustrate the remedy’s purpose of providing equitable relief to minority
shareholders in a given case.460

458. See id.
459. In fact, it is likely that the choose one party’s valuation approach will seldom turn up
again in Delaware. Although the supreme court in Gonsalves left open the possibility that this
approach may be employed in a given case, although not announced in advance, the example
used by the court to illustrate its point indicates this will not happen frequently. The court referred to the possibility that the chancery court might reject the testimony of a “thoroughly discredited” witness, and presumably accept, in full, the testimony of the other party’s witness.
See Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 361. Presumably, this sort of “thorough discrediting” will not be a
common occurrence. In addition, the bulk of the supreme court’s decision in Gonsalves appears to call for the trial court to sift and comb through each side’s contentions in the typical
fashion, picking and choosing aspects of each side’s valuation that appear reasonable. See id. at
361-62.
460. These problems are evidenced in the chancery court’s decision in Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc., in which the owner of 79% of Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc. (SAP)
engaged in a cash-out merger to eliminate the minority shareholders. See No. CIV.A.8474,
1996 WL 696936, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996), rev’d, 701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997). There was no
active market for the stock of SAP. See id. In short, this was precisely the type of transaction
that poses the greatest risk of unfair treatment of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder, where the appraisal remedy should provide minority shareholder protection, both ex
post and ex ante. See Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 26-27.
The chancery court adopted the corporation’s valuation of $131.60 per share, which resulted in a total valuation for SAP of approximately $11,250,000, given the 85,428 shares of
SAP outstanding. See Gonsalves, 1996 WL 696936, at *1 n.1. In 1985, the last full year before
the merger, SAP had pre-tax earnings of $3,470,000. See id. at *3. Thus, the court valued SAP
at approximately 3.24 times the most recent pre-tax earnings, a number that appears to be quite
low.
In addition, it appears that 1985 earnings were depressed by non-recurring costs associated with the cash-out merger and non-recurring losses from operations that had been discontinued by the end of 1985. See id. at *3. Earnings in 1985 were also decreased by the compensation SAP paid to its controlling shareholder; the dissenting shareholder contended that this
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b. Court-Appointed Neutral Experts. The second mechanism courts
have explored in appraisal cases to address the dueling experts
problem is the use of a court-appointed neutral expert. The
Delaware Supreme Court, in In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., took
“the occasion to comment upon a recurring theme in recent appraisal
cases—the clash of contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions
on value.”461 The court noted that this process often forced the trial
court to “pick and choose from a limited record without the benefit
of objective analysis and opinion.”462 In such circumstances, the court
stated, “the Court of Chancery should consider, in a proper case,
appointing its own expert witness.”463 The court concluded that the
court of chancery has the inherent authority to appoint a neutral
expert on its own initiative.464
In Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., the chancery court
followed the suggestion of the Delaware Supreme Court and appointed a neutral expert to assist it in sorting through the opposing
experts’ valuation testimony.465 The court had the neutral expert critique the opinions of the parties’ experts, but instructed him not to
provide an independent valuation of the corporation.466 The court
noted that it “used [the neutral expert’s] report to critically evaluate
each expert’s opinion.”467 In addition, after the court concluded that
the corporation’s expert’s valuation most closely represented the
corporation’s value, the court used the neutral expert’s testimony to

compensation exceeded market value for the services rendered, but the court refused to consider this argument. See Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A.8474, 1996
WL 483093, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1996); see also supra notes 261-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the Gonsalves court’s treatment of the excessive compensation issue). The net result is that SAP was valued at a low multiple of current earnings, and that those earnings were
probably understated. It is also worth noting that in 1984, SAP’s own internal projections forecast rising earnings and revenues for the next four years, indicating that 1985 was not expected
to be an aberrational year for earnings. See Gonsalves, 1996 WL 696936, at *2.
461. 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992).
462. Id.
463. Id. The court was careful to note that “[t]here is, of course, no requirement” that a
neutral expert be appointed. See id.
464. See id. Because no statute or rule explicitly permits the appointment by the court of its
own neutral witness, the authority to do so had to be inherent. See id.; see also Gonsalves, 701
A.2d at 362 (noting inherent authority of court of chancery to appoint neutral expert).
465. See No. CIV.A.11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995).
466. See id.
467. Id. at *5.
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help it adjust that valuation to remove some of the “adversarial hyperbole” attached to it.468
The use of a neutral expert can, in proper circumstances, be useful to a court conducting an appraisal proceeding. There are, however, two points of caution. First, the use of an additional expert imposes additional costs to the proceeding and probably increases the
time involved to reach a final result. It also adds a host of procedural
issues associated with the appointment of the expert and how the expert will function in the process.469 The court must be careful to insure that the benefits of appointing a neutral expert justify the added
time and expense and the additional layer of procedure.
The second point of caution involves the potential for excessive
reliance by the court on the neutral expert. The court is charged with
the statutory responsibility of conducting the appraisal,470 and should
not excessively delegate that responsibility to the neutral expert. The
Delaware Supreme Court, in authorizing the appointment of a neutral expert, was careful to point out that the trial court is not required
to accept the findings or opinions of any such expert, and is not limited by such an appointment from exercising its “broad discretion in
fixing fair value.”471 This is especially important in view of the critical
role that equitable conduct plays in the appraisal proceeding.472 The
neutral expert, in all probability, will not have access to the full range
of information that will be available to the court with respect to the
relative equities of the parties’ conduct, or may not fully appreciate

468. See id. at *5, *8. The court frequently noted the position taken by each party’s expert,
together with the neutral expert’s views, as it addressed specific valuation points of contention.
See id. at *8-10.
469. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.: “The expert
should be appointed sufficiently in advance of trial as to permit opportunity for hearings on the
appointment, consent of the expert, notification of duties, research by the expert, and a communication by the expert to the parties informing them of his findings.” 607 A.2d 1213, 1223
(Del. 1992); see also Recent Use of Independent Expert in Merger Appraisal Offers Guidance,
But Area Said to Remain “Twilight Zone,” 10 Corp. Counsel Wkly. (BNA) No. 32, at 8 (Aug.
16, 1995) [hereinafter Twilight Zone] (noting that both sides in Kleinwort were required to
communicate with the neutral expert through the court to prevent ex parte contact).
470. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991); see also Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,
Nos. CIV.A.7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *64 (Feb. 22, 1988) (“The statute directs that the Court ‘shall appraise’ the . . . shares.”), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
471. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d at 1223 n.3.
472. See supra Part II.F.
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such information.473 Accordingly, the court must guard against excessive reliance on the neutral expert.
III. IMPROVING THE APPRAISAL REMEDY
The appraisal remedy continues to serve a liquidity function in
isolated cases, providing a “way out” for shareholders trapped in an
involuntarily altered investment.474 Its greater use, however, is to protect minority shareholders, primarily in the context of cash-out transactions, often initiated by controlling shareholders.475 Because appraisal statutes were not originally drafted with cash-out transactions
in mind, existing statutes do not fully achieve these purposes. In addition, courts applying appraisal statutes often do not do so in a manner fully consistent with these purposes. The appraisal remedy would
better fulfill its current purpose if appraisal statutes were amended to
suit these functions, and if courts applied the statutes in a manner
more consistent with the current purpose of the remedy.
A. Appraisal Statutes
1. Triggering Events. The first area where current appraisal
statutes are inadequate, given the purpose of the remedy, is with
respect to the events that trigger the right to dissent and appraisal.
Acquisitions can take many different forms, including mergers, asset
purchases, share exchanges, and recapitalizations, and each of these
forms can be utilized to cash out a minority shareholder. In order to
adequately protect the interest of the minority shareholder, the
availability of appraisal should not depend on the form that the
transaction takes, particularly when the controlling shareholder is the
party that selects the form of the transaction.
The Delaware statute is the worst offender in this regard. It
provides an appraisal remedy only in the event of a merger or con473. One of the parties may, in fact, prefer it that way. In Kleinwort, the court determined
that the fair value of the corporation was less than the merger price. See supra notes 349-56
and accompanying text. The attorney for the corporation, obviously pleased with the result
achieved by his client, has stated: “[a]n appraisal action isn’t about credibility of witnesses,
good guys and bad guys,” but instead “should be analytical. Find the value.” Twilight Zone,
supra note 469, at 8. It is not surprising that the corporation’s attorney would hold this point of
view, but in a proceeding serving a purpose of minority shareholder protection, credibility of
witnesses, good guys, and bad guys should be important. See supra Part II.F.
474. See Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 28-32.
475. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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solidation.476 Thus, a controlling shareholder can structure an acquisition as a sale of assets, for example, and deprive minority shareholders of an appraisal remedy.477
The Model Business Corporation Act is drafted more inclusively. It provides an appraisal remedy in the event of a merger,
share exchange, or sale of assets, or upon certain amendments to the
articles of incorporation.478 It is not, however, drafted broadly
enough to cover all possible forms of transactions having virtually the
same effect, including the typical de facto merger transaction.479
The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance (ALI Principles) provide a more comprehensive statutory
model that is designed to grant an appraisal remedy regardless of the
form in which a fundamental transaction is cast.480 The ALI Principles provide dissenters’ rights in the event of a “business combination,” any other transaction that has the effect of eliminating a shareholder’s equity interest in the corporation, a sale of assets
transaction, and certain fundamental changes to the articles of incorporation.481 “Business combination” is defined broadly to include

476. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1996).
477. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 182 A.2d 22, 27 (Del. Ch. 1962) (declining to find
a de facto merger where the transaction conformed with the requirements for a sale of assets
under Delaware law), aff’d, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963); cf. Angie Woo, Appraisal Rights in
Mergers of Publicly-Held Delaware Corporations: Something Old, Something New, Something
Borrowed, and Something B.L.U.E., 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 719, 731 (1995) (arguing that Delaware
should expand the events that trigger the appraisal remedy).
478. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (1991).
479. The classic de facto merger transaction involves a corporation that, in form, purchases
the assets of another entity in exchange for a large quantity of its stock, such that, in substance,
the corporation purchasing the assets actually is the acquired party. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 31 (Pa. 1958) (recharacterizing a purchase of assets transaction as a
de facto merger). Interestingly, the official comment to the MBCA states that the problems
concerning de facto mergers “should not occur under the Model Act since the procedural requirements for authorization and consequences of various types of transactions are largely
standardized.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.01 cmt. 2. The comment goes on to note, for example, that the MBCA treats merger transactions like sale of assets transactions. See id. But,
because the MBCA does not provide appraisal rights to shareholders of corporations that purchase assets, see id. § 13.02(a), it provides no appraisal remedy to shareholders of the corporation that has been, in substance, acquired in a de facto merger. Thus, a de facto merger identical to the one in Glen Alden could be accomplished under the MBCA, and would raise
precisely the same de facto merger problem raised in that case.
480. The ALI Principles borrow in part from the California approach. See 2 ALI,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 7.21 cmt. a & reporter’s note 2.
481. See id. § 7.21.
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traditional triggering events such as mergers and consolidations, but
also covers nontraditional events such as de facto mergers.482
The ALI Principles provide the most neutral set of triggering
events in the sense that the form of transaction does not affect the
availability of appraisal rights. Another drafting technique that could
be employed to achieve this goal, using the Model Business Corporation Act as a starting point, would be to include the usual Model Act
list of triggering events,483 and then provide a catch-all provision that
makes available appraisal rights for any other event that has substantive effects similar to the enumerated events.484
2. Statutory Exceptions to the Appraisal Remedy. The second
area where current appraisal statutes fail to comport with the
purposes of the remedy is with respect to statutory exceptions to the
appraisal remedy. The continued existence in many states of a
market exception to the appraisal remedy is the most glaring
problem. The market exception arose in conjunction with the
liquidity rationale for the appraisal remedy.485 There is no longer any
justification for this exclusion, given the minority shareholder
protection rationale for the remedy.486 Minority shareholders of
482. “Business combination” includes an exchange by a corporation of its stock for substantial assets of another corporation, unless the persons who were shareholders of the exchanging
corporation immediately before the transaction own 60% or more of the voting power of the
surviving entity immediately after the transaction, in approximately the same proportions. See
id. § 7.21(a). In other words, dissenters’ rights attach if a corporation buys assets from a corporation, and issues stock in return, and its existing shareholders wind up with less than 60% of
the voting power of the post-transaction entity. Unlike the MBCA, this provision would cover
the Glen Alden situation.
The ALI provision on triggering events is an improvement over existing appraisal statues, although it is not perfect. For example, it refers only to acquiring the assets of another
corporation in exchange for stock, see id., although it is not clear why the provision should apply only if the seller of the assets happens to be a corporation, as opposed to another kind of
entity. This is probably a drafting oversight rather than an intentional limitation. It also is unclear why voting power alone is determinative. If the existing shareholders retain 60% of the
voting power, but only 40% of the other incidents of share ownership, such as dividend and
liquidation rights, should appraisal rights be withdrawn? In addition, whenever an arbitrary
number is chosen, such as 60% in this provision, it is always possible to argue that it should be
higher or lower.
483. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a).
484. This approach might be criticized as creating too much uncertainty, but it is the kind of
uncertainty that provides an ex ante incentive not to attempt to circumvent the appraisal provisions in an abusive manner.
485. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. Similarly, there is no reason for industry-specific exceptions to the availability of the appraisal remedy. See, e.g., Virginia Bank-

WERTH

1998]

07/15/98 11:57 AM

SHAREHOLDERS’ APPRAISAL REMEDY

705

public corporations need protection from unfair cash-out mergers as
much as their counterparts in nonpublic corporations.487
The Delaware experience is instructive. Because Delaware’s
market exception is inapplicable to cash-out mergers,488 much of the
Delaware appraisal case law involves shareholders cashed out of
publicly traded corporations.489 Courts have determined in many of
these cases that the fair value of the shares substantially exceeded the
cash-out merger price.490 In other words, the cash-out merger was
proposed at a price well below fair value, and the minority shareholders needed the protection of the appraisal remedy.
Additionally, numerous cases of egregious behavior by majority
shareholders of public corporations have arisen in the context of fiduciary duty claims, rather than appraisal claims.491 These cases illustrate that minority shareholders of public companies need protection,
both ex post and ex ante, from overreaching transactions proposed by
majority shareholders; the mere existence of a market is not adequate protection.492

shares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1108 n.14 (1991) (noting that no appraisal remedy is
available under Virginia law in the event of bank mergers).
487. Ironically, the presence of a market exception may work against the interests of the
acquiring corporation. The appraisal remedy is, at least in some instances, the exclusive remedy available to shareholders in the event of an acquisition. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 13.02(b). If the appraisal remedy is unavailable due to a market exception, a court might be
more inclined to grant a shareholder alternative relief, perhaps including injunctive relief.
488. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (Supp. 1996).
489. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 4, 25-28.
490. See, e.g., Harris v. Rapid-American Corp., No. CIV.A.6462, 1992 WL 69614, at *1, *3
(Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 1992) (finding that the fair value was $73.29 per share while the cash-out
merger price was $28); In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. CIV.A.8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS
199, at *1, *2 (Dec. 11, 1990) (finding that the fair value was $71.20 per share while the cashout merger price was $58), aff’d, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992).
491. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., Nos. CIV.A. 10229, 11977, 1996 WL 936160, at
*14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1996) (holding that a sale of assets and merger was unfair when, inter
alia, the controlling shareholder had separate consulting and noncompetition agreements with
the buyer), aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997); Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club,
Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1121-22 (Mass. 1986) (holding that a freeze-out merger designed solely
for the benefit of the controlling shareholder was a violation of the controlling shareholder’s
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566, 573
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (enjoining a merger where the minority stockholders alleged
that the controlling shareholders attempted to freeze-out minority stockholders, reduce the
company’s earnings prior to the merger by giving themselves large bonuses, and effect the
merger when the market price was unreasonably low).
492. See 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, ch. 4 introductory note (stating that “availability
of a market exit falls short of being a satisfactory remedy in many instances”).
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There is a reasonable consensus among commentators that the
market exception as it currently exists is contrary to the purposes of
the appraisal remedy.493 Some have proposed retaining the market
exception, but only for non-conflict of interest transactions.494 In
other words, the market exception would apply to bona fide thirdparty transactions, but would be inapplicable to transactions where
an insider had a conflict of interest, including the typical cash-out
merger initiated by a majority shareholder. Although this would be
an improvement over the blanket market exception that currently
exists in a number of jurisdictions, it would be preferable to eliminate
the market exception entirely and deal with true third-party transactions as proposed earlier.495
In order to apply the market exception only to non-conflict
transactions, it would be necessary to craft a statutory definition of
conflict of interest transaction that is broad enough to cover the multitude of potential conflicts. This is a hazardous undertaking, because
it creates a risk that a conflict of interest transaction could slip
through the cracks of the statutory definition.496 Some conflict of interest transactions are easily identified; for example, a going private
cash-out merger initiated by a controlling shareholder. Others are
harder to locate. A merger may appear to be an arm’s-length transaction between unrelated parties, but the directors or managers of
one corporation may receive a payment on the side, or other consideration, in return for their agreement to support the transaction.497
This more subtle side payment scenario is a real concern because it
negates true arm’s-length bargaining.498

493. See supra note 101.
494. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 4, at 113, 124-29; Seligman, supra note 6, at 836, 840-41.
495. See supra notes 319-26 and accompanying text.
496. Professor Siegel, who advocates this approach, has designated general categories of
relationships that would create conflicts of interest, but has not attempted to draft a statutory
definition. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 124. The categories she proposed have some obvious
gaps. For example, she included within the conflict of interest category transactions with officers of the corporation, but did not mention transactions with directors of the corporation. See
id. Similarly, she included transactions in which directors receive financial benefits not available to shareholders, but did not include officers that receive such financial benefits. See id.
497. See Carney, supra note 24, at 101 & n.137; see also Kanda & Levmore, supra note 6, at
467-68 (noting that the self interest of managers may render them ineffective bargaining
agents).
498. Those commentators calling for a continued market exception for non-conflict transactions generally have recognized that side payments to insiders create a conflict that should render the market exception inapplicable. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 124; Seligman, supra note 6,
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From an ex ante perspective, it is preferable to provide an appraisal remedy to public shareholders in all contexts, rather than only
in non-conflict situations. Subtle conflict of interest transactions present difficult problems of proof and interpretation. For example, if
the acquiring corporation promises long-term employment contracts
at enhanced compensation to the officers of the target corporation,
does it do so to serve its business interests by securing a management
team for the future, or does it do so to buy the cooperation of the officers of the target corporation in support of the transaction? This
shade of gray problem justifies ex ante deterrence against overreaching transactions by insiders. Providing an appraisal remedy to all
public shareholders best serves that purpose.499
Another statutory exception to the availability of appraisal rights
that does not make sense is found in the Model Business Corporation
Act with respect to sale of asset transactions. Under the MBCA, the
sale of all or substantially all of the property of a corporation outside
the usual and regular course of business ordinarily triggers the right
to dissent.500 Appraisal is unavailable, however, if the sale of the corporation’s property is for cash and is pursuant to a plan that calls for
the proceeds from the sale to be distributed to the shareholders
within one year.501
The official comment to the MBCA explains this exception by
stating that “[t]hese transactions are unlikely to be unfair to minority
shareholders since majority and minority are being treated in precisely the same way and all shareholders will ultimately receive cash
for their shares.”502 This is true, however, only if the property of the
corporation is sold to an unrelated third party in a transaction without a conflict of interest.503 If the majority shareholder, or an entity
at 838-39; cf. 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 7.22 cmt. c, illus. 2-3 (illustrating that side
payment problems can negate existence of arm’s-length transaction).
499. There is no reason to treat public and private corporations differently in this regard.
In both types of corporations, a transaction triggering the appraisal remedy can involve a conflict of interest, or may be a true third-party sale. Private corporation shareholders receive appraisal remedies in both cases, although the presence of a true third-party sale should influence
the way the court handles the appraisal proceeding. See supra notes 319-26 and accompanying
text. Public corporation shareholders should be treated the same way.
500. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(3) (1991).
501. See id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(B) (West Supp. 1997) (providing an
exemption to applicability of appraisal remedy when triggering transaction involves a cash sale
and a plan to distribute the proceeds within one year).
502. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 cmt. 1(3).
503. The ALI Principles have recognized this point and, in many instances, provide an appraisal remedy if assets are sold to insiders. See 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 7.21(c)(1).
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controlled by the majority shareholder, is the purchaser of the corporation’s property, the transaction presents exactly the same risk as a
cash-out merger proposed by a majority shareholder, and an appraisal remedy should be available.504
For the same reasons, the existing Delaware market exception
for non-cash-out mergers505 should be abolished. Overreaching transactions can be accomplished with non-cash consideration as well as
with cash consideration, and the appraisal remedy should stand as
both ex ante and ex post protection against such transactions.
3. Procedural Requirements. A third area where appraisal
statutes could be improved is with respect to the procedures incident
to the remedy. In many statutes, the procedural requirements
imposed on a dissenting shareholder remain excessively onerous.506
The current MBCA has reduced, but not eliminated, the procedural
burdens placed on the dissenting shareholder.507 Existing statutes
should be scrutinized to insure that procedural burdens are
minimized.508
These statutory procedures serve two primary purposes. First,
they insure that the corporation is informed, at an early stage, about
those shareholders who will seek appraisal. For planning purposes,
those proposing a transaction have a legitimate interest in learning,
prior to the time the transaction is consummated, whether a large
number of shareholders will seek appraisal.509 Second, the procedures
provide a timetable to keep the appraisal process moving along and

504. Sale of asset transactions should be treated no differently than mergers for appraisal
purposes. A sale of asset transaction can involve a conflict of interest or a true third-party sale.
From an ex ante perspective, appraisal rights should attach to all transactions involving the sale
of all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation. If the sale of assets is a true third-party
sale, the appraisal court should respond accordingly. See supra notes 319-26 and accompanying
text.
505. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1996).
506. For example, under Delaware law, the dissenting shareholder receives no payment
until fair value finally is determined. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991); Thompson,
supra note 6, at 41. But see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.25 (requiring the corporation to pay
the dissenting shareholder the amount the corporation estimates to be the fair value of his
shares “as soon as the proposed corporate action is taken, or upon receipt of a payment demand”).
507. See supra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
508. The ALI Principles are useful in this regard. See 2 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, §
7.23.
509. If a large number of shareholders elect appraisal, the corporation might abandon or
restructure the transaction. See EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 83.
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prevent undue delay.510 These purposes, however, can be served
without penalizing shareholders who deviate insignificantly from the
statutory procedures.
At times, strict adherence to the statutory procedures has prevented shareholders from exercising appraisal rights, even where
there has been no prejudice to the corporation.511 One way to solve
this problem would be to adopt a statutory harmless error rule, or
substantial compliance defense. Under such a rule, minor defects in
compliance with the procedural requirements of the statute would
not be fatal to the shareholder’s appraisal remedy as long as the corporation received notice of the shareholder’s intent to dissent before
the transaction was consummated,512 and no substantial prejudice inured to the corporation.
Statutory procedures with respect to fee shifting and interest
payments could also be improved. Appraisal statutes should grant
courts flexibility to shift fees and costs to deter meritless litigation
and unreasonable litigation tactics. The Delaware statute, in particular, is inadequate in this regard.513
Because the dissenting shareholder is entitled to payment as of
the transaction date, and often does not receive full payment until
much later, appraisal litigation often involves a skirmish over the
amount of interest the corporation must pay the shareholder as a result of this delayed payment.514 In many cases, the litigants and courts
have expended considerable energy resolving the interest rate that
should be applied in this context.515 A statutorily defined rate of in-

510. The MBCA procedures also require each party, early on, to take a position as to the
fair value of the corporation. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.25(a), 13.28(a)(1). This joins
the issue at the outset, perhaps encouraging a private agreement as to fair value without resort
to judicial appraisal. See id. ch. 13 introductory cmt.
511. See Pritchard v. Mead, 455 N.W.2d 263, 266-67 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
512. The corporation’s interest in receiving notice of dissent prior to the consummation of
the transaction should depend, however, on receipt by the shareholder of adequate disclosure
in order to decide whether to exercise dissenter’s rights. If the disclosure is inadequate or misleading, a court should have the equitable power to waive the requirement of advance notice of
intent to seek appraisal.
513. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
514. Statutes generally call for a payment of interest to accompany the payment of fair
value, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.30(e), or permit the court to award interest, see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991).
515. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. CIV.A.8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199,
at *96-103 (Dec. 11, 1990), aff’d, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *107-12 (Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d on other grounds,
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terest would simplify matters and eliminate this counterproductive
expenditure of resources.516 The rate chosen must be fair, and able to
respond to market conditions, rather than fixed at a level that becomes outdated. An interest rate tied to the prime rate would be a
workable solution.517
B. Appraisal Case Law
Courts have been slow to recognize the shift in the purpose
served by the appraisal remedy, and have not uniformly applied the
remedy consistent with its current purpose. The changes brought
about by Weinberger518 have brought the appraisal remedy closer to
fulfilling its current purpose, but greater judicial sensitivity to that
purpose when making determinations of fair value would be desirable.
In particular, courts determining fair value should be willing to
look at all relevant appraisal evidence. They should not rely excessively on market prices, and should not permit minority or lack of

684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. CIV.A.7499, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 50, at *57-63 (Nov. 8, 1989).
516. It might be argued that a single statutory interest rate is unfair because different corporations have different costs of capital. Although this argument has some merit, it is questionable whether it justifies the resources devoted to skirmishing over the appropriate interest
rate in individual cases, particularly when the skirmish amounts to another “dueling expert”
scenario.
517. An alternative to prime rate would be a rate tied to a specified maturity of United
States treasury securities.
Another issue that arises with some frequency is whether the interest paid should be
simple or compound. In Delaware, this decision is left to the discretion of the trial court. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (1991); Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 301. In many instances, the
courts have opted to award simple interest. See, e.g., id. at 301; In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.,
607 A.2d at 1221-22. But see Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No. CIV.A.13414, 1998
WL 44993, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998) (holding that an award of compound interest is
appropriate because “in today’s financial markets a prudent investor expects to receive a compound rate of interest on his investment”). The award of simple interest penalizes dissenting
shareholders and does not accord with economic realities. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 4142; David S. Reid, Note, Dissenters’ Rights: An Analysis Exposing the Judicial Myth of Awarding Only Simple Interest, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 515, 515 (1994) (asserting that “fully compensat[ing]
a shareholder for loss of use of money . . . necessarily involves awarding compound interest
through application of future value concepts”). Rather than permitting ad hoc case-by-case
determination, appraisal statutes should call for the payment of compound interest at a prescribed rate.
518. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); see supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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marketability discounts.519 Courts should adjust upward market price
based valuations to eliminate the inherent minority discount embodied in such valuations. Evidence of third-party sales value with respect to the corporation as a whole should be particularly relevant in
the appraisal context.520
Courts should be aware of the context in which the appraisal
proceeding arises and the equitable posture of the parties. When appraisal is employed as a remedy in the context of a conflict of interest
transaction, courts must be particularly alert to the possibility that
the transaction price may not be fair and equitable. On the other
hand, when faced with a true third-party, arm’s-length transaction not
raising any conflict of interest problem, courts should not hesitate to
dispose of the appraisal proceeding summarily.
IV. CONCLUSION
The appraisal remedy, long a fixture of corporate law, has seen
new life since the Weinberger decision. At the same time, the purpose of the remedy has evolved so that its primary function is now to
protect minority shareholders from unfair fundamental transactions
519. See Heglar, supra note 136, at 261; Siegel, supra note 4, at 137-39; Thompson, supra
note 6, at 38-40.
520. An ongoing dispute in corporate finance involves why purchasers of corporations are
consistently willing to pay substantial premiums above market prices. See, e.g., Black, supra
note 33, at 598-99 (stating that while the debate over the existence of premiums centers on
whether or not the premiums reflect real efficiency gains, some combination of efficiency gain
and overpayment may explain the premiums); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously:
The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
891, 893-901 (1988) (reviewing three explanations for acquisition premiums: “(1) acquirers may
be discovering more valuable uses for target assets; (2) share prices may ‘underprice’ these assets; or, finally, (3) acquirers may simply be paying too much”). One possibility is that the purchaser will be able to run the target company more efficiently, or will achieve synergy with its
existing operations, such that there are gains to be achieved by the acquisition. See Kraakman,
supra, at 894. If such gains are indeed achievable, the next issue is how they should be allocated between the purchaser and the selling shareholders.
Third-party sales value permits the market to make this determination. The purchaser
must pay a price sufficiently above the prior market price to convince enough of the selling
shareholders to part with their shares. This effectively allocates some of the anticipated gains
to the selling shareholders. The purchaser will pay this premium price, however, only if it believes that it can still earn an attractive return by engaging in the acquisition, relative to other
investment opportunities available to it. Thus, some of the expected gains inure to the purchaser, or it would not be willing to make the purchase. Properly viewed, this is not really a
matter of allocating to the dissenting shareholder “synergy” or gains anticipated from the
transaction, but merely a recognition that when the corporation is valued as a whole based on
third-party sales value, the parties are, in effect, sharing the difference between the pretransaction market price and the value believed achievable by the purchaser.
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involving conflicts of interest. Existing appraisal law, both statutory
and judicial, has not fully recognized the role that the appraisal remedy now plays in corporate law. Appraisal statutes should be
amended to comport with the remedy’s current purpose. In addition,
for the appraisal remedy effectively to serve its function, both ex ante
and ex post, it is crucial that courts determine fair value in a manner
consistent with the purposes of the remedy.
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